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Two Models of Consensus
Sudarsan Padmanabhan
ABSTRACT

My dissertation titled “Two Models of Consensus” is based on five arguments. 1.
Consensus is asymmetrical. 2. Consensus is partial or limited unanimity. 3. Consensus and
democracy do have a concomitant relation. 4. Consensus is not organic to political systems. 5.
Consensus depends upon civil society, subsidiarity, and the dominant cultural paradigm of
society.

In the first chapter titled “Historical Specificity of the Western Conception of Civil
Society” I argue that concept of civil society evolved under certain conditions in a liberal
democratic tradition such as shared social imaginaries. As an example of how diversity could lead
to hypostatization of cultural differences, I exposit the concept of Indian caste system.

In the second chapter, “Intersubjectivity and the Problem of Cultural Identities,” I
compare the ideas of Hans Georg Gadamer and George Herbert Mead about self- interested
action and mutual cooperative action. Gadamer and Mead emphasize intersubjective
communication, ‘I – Thou’ relationships. I explain the importance of the ‘I – Thou’ relationship
for a consensual activity.

The third chapter, “Consensus in the Realm of Science,” discusses the impact of science
as the context of justification in advanced liberal democracies and its effect on consensus. Charles

iii

Sanders Peirce’s attempt to apply his scientific method to arrive at a consensus in the social
sphere is also discussed in this chapter.

In the fourth chapter, “Kwasi Wiredu – The Akan Conception of Communitarian
Consensus,” I discuss Kwasi Wiredu’s emphasis on achieving a consensus on the basis of ‘what
is’ and not ‘what ought to be,’ in the social realm. Wiredu differentiates between a government by
consent and a government by consensus. I elaborate Wiredu’s analysis of the process of
consensus that was in vogue in the Akan community of Ghana.

In the final chapter, “Political Consensus – Intra-cultural and Extra-cultural,” I argue that
consensus is asymmetrical. It is imperative to compromise in social, political, economic, and
religious beliefs on the basis of weak deontological and weak consequential approaches.
Consensus necessitates a synthesis of different kinds of social actions such as purposiveinstrumental, traditional, value-laden, and communicative action into what I call the Cooperative
Action. Only such an action can speak across cultures and facilitate genuine cross-cultural
interaction.
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Introduction

My dissertation titled “Two Models of Consensus” explores how seemingly
unproblematic process of consensus becomes very complex and vexatious. The term
‘Two Models” represent the general sociological and anthropological distinction between
societies and communities, culture and nature, and open and closed societies that is used
to conceptually differentiate modern Western societies from non-Western traditional
communities.1 Consensus in a pejorative sense means agreement or compromise.
Etymologically, consensus is related to consent, which means to agree.

I was troubled by why an agreement even in simple matters remains elusive. I
realized that the entire process of consensus or agreement is informed by a fore-structure,
fore-understanding, and fore-judgment. Doctrines and dogmas are intertwined in the
process of a discourse aimed at achieving consensus. Hence, there is no plateau of
knowledge from which cultural paradigms could be theorized. What we have is a rough
terrain full of cliffs and valleys. My interest in the problem of consensus began as an
aesthetic question. Habermas claims that a genuine consensus is not possible in the
aesthetic realm because of its emphasis on subjective expressions. Only an evaluation in

1

Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society, Trans. Charles P. Loomis, New York: Harper & Row, 1963.
pp. 5-29. Tönnies characterizes communities (gemeinschaft) organic and society (gesellschaft) mechanical.
Both Tönnies and Max Weber argued that communities inexorably became societies due to social
rationalization. According to Tönnies, science plays an important role in the transformation of a community
into a society.
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the form of aesthetic criticism is possible, according to Habermas. My argument is that
since every cultural paradigm including religion, language, and science is influenced by
the social and political, aesthetics cannot be relegated to the realm of the subjective
because of its perceived absence of objectivity. Aesthetic objects are not ahistorical. It is
understandable that a consensus could be difficult to achieve in the aesthetic realm
because of individual tastes, but even normative and descriptive issues are problematic.
In order to understand the factors that support or vitiate consensual activity, I explore the
structural conditions of a process of consensus. The process of consensus has to be
normative and hermeneutical. Therefore, I surmised that consensus has to be both
diachronous and synchronous.

Consensus on any issue involves socio-political, interpersonal, and cultural
aspects. I choose to examine the process of consensus from three aspects. They are:

1) Civil society (Social conditions)
2) Interpersonal relationship within a society (I – Thou relationship)
3) Contemporary cultural paradigm (Science)

All the three afore-mentioned aspects are interconnected. In my research on the process
of consensus, I found that most social and political theorists have started from a ground
zero and then constructed a theory. In this sense, I call the theories of consensus of Rawls
or Habermas, symmetrical theories of consensus. Their theories search for conditions of
uniformity of opinions and do not deal with divergence of opinions. I decided to analyze

2

consensus not as a total agreement but a tentative agreement of divergent views.
Consensus is about an agreement on how to make things better. The process of consensus
involves both good and bad ramifications. In a consensual process, tactics, strategy,
honesty, threat, and conciliatory gestures are all involved. Hence, it is not only moral but
also strategic. I argue that consensus is asymmetrical. It is not only a discourse on what is
the right path but an agreement to act cooperatively in spite of disagreements. Hence, I
call consensus “co-operative action.” My conclusion is that even a definition of
consensus must be consensual and flexible. I discuss the process of cooperative action in
the fifth chapter.

In this dissertation I also compare and contrast the predominant Western models
of consensus such as Habermas’ ideal speech situation and John Rawls’ hypothesis of the
original position with the political system of the Akan society in Ghana, which
traditionally had a system of government by consensus. The Akan political system
emphasizes consensus in resolving all disputes. Habermas’ concept of an ideal speech
situation contains the following features.2

1. Clarity in the structure of communication
2. Description in formal terms and show of force within the process of
understanding or from outside
3. Only the force of better argument is allowed
4. All motives except the cooperative search for the truth are to be banished.

2

Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, Trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon
Press, 1984. p. 10.

3

John Rawls defines the original position as follows: “It is a state of affairs in which the
parties are equally represented as moral persons and the outcome is not conditioned by
arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social forces. Thus, justice as fairness is
able to use the idea of pure procedural justice from the beginning.”3 Since the aforementioned approaches emphasize ideal conditions that are necessary for a process of
consensus, I call them symmetrical approaches to consensus. I have argued in the course
of my dissertation that a need for consensus in the political or social realm necessarily
indicates unrest or instability of social situations. Hence, a theory of consensus based on a
theory of ideal situations fails to recognize the dynamic nature of the dialogical process
necessary when there is strife between two social groups or paradigms. I have constructed
my arguments on the basis of five assumptions, which are as follows.

1. Consensus is asymmetrical. It has no ideal starting or culminating state.
2. Consensus is partial or limited unanimity.
3. Consensus and democracy are not concomitantly related. For example, some
African societies have a strong participatory political system, which emphasizes
consensus as the only method of resolving disputes. I have discussed the role of
consensus in the communitarian democracy of the Akan society in Ghana.
4. Consensus depends upon civil society, interpersonal relationships, and the
dominant cultural paradigm of a society.
5. Consensus is not necessarily organic to cultures or political systems. It is
deliberative and accommodates cultural differences. Hence, a consensus is
3

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999. p. 104
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possible only as a fusion of horizons, exchange of viewpoints. Consensus is the
recognition of cultural interstices and it is a cultural middle-path.

In the first chapter titled, “Historical Specificity of the Western Conception of
Civil Society and its Problems,” I analyze the development of civil society in liberal
democracies. Civil society is characterized by freedom of association. In this chapter, I
discuss the role of individuals, social and political institutions, and modern social
imaginary discussed by Charles Taylor and how consensus evolves in civil society. What
Taylor calls direct-access society, horizontal relationships, unmediated interaction, and
secular polity are explained in sufficient detail. Taylor mentions Habermas’ idea of the
transformation of the public sphere as an important aspect of the modern social
imaginary. I discuss Habermas’ theory of communicative action, which facilitates mutual
understanding. I also analyze in detail, the development of civil society from ancient
Greek civilization to the modern period. This chapter also contains a brief description of
the Akan society and the caste system in India. I also introduce concepts of solidarity and
subsidiarity in order to explain the complementary relation between the individual and
the social. The notion of subsidiarity is a catholic notion that says, “… nothing should be
done by a larger and more complex organization which can be done as well by a smaller
and simpler organization.”4 The aim of the principle of subsidiarity is to encourage social
relationships and mediating institutions.5 I argue that democracy does not necessarily
encourage consensus while communitarianism is not necessarily authoritarian.

4

David Bosnich, “The Principle of Subsidiarity,” Religion and Liberty, Volume 6, Number 4, Grand
Rapids: Lord Acton Institute, July and August 1996.
5

P. W. Hogg, “Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers in Canada” (1993) 3 National Journal of
Constitutional Law 341. ‘Subsidiarity’ is a jurisdictional principle regarding the distribution of

5

Kwasi Wiredu’s analysis of the Akan system of governance through a process of
consensus is a very good example of how non-Western cultures have institutionalized
cooperative concept of governance. The best example of equilibrium between solidarity
and subsidiarity is the Akan political system. Solidarity is the common identity of a
group. Subsidiarity is the mutual relationship between the individuals in a society. As a
contrast, I have also examined how social stratification has been rationalized in India as a
response to divergent social, linguistic, religious and ethnic population. Indian social
structure displays a lack of subsidiarity. Consensus becomes redundant when there is
social solidarity but not subsidiarity. But even a notion of solidarity is questionable with
respect to India.

In the second chapter titled “Intersubjectivity and the Problem of Cultural
Identities,” I further expand on the importance of the notion of subsidiarity, I analyze two
conceptions of intersubjective relationships. One is Hans Georg Gadamer’s
hermeneutical approach and the other is George Herbert Mead’s social behaviorism. The
former emphasizes the independence of the ‘other’ from the ‘I’ and the latter attempts to
define the ‘other’ in its relation to the ‘I.’ I have argued that the relationship between
individuals in a society is an important factor in political, social, and cultural debates.
competence between federal and sub-federal levels of government. The leading statement of this
principle is Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Official Journal C 340),
which states that "In areas that do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall
take action only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed
action, be better achieved by the Community". Although the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ is not found in
the text of the Constitution Act, 1867, several commentators have been attracted to the principle
because it appears to provide a principled and rational basis for allocating jurisdiction between the
provincial and federal governments. It recognizes both the importance of provincial autonomy and
the functional superiority, in certain circumstances, of federal jurisdiction.

6

The ‘I – Thou’ relationship in a society is an indicator of the balance between solidarity
and subsidiarity. A climate of mutual cooperation is possible only if there is an equitable
‘I – Thou’ relationship between the members of a society. There are several underlying
factors underlying a strong ‘I – Thou’ relationship among the members of a society.
Religion, ethnicity, language, culture, and nationality could influence the ‘I – Thou’
relationship. Both Gadamer and Mead distinguish between interest based interaction and
mutual cooperative action. Gadamer characterizes communication as the fusion of
horizons, a confluence of cultural perspectives. I argue in favor of the need to treat
communicative interaction as the fusion of horizons rather than stimulus-response
activity. Consensual activity becomes more flexible if a conversation of cultural horizons
is encouraged. Gadamer’s emphasis on non-strategic communication encourages
multicultural interaction.6

In the third chapter titled “Consensus in the Realm of Science,” I argue that
essential characteristic of scientific disciplines is the emphasis on the theory-laden nature
of an idea. I will supplement Peirce’s analysis of consensus in science with Stephen
Turner’s distinction between a scientific consensus and consensus among scientists.
Kwame Anthony Appiah asserts that science is the context of justification in
contemporary Western society. With science as the dominant cultural paradigm,
consensus is heavily influenced by scientific practices. What C.S. Peirce defines as the
experimental method or the scientific method demands a shift in paradigm since a
knowledge episode contains tenacity, authority, and a priori methods of belief. Peirce

6

Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 355-361.
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attempts to apply the same methodology applied by the natural sciences to arrive at
epistemic consensus in scientific disciplines to the moral and social realm.

In advanced liberal democracies, the government and the people alike appeal to
scientific evidence in order to establish truth. People generally share a belief in science
and in the veracity of its method. Hence, scientific methodology has become the most
dependable tool even in non-scientific disciplines. Demonstrability of empirical evidence
and the cultivated emphasis on reciprocity and justifiability due to the proliferation of
freedom and equality has complicated the process of education and the fixation of belief.
A doctrinal approach such as the ones adopted by religion or pseudo-scientific disciplines
is inadmissible in the age of science and democracy. Vast variations in individual
standards of understanding, the tension between various dogmatic positions in the civil
society, and the progressive movement of science are always in a state of constant flux.
Hence, consensus is influenced by the dominant cultural paradigm of science.

In the fourth chapter, “Kwasi Wiredu – The Akan Conception of Communitarian
Consensus,” I explain how a pragmatic and operational system of consensual governance
based on personhood and human rights was followed by the Akan society of Ghana. A
government by consent and a government by consensus were fused together by
representative and deliberative mode of governance. I argue that such a system of
governance was possible because of the communitarianism and the shared culture of the
Akan community. Ironically, Habermas’ ideal speech situation could be more plausible in
societies such as the Akans in Ghana, which are communitarian in nature. The Akan
8

community insists on a consensus based on a conception of common good of the
community. A decision is arrived at in the Akan council only if all concerned agree
unanimously to a course of action. Hence, the community of Akans mandates consensus.
Kwasi Wiredu’s emphasis on a non-party democracy and his views on the process of
achieving a consensus in the Akan community are also discussed.

In the fifth chapter titled “Political Consensus – Intra-cultural and ExtraCultural,” I argue that cross-cultural interactions are hampered by a lack of agreement
due to intra-cultural and extra-cultural variations in the social, individual, and cultural
realms. Hence, only a tentative understanding of alien cultures is possible. A consensus
cognizant of differences rather than uniformity is necessary in a multi-polar and multicultural world. A failure to recognize the asymmetrical nature of the global village would
result in cultural conflicts within and without the society. It is here that subsidiarity as the
notion that engages differences at the micro-level rather than the macro-level becomes
invaluable. There is no seamless transition between the social, the individual, and the
institutional. A consensus that emerges from cultural interstices is anti-essentialist and
anti-metaphysical. It also, in some sense, disputes the emancipatory effect of the process
of deliberation within a society. The term ‘cultural interstices’ indicates an opposition to
rigid social and conceptual categorizations. Homi Bhabha defines his philosophy of
culture as a philosophy of cultural interstices. Normal characterizations such as center –
periphery, north – south, society – community, and majority – minority relations are
ineffectual as concrete social categories. Instead of homogeneity and uniformity, a
philosophy of cultural interstices advocates an analysis of cultures in terms of their

9

differences. A consensus in a global and multi-cultural world is plausible only as
informed by a philosophy of cultural interstices.

A philosophy of difference is a philosophy of ever-expanding possibilities. A
concrete example of a consensual approach based on cultural interstices could be
borrowed from a completely different topic. Stephen Turner’s description of a ‘third
way,’ which is the middle-path between market economy and welfare state, is a robust
case of cultural interstices.7 Globalization is creating problems in terms of cross-cultural
interaction in the fields of economics, science, health, political systems, religious beliefs,
and terrorism. Hence, in order to achieve consensus conjoining deontology and
consequentialism is inevitable. I suggest a concept of cooperative action that coordinates
action orientations not on the basis of rationality but on a shared conception of good.
Such a conception of a good can evolve in the process of consensus.

Ultimately, the aim of a consensus is peaceful resolution of problems. In such a
situation, a consensus need not be a rational agreement but a non-violent disagreement
that enables cessation of hostilities. More often than not, consensus is inherently
asymmetric because one side always sacrifices more than other on account of social,
economic, and political inequalities. The need for consensus indicates the existence of
disagreements because of the asymmetric nature of the lifeworld. Irrespective of whether
a consensus is sought to resolve violent or non-violent confrontations, the force of better
argument does not bring about a consensus but only the will to concede ground on the
part of interlocutors. That is the function of consensus as a cooperative action. My
7

Stephen Turner, “The Third Way,” Society, Volume 42, Number 2, January/February 2005.
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conclusion is that Western cultures emphasize legal remedies of disputes and not
consensus. The Akans emphasize consensus and hence attempt to find a solution within
their community. In the caste-based Indian society, religion, morality, lifeworld, art,
culture, law, and economics were fragmented by social stratification. Contemporary
Indian society is constructing new social imaginaries by redefining the relation between
solidarity and subsidiarity in civil society. In a rapidly changing world, a cooperative
action emphasizing the redefinition of both individual and social imaginaries through a
conversation of cultures is inescapable.

11

Chapter 1
Historical Specificity of the Western Conception of Civil Society and its Inherent
Problems
The concept of civil society is an important part of the modern Western sociopolitical tradition. But the idea of civil society has been transformed over the course of
history. In the modern period, the emphasis of civil society was on individual liberty in
the Lockean tradition, while in the Rousseauean tradition the emphasis was on
citizenship. A conception of civil society was antithetical to feudalism and represented
freedom of expression, free economy, and participatory democracy, to name a few. Civil
society belongs to the realm of non-governmental association of people. The history of
civil society begins with Plato and Aristotle in Greece. Later, Romans and Christian
thinkers such as Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Francisco Suarez emphasized different
aspects of civil society. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu were the progenitors
of the contemporary notion of civil society. Alexis de Tocqueville, who traveled in
America in the nineteenth century, identified the concept of voluntary associations as the
most distinguishing aspect of the American civil society.1 According to Howard Wiarda,
civil society signifies civic consciousness which functions as an effective institution of
checks and balances on the government. Wiarda says, “Civil society thus meant the
possibility of participatory citizens living together in a condition of protected property
rights providing for economic prosperity and political freedom guaranteed by regular,
constitutional procedures and the rule of law.”2

1

Howard J. Wiarda, Civil Society – The American Model and the Third World Development, Cambridge:
Westview Press, 2003. pp. 13-19.
2
Ibid., p. 18.
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In this chapter, I have analyzed the following: 1) Solidarity and subsidiarity –
defining features of a civil society; 2) Development of civil society in ancient Greece and
India; 3) Archaic and modern aspects of civil society; and 4) The impact of the modern
social imaginary. I have also given a short introduction to the Akan communitarian
democracy and the Indian caste system. I argue that civil society has ameliorated social,
religious, and political schisms in the West. But, genuine consensus is elusive in the West
on account of the emphasis on law for adjudication of disputes and the irreconcilability of
individual interests with common interests. In contrast, African communitarian traditions
emphasized the role of consensus in order to arrive at decisions in a non-adversarial
manner. I have discussed the Akan communitarian system elaborately in the fourth
chapter.

A civil society has two facets, namely, the individual and the collective. For a
society to function effectively there is a need for both arms of the society, the individual
and the collective, to have a balanced relationship. But a distinction between the
individual and the collective is not one of binary opposition to each other. Rather, a
society achieves equilibrium on account of flexible and mutually enriching nature of the
relationship between its members and the social apparatus that governs their everyday
practices. Everyday practices are encapsulated in the habits, manners, customs, religion,
and other shared practices in a society. But the most important aspect of a society is the
role of the collective in the unfettered and unencumbered development of the individual.
While the individual is not pitted in an antagonistic relationship with the social whole,
factors such as freedom, security, and opportunities for the optimal development of an
all-round personality in an individual depend upon the structure of a society to a large
13

extent.

While equality of opportunities is dependent upon the equality of individuals as
members of a society, all ancient societies did not practice equality of social status with
guaranteed rights and autonomy. Autonomy and rights for all people are recent
developments after the advent of liberal democracy in the West. In any society, factors
such as economy, justice, social rules and regulations, standard of living, facilities such
as housing, sanitation and water, health, occupations, and creative expressions in the form
of art, sculpture, painting, and music were viewed as demonstrative of the advancement
and progress of the society under consideration.

In both ancient as well as modern societies, artistic expressions and even religion
and philosophy were considered to be the bastion of the literati and the cognoscenti. By
dispossessing the masses of their access to intellectual achievements the higher echelons
of the society could reign over the masses with untrammeled freedom. When a society is
sapped of its creative energy and aspirations, it ceases to prosper and becomes vegetative.
In most of the troubled areas in the world, the main reason for social unrest is not the lack
of existence of a civil society, but the destruction of the social structure by religious
extremism, political turmoil, ethnic violence or foreign intervention. This is demonstrable
with an analysis of the nature of violence perpetrated on the populace in developed and
developing countries. In the developed countries, the nature of violence and crimes are
more often than not individual. In a developing country, the nature of violence is mostly
of the character of group versus group, caste, religious, and ethnic. In some ways, the
notion of community or collective is stronger than the individual.
14

The tension between the individual (I) and the collective (Thou) is present in all
societies. In democracies, avenues for ventilating the tension between the individual and
the collective are available in the form of political and social institutions. In advanced
liberal societies, existence of a common justice system serves as an effective avenue for
ventilating the tension between the individual and the collective. In a closely-knit
community, there are institutions that adjudicate disputes. But, legal institutions in
ancient Islamic civilizations, China, or India were different from the modern day
institutions in the liberal Western countries and hence comparisons between the Western
and traditional cultures are not tenable. Even if comparisons are inevitable, thinkers such
as Habermas claim that a dialogical process of argumentation is peculiar to the Western
hemisphere because of the emphasis on rationality from the modern epoch. Habermas
argues that traditional cultures are monological and a dialogical rational argumentation is
possible only in socially rationalized Western countries. Hence, according to Habermas, a
rationally motivated consensus in a debate is possible only in the modern societies that
have democratic institutions, freedom of speech, communicative rationality, and secular
ideals.3 In contrast to the Habermasian position of symmetrical nature of consensus, it
can be shown how traditional cultures had a methodology of achieving consensus even in
asymmetric situations. An example of symmetrical nature of consensus is Habermas’
“ideal speech situation”. According to Habermas,4
This concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotations based
ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus –
bringing force of the argumentative speech, in which different participants
overcome their merely subjective views and owing to the mutuality of rationally
3

Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, Trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon
Press, pp. 46, 284.
4
Ibid., p. 10.
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motivated conviction, assure themselves of both unity of the objective world and
the intersubjectivity in their lifeworld.

In Ghana, the Akan society debated all decisions and arrived at a consensus not by
the force of majority but by hearing arguments from all sides. Only when all participants
were convinced of the veracity of the consensus, the debate ended. Hence, even
traditional societies had a very amicable system of conflict resolution.5 The aim of the
Ghanaian political system is not only a consensual decision making but also encourage
the participation of people in the deliberative process, which is the strength of the modern
day democracies. But, Ghana was forcibly turned into a Western style democracy, after
its independence from Britain, and its traditional social structure was neglected, which
resulted in a crippling economic, social, and political situation. On the other hand, the
process of consensus arrived in the Akan society is based on a strong cultural bond
existing within a group sharing a common framework of understanding.

Charles Taylor argues that the modern social imaginaries that characterize
Western democracies and the social imaginaries that characterize other cultures are
different, which brings forth the issue of cultural particulars and universals. Cornelius
Castoriadis formulated the concept of social imaginaries. According to Castoriadis, “Each
society is a construction, a constitution, a creation of a world, of its own world.”6 George
Elliott writes that the concept of social imaginary has a Freudian ring in Castoriadis. A
5

Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
Cornelius Castoriadis, “The Imaginary: Creation in the Social-Historical Domain,” in World In
Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and theImagination, Trans. David Ames Curtis.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997, pp. 3–18. Cited from Anthony Elliott, “The Social Imaginary: A
Critical Assessment of Castoriadis’ Psychonanalytic Social Theory,” American Imago 59.2, Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2002. pp. 141-170.
6
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social imaginary is the world of creation effected by a subject for itself.7 Hence, it is
imperative to distinguish cultural universals and cultural particulars. In short, Kwasi
Wiredu emphasizes the difference between custom and morality. Customs are particular
to a culture whereas morality has universal connotations.

Solidarity and Subsidiarity – Defining Features of a Civil Society
George McLean defines two most important aspects of social interaction between the
society as a whole and its individual members. They are: solidarity and subsidiarity.
Solidarity is defined as the communication or interaction between social groupings and
communities in a society. Subsidiarity is defined as the participation of the groups and
communities in the social activities. The notion of subsidiarity is a catholic notion that
says, “… nothing should be done by a larger and more complex organization which can
be done as well by a smaller and simpler organization.”8 The aim of the principle of
subsidiarity is to encourage social relationships and mediating institutions.9 The solidarity
could be construed as a feeling of togetherness or a sense of belonging together found in
a society. Subsidiarity is the operational element that tests the solidarity of a society as it
7
8
9

Ibid., p. 143.
David Bosnich, “The Principle of Subsidiarity,” Religion and Liberty, Volume 6, Number 4, Grand
Rapids: Lord Acton Institute, July and August 1996.
P. W. Hogg, “Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers in Canada” (1993) 3 National Journal of
Constitutional Law 341. ‘Subsidiarity’ is a jurisdictional principle regarding the distribution of
competence between federal and sub-federal levels of government. The leading statement of this
principle is Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Official Journal C 340),
which states that "In areas that do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall
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involves the participation of the people living in that society.10 For example, in ancient
Indian social organization, social groupings were mobile and hence formation of
identities, namely, ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic was not static. Also, migration
in large numbers from one place to another happened when the situation became hostile
for a group of population. For a society to have a concrete framework of administration
and government, it must become sedentary and urban.11

When a society settles down, efforts are made to streamline its infrastructure such
as roads, buildings, lakes, health, agriculture, education, government and trade that would
benefit the whole population. In this regard, a society is a voluntary association of its
members to improve their standard and culture of living. Even nomadic communities had
rules and regulations concerning the conduct of the group in marriages, sharing wealth,
family, occupation, social habits and other customs. For example, early Vedic
communities of India had a standardized system of procedures and rules required for a
common law.12 Even anterior to the Vedic Aryans, urbanization was at its zenith during
the Indus Valley civilization.13 Indus Valley civilization appears to have been effectively
administered.

Unlike modern social imaginaries that emphasized absolutely secularized ethics of
argumentation which itself had a very strong influence of religious tradition,
10
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contemporary societies need a discursive framework that incorporates hermeneutical
understanding of different cultures and traditions. In Western democracies, political
relation between subsidiarity and solidarity defines the social imaginary. In most liberal
societies, subsidiarity and solidarity are interconnected.14 Even in traditional societies, the
city-dwellers had a better understanding of the notion of subsidiarity when compared to
their rural brethren. Problems arising out of rapid urbanization even in less populated and
abundantly rich countries such as the United States could be catastrophic to the social,
political, and economic aspects that are integral to the maintenance of social equilibrium.
As Taylor observes, in rural societies, groups coordinated their activities with each other
in the spirit of mutual cooperation while social status was not always based on mutually
equal relationships.15 One of the most salient features in the social imaginaries envisioned
by the modernity is the secularized transcendental principle of the equality of human
beings.

Development of Civil Society in Ancient Greece and India
The origins of civil society in the West can be traced to ancient Greek polis. Plato
envisioned a corporate system of governance that culminated in the Utopian ideal of a
Republic, in which the philosopher-king was at the helm of Athens. Plato’s pyramidal
structure of social stratification was based on a classification of physical, mental, and
spiritual capabilities of the people of Athens. The philosopher-king was the most
meritorious candidate who has been trained in several disciplines and who had outshone
all others. Such a system actively encourages social stratification in which the lower
14
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classes such as artisans only had a theoretical chance to graduate to the next rung of the
social ladder.16 The chances of an artisan or a handicraftsman ascending the throne of
Athens as a philosopher-king are remote in Plato’s Republic. Thus, Plato’s Republic is
elitist. While Aristotle’s polis did not defy the prevalent social stratification in Greece, it
suggested a more ecumenical form of governance that included a broad spectrum of
population called community. Even in Aristotle’s conception of polis, women, and slaves
were not liberated. Ironically, Plato had an elaborate training regimen for women since he
envisioned a functional role for women in the society. Plato’s characterization of women
appears to be strong, independent and dynamic because their role is oriented towards the
welfare of the Republic.

Plato claims that men are physically stronger than women. Romantic relationship
between men and women is discouraged in Plato’s Republic. Even procreation is for the
purpose of strengthening the Republic. The relationship between men and women is
devoid of traditional male-domination because even conjugal relationship is for a higher
cause. Hence, women have more equitable status under the auspices of the Republic. But
a philosopher-king could rarely be a woman because Plato did not consider men and
women equal in terms of natural abilities thereby adhering to the social hierarchy. While
Plato’s Republic is designed to eliminate factors that contribute to disorder in the state by
a system of governance that respects knowledge, Aristotle’s politics is regulated by the
ethics of the polis. A polis is administered as per the wishes of its citizens. Aristotle did
not consider women and slaves part of the citizenry. But the role of an individual citizen
16
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is very clearly delineated by Aristotle in his ethics. According to Aristotle, positive
qualities such as responsibility, friendship, non-acquisitiveness and duty if nurtured in its
citizens would strengthen the polis. A strong and cordial intersubjective relationship
amongst the citizens of a polis cements its stability. But, it is very clear that the welfare
of the citizens is always subservient to the stability of the polis. Thus, eudaimonia, as the
concept of good life, is always in the context of the polis towards which its citizens have
a duty.17

While the city-states of Greece were strong cultural entities, India was the land of
immigrants. Pastoral and agrarian cultures were in constant tension, which necessitated
continuous redefinition of cultural identities. After the demise of the Indus Valley culture,
the Aryans who were pastoral inhabited the Indian subcontinent. Re-urbanization of
Northwestern India was at its pinnacle after the period of the Upanishads.18 Urbanization
is the result of the development of subsidiarity, the spirit of participation of the members
of a society. A city administration requires the participation of its people in an orderly
fashion in its political and development. There was a paradigm shift in the social
organization of the post-Upanishadic India, which was already beginning to move away
from a society of hunter-gatherers and pastoralists towards a full-fledged agrarian
population. After several stages of social development, urbanization was achieved.

While ideas of individual enterprise, moral values, a good life, a happy family,
17
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work ethic, and religious activities were all part of the Indian social fabric, the role of the
collective was dominant and the individual had freedom within limits as prescribed by
the collective. Indian society was stratified into four classes from the time of the Rig
Veda. The famous Puruṣasukta (the hymn to the Puruṣa) clearly delineates the class
distinctions that existed during the Vedic times.19 Social distinctions were common to
almost all contemporary ancient civilizations such as the Egyptian civilization and
Mesopotamian civilization. In the Western hemisphere, the Greeks and the Romans also
had social stratification in the form of class structure. But the factor that distinguishes
other civilizations from the Indian civilization is the entrance of the caste system into the
class structure. With the advent of the caste system, the application of concepts such as
solidarity and subsidiarity assumes an entirely different connotation. In India, solidarity
and subsidiarity were based on the imperceptible law of karma, which explains social
status on the basis of past deeds. A concrete social imaginary is a more recent
phenomenon in India. Religion had a minimal bonding effect while the caste-system
effectively divided the Indian society into windowless pockets of social space.

While society can be theoretically mapped as a whole and its parts, in practice, a
society cannot exist as a collective without its parts, the individual members or vice
versa. The subtle distinction between the society as a whole and its members lies in the
perspective of the members as individuals and their function as a part of the collective.
When a society fails to produce conditions conducive to a good life, then such a society
will witness dissensions and schism between its individual members and the collective
19
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community that oversees the everyday functions of the society. When mutual cooperation
between members of the society and the general social order breaks down, the society is
thrown into turmoil. The absence of a cultural social imaginary in the form of a nationstate, religion, language, or culture in India and the daunting task of governing a diverse
culture resulted in the hypostatization of cultural differences.

In India, in order to preserve the social order, solidarity was emphasized to the
detriment of subsidiarity. Even though novel attempts, as those found in The Bhagawad
Gita, to instill a sense of purpose and belonging to those who were disempowered in the
form of non-attached action (niśkāma karma), order (dharma), action (karma), devotion
(bhakti) and knowledge (jñāna) were philosophically appealing, these concepts could not
be put into practice due to asymmetric social relationships.20 Even religions such as
Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, and Islam tried in their own ways to redress caste
stratification in India. But, all Indian religions could only suggest a spiritual escape to the
social problems. The Gita proposed an indirect way of reconciling social stratification
and individual freedom by the concept of non-attached action that could lead any person
belonging to any caste to achieve liberation.

In almost all societies that were either contemporaneous or anterior to the Greek
society, social stratification was based on perceived natural qualities. African societies
did not practice social stratification. Plato stipulates four virtues required of the citizens
of the republic. They are: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. The aforementioned qualities are imperative for being the citizens of a successful state. Plato also
20
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describes three qualities that In India, social stratification was justified on the basis of
gunas (qualities). Three qualities equivalent to appetite, courage (spirit) and reason
(wisdom), respectively, tamas, rajas, and sattva combine in different ratios to constitute
the human species.21 Interestingly, the concept of gunas, which sought to adduce natural
justification for the class distinctions in India, was developed over a course of several
centuries. From a classless society, gradually the Indian society was divided into four
classes, namely, the brahman (priest), kshatriya (warrior), vaisya (business), and śudra
(labor).22 From a society of hunter-gatherers and clans, the institution of kingship evolved
with increasing urbanization.23 Weber’s account of cities as centers of political
administration could be applied to the development of the cities in the Indian context as
well. The development of a class-system aided administration and the specialization of
occupations led to the institutionalization of kingship. Thus, from a diffuse and
consensual decision-making social structure in the form of clans, Indian civil society
came under the control of kingship and its supporting institutions.

Simultaneously, a hitherto non-class society also began to stratify itself on the
basis of endogamous and exogamous rules of kinship, social status based on vocation,
access to religious rituals, and political clout. But in the context of India, what Socrates
euphemistically called a noble lie, the gunas or qualities, was ennobled in the scriptures
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and became rigidified.24 The gunas became constitutive in determining behavioral and
hereditary qualities of the individuals but only in the context of a society classified on the
basis of vocational status. Because of relentless migrations and intra-social stratification,
class distinctions were gradually replaced by more minute caste distinctions. The caste
distinctions were based on birth and hence any chance of upward mobility in the social
hierarchy was impossible. Interestingly, religious ideologues realized the problems
inherent in reconciling the concepts of svadharma (individual duty), kuladharma (family
duty) on the one hand, and apadharma (duty under extraordinary circumstances)
sādhāran dharma (everyday duty).

The tension between the individual and the social duty is one of the main aspects
discussed in The Bhagawad Gīta. The term dharma contains the social aspect, which is
in turn linked to the cosmic order (rta). Thus, the concept of dharma is akin to a
conception of duty of the citizens of a polis. According to the concept of dharma,
individual duty is always attuned to family and social obligations. Interestingly, in a
class-based society, different modes of dharma were based on various occupations
whereas in the caste-based society one’s birth determines one’s individual, family, and
social dharma. The ineluctable causal relationship divined by the votaries of the caste
system absolutely arrested upward mobility in the caste hierarchy by connecting birth,
social status, and past deeds. It was only by fulfilling duties pertaining to one’s caste that
24
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a person could graduate to the next caste in the hierarchy which could ensure rebirth in
higher classes for attaining liberation from the birth-death cycle.

One could argue that while the higher classes were living and enjoying the
present, the lower classes were wallowing in the fruits of their past while yearning for a
better future all the while ruing the present. Throughout human history the higher classes
have subjugated the lower classes by denying and depriving their hope for a better future.
Very seldom has there been an uprising in the history of mankind that has been unaided
by disgruntled elite classes even in revolutions inspired by popular movements. As
Charles Taylor observes, people seem to be paralyzed with fear without a leader.25

One of the reasons why the Indian society did not witness revolutions in the scale
of the French or the American Revolution is the lack of one identifiable singular cultural
objective and mind-boggling diversity of cultures. The political, economic, and religious
power in the Indian society was distributed among the three forward classes, namely, the
priestly, warrior and mercantile classes. Apart from the fourth class, the śudras, there was
a fifth class (panchama) or pariah (drummer). Furthermore, because of the in-group/outgroup, ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural differences, the interstices of the society
were filled with intra-caste distinctions. No attempts were made to unify the society
based on a common goal. Instead, individual, family, and social goals were meshed with
the caste and class obligations, which prevented any mobilization of the masses. Even the
25
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elites who authored the codes of conduct, interpreted scriptures, and taught statecraft to
the rulers could only provide the masses with a vague and abstract concept of liberation
(moksha) that is actually expressed vividly by the Buddhist conception of nirvāṇa, which
is the total destruction of the birth and death cycle.

In the absence of a unitary social imaginary, Indian society was not able to either
produce huge empires such as the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East or the Greek, the
Roman, the British or the French Empires in the West. The same reason could be
attributed to the lack of concerted and unified effort to fight the British when they ruled
India for almost two hundred years. The vertically stratified Indian civil society helped
the British unseat the top layer of the society and conquer India without much bloodshed.
The lower classes, which were alienated from the higher classes, did not feel any
structural difference in political governance or moral compunction when power changed
hands from the Indian kings to the British Viceroys because the social structure was left
unmolested. In somewhat similar manner, present day democracies fail to inspire the
populace even during elections unless some revolutionary events such as war,
assassination, terrorism or economic depression happen.

In the Indian society, myriad distinctions among the castes made it difficult for
the people to fight for their rights as well as social change. The rumblings due to
discontent were usually passed on to the vertical and horizontal social structures that are
immediately above or below one’s caste. For example, a group of people belonging to a
lower caste if they feel disempowered and disgruntled usually fights with the immediate
27

sub-caste above or below themselves. Ironically, each caste has its own chosen nemesis
and seldom do members of different castes join together in a clash between two castes.

The Modern Aspects of Civil Society
The concept of civil society is considered to be one of the finest achievements of Western
social and political theory in terms of social organization. Civil society is considered to
be the consummation of a politics of discussion that empowers democratic system of
governance. The history of civil society has traversed a long and torturous path
culminating in advanced liberal democracy in which the State and the society are
separated. The Western conception of civil society is situated on certain cultural,
religious, economic, and political contexts. Civil society has acquired the connotation of
a religious dogma as the panacea for all the ills of the world. Principles such as
democracy, freedom, rights, law, and free market are considered to be irrevocable for a
harmonious existence. Civil society, which is a cardinal feature of democracy,
emphasizes freedom from authoritarian institutions such as religion.

One of the cornerstones of religious dogmatism was the community of believers
and the Enlightenment attacked the very conception of a religious community by
encouraging individuation. Civil society is ineluctably intertwined with democracy and
market economy in which freedoms of action, speech and expression are guaranteed.
While democracy facilitates individual freedom and social cooperation, civil society is
the non-political manifestation of democracy. But, many vexatious issues such as
religious tensions, ethnic strife, abject poverty, majority-minority differences and ethical
28

questions that characterize the public sphere are not considered to be a part of the
political-legal spectrum, by thinkers such as John Rawls.

John Rawls' in his “Justice as Fairness – Political not Metaphysical” defines
issues such as justice, equality, and liberty as conceptions that could be approached
procedurally. But Rawls expressly affirms that his notion of justice as fairness must be
considered only in the context of liberal democracy.26 This salient claim of Rawls has
been neglected by most advocates of civil society who have treated the conditions
required for a liberal democratic society as the end-result of a democracy.27 Democracy
requires stable economy, representative government, peaceful society, and a justice
system that adjudicates disputes. Scholars such as Rawls and Habermas have attempted
to rationalize democracy by adducing ideal conditions such as the original position and a
veil of ignorance in the case of Rawls and ideal speech situation in the case of Habermas.
In many ways, social and political theories of Habermas and Rawls are democratizations
of the Kantian categorical imperative. The categorical imperative has two aspects. The
first aspect emphasizes the duty of a moral agent to act not out of self-interest but
common interest. In many ways, it is a restatement of the Golden Rule, which exhorts
people to act towards others in a way they themselves would like others to act towards
them.28 The second aspect of Kant’s categorical imperative emphasizes the autonomy and
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human value of individuals. Kant asserts that every human being must be treated as an
end and not as a means. In a democracy, the Kantian concept of duty has to be rational,
redeemable, justifiable, and discursive. The Kantian conception of categorical imperative
facilitates a conception of procedural democracy. But a procedural democracy could be
deliberative. The categorical imperative is the summum bonum of practical reason, for
Kant.

When questions are raised about the justification of the categorical imperative,
questions of happiness and good life arise. But, for Kant, categorical imperative is far
removed from the expectations of happiness. The categorical imperative is universal and
hence beyond the confines of individual happiness. Only a rational and moral person can
act according to the principles of Kant’s categorical imperative. Kant’s moral philosophy
has tremendously influenced the modern social imaginary.

Civil society and democracy are procedural categories that cannot be uprooted
from their contexts and transported to other cultures. All cultures have the potential to
cultivate democracy but the fertile conditions have to emanate organically in order to
sustain it. Even if governments in countries such as the United States and Britain sow the
seeds of democracy accompanied by a civil society in an attempt to rationalize nondemocratic regimes all over the world, the connection between democracy, freedom,
prosperity, and justice cannot be replicated without a precipitous process of forcible
democratization of the lifeworld of those cultures. Hegel's brilliant expression “the owl of
way that we treat Humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in
itself. Johnson, Robert, "Kant's Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/kantmoral/>.
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Minerva flies at the dusk” explains the progression of reason towards the Absolute Idea
and the process of sublation.29 The problem facing Western cultures is that of simulating
the flight of the Owl of Minerva on those cultures in which the dusk has not been reached
yet or long forgotten.

Habermas’ Communicative Reason and its Problems
Habermas' emphasis on communicative reason necessarily assumes linguistic and
communicative competencies on the part of the interlocutors who debate in a speakerhearer situation. For Habermas, social rationalization cannot be reduced to purposiveinstrumental activity. Hence, communicative reason presides over a normatively
regulated discourse, which invokes the illocutionary force of an argument in an
atmosphere of free and un-coerced interaction. This is in essence the ideal speech
situation.30 The underlying assumptions of a theory of communicative action suggest a
specialized discourse that, even though conducted in an everyday language, is not
accessible to common people. Moreover, by overzealously guarding communicative
discourse against all forms of defects, Habermas limits its scope. Habermas considers the
open society (modern Western rational society) as dialogical in nature and the closed
(archaic societies) as monological. Habermas argues that an archaic understanding of the
lifeworld was seamless and undifferentiated while the modern understanding is objective
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and critical.31 In Heidegger's terminology, a distantiation between the subject and the
environment is not found in the archaic understanding.

Robin Horton argues that archaic or traditional societies do not have a distinction
similar to the public – private sphere distinction, between a person, a group, and an
environment. Horton calls a lack of critical-rational framework as the absence of innertheoretic critique. According to Habermas, archaic societies do not possess criticalrational understanding. But the modern worldview is constructed upon critical rational
distinction and universalizing validity claims which are in turn discursively justifiable.
While Habermasian communicative theoretic bolsters the Enlightenment rationality it
humanizes the purposive-rational component by positing a communicative rationality.
The emancipatory intent that Habermas assumes is, however, as irrational as the archaic
understanding that he examines. A deliberative democracy is an abstraction from the
existing democratic societies. Democracy did not evolve out of a disinterested search for
a true form of government. Hobbes emphasizes the presence of self-interest in the
formation of a state and Locke's political philosophy emphasizes the value of individual
rights and property. Furthermore, Locke even justifies the exploitation of foreign lands if
they lay unutilized. Thus, the emancipatory intent envisioned by Habermas does not stand
scrutiny in a democracy.32

Ancient Greek society with its polis had a conception of a utopia or eudaimonia
but such a conception is not possible in a liberal democracy. Democracy is a result of
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social rationalization, not in terms of emancipation, but economic and political freedom.
Economic and political freedom for the individuals is antithetical to a conception of
emancipation akin to religious concepts of liberation. There is no salvation but only
progress and betterment. Habermasian attempts at social rationalization leads us to some
unpalatable conclusions. Habermas' process of argumentation is applicable only in a
highly specialized discursive environment and his communicative discourse is
symmetric. But Habermas does not adequately address issues pertaining to an asymmetric
discourse in which participants belong to all sections of the society.

The process of disengagement with other cultures because of the difference in the
conceptual apparatus has real life consequences. The most catastrophic examples in
recent history are the World Trade Center and Pentagon terror acts and the Iraq War. The
failure to understand, hermeneutically, cultural conflicts and their potential social and
political manifestations have resulted in the clash of cultures.33 Ironically, Western
societies are considered to be civilized and non-Western world less socially rationalized.
Such a conclusion is inescapable not only because of the historicity of understanding but
also due to an attitude of possessive individualism cultivated in advanced capitalistic
societies.34 By making the enemy the other or vice versa, once again the West is mired in
the religious binary-oppositional framework of good and evil.

For a good life, which Habermas aims to facilitate in his Communication and
Evolution of Society (1979), linguistic and communicative competencies serve only at
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the level of meta-theoretical and meta-practical discourse. Communicative action is
required to formalize and universalize opinions. But, an interpretation of social, political,
and scientific discourse does not stop at the level of communicatively competent actors
but filters down to actors at different levels of linguistic and communicative
competencies. Hence, there is a need for addressing social and political issues at different
levels simultaneously. A communicative action, at once, needs to appeal to actors with
strategic (oriented to success), norm-forming, and dramaturgical (expressive) intentions.
In this sense, I argue that there is a need for a broader conception of social action than
communicative action that coordinates strategic, norm-forming, and dramaturgical
actions. Hence, I would call such an action, a co-operative action. A co-operative action
does not aim at outright conversion of viewpoints but accommodation, rational
persuasion, and non-violent problem solving.35

Charles Taylor’s analysis of the modern social imaginaries of the Western
hemisphere deals with societies that have less religious strife and less rigid social
stratification than countries such as India or Nigeria which are culturally diverse. Taylor
also forewarns that any attempt to replicate the Western experience in a non-organic
manner elsewhere could produce catastrophic results. While Taylor accepts the existence
of several social imaginaries even within the Western hemisphere, differences between
them could be termed as variations in cultural particulars rather than universals.
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Impact of the Modern Social Imaginary
There is a need for de-centered understanding of civil society in terms of procedures that
supply the contours of what Taylor calls modern social imaginaries. Modern social
imaginaries are those imagined structures of social beliefs that determine the social
practices particular to a society. The concept of social imaginaries is also reflexive in the
sense that people belonging to a particular social grouping understand themselves and
their goals from what they perceive as their social milieu.36 People belonging to a cultural
and social milieu have an idea what their society stands for. It is this centered
understanding of one's position in a society, what is valued in the society and what the
society stands for, which determines the civil society. Contemporary Western discourse
on civil society seems to conveniently neglect the ontological remnants that underlie an
ontic understanding in the emphasis on human rights, individual liberties, and equality.

Liberal democracy that facilitated the emergence of free market and individual
freedom is hailed as the panacea for all ills of the world. Due to the dissociation of the
individual and the society, in the modern social imaginary the state became more
responsive to individual interests. This is a reversal of the traditional Platonic and
Aristotelian conception of the individual as the citizen of the polis. Plato and Aristotle
emphasize the unity of the polis as most important function of justice. The social
imaginary of that particular epoch is fractured along the lines of social classes. In
contemporary liberal democracy, the social imaginary has less solidarity and more
36
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3rd 1998. Fotopoulos cites Castoriadis’ The World in Fragments, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
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subsidiarity.37 The social imaginary also varies according to the contexts and hence it is
not stagnant. In a discourse, the social imaginaries of interlocutors are constantly shifting.
Another important aspect of the liberal democratic discourse is regarding the question
whether it only applies to the population belonging to the society with which the
government has a compact or are the rules applicable to the interaction between the
countries with different forms of governments.38 Taylor’s notion of a ‘social imaginary’
is contextual and limited to a society or a lifeworld to which one belongs.39 The choice of
the term ‘imaginary’ underscores the point that it is the perception of the people of a
society about the objectives and practices of their own society. The social imaginary of a
society is a mosaic of perceptions. The social imaginary has several parts but reconciled
in a whole. The social imaginary also affects the ‘I – Thou’ relationships, mutual respect
and equality that Charles Taylor mentions as the main aspect of the modern Western
social imaginary.
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George F. McLean George F. McLean, Ed. Civil Society and Social Reconstruction, Cultural Heritage
and Contemporary Change Series I, Volume 16, Washingto D.C: Council for Research in Values &
Philosophy, 2001. p.15.
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In a real life situation, the dilemma of the United States government how to treat the Prisoners of War,
especially with respect to the terror suspects detained in Guantanomo Bay and Afghanistan and other
United States Military bases all over the world as enemy combatants with no legal status under the
constitution of the United States or under Geneva Convention proves the inadequacy of the laws of a
liberal democracy which has not foreseen the asymmetric nature of the conflict. The notions of equality,
mutual respect, individual rights or innocent until proven guilty which are considered to be the
paradigmatic virtues of a liberal democracy fail to impress Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas and other
terror organizations. Furthermore, the hypocrisy of liberal democracy came to the fore when the abuse
of the prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq filtered out, the whole of the United States recoiled in
moral indignation. All the while, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was held incommunicado in some
undisclosed location by the United States military which was extracting information about the Al Qaeda
and other terror plots. Taylor’s social imaginary must include positive, negative and wrong perceptions
of the social characteristics by the people of the society which in turn leads to events such as the
September 11, 2001. But Taylor agrees that the social imaginary is not stationary and illusory but
always tested against ground reality.
39
Charles Taylor warns about the danger of reducing the social imaginaries to unitary perceptions. He cites
the example of France and the United States which became democracies by taking different paths.
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Charles Taylor identifies economy, public sphere, and democracy as the three
most distinguishing features of modernity that govern the self-understanding of the
people. The pre-modern conception of politics contains a strong religious dimension
imbedded in the perception of the world as totally ordered by a God who was a
benevolent supernal artisan, micro-managing the events happening in the world. The
institution of monarchy was a replication of such a God controlled the conception of
nature, which is an ancient idea. But in modernity, the upward despondent gaze towards
the whims of a celestial being was abandoned and terrestrial prospects were eagerly
explored.

In an interesting transformation, what Weber characterized as the ethics of the
puritans, encouraged people to toil and succeed in this world rather than worrying about
what was in store for them in the nether world.40 Such an insouciant attitude towards the
designs of God was largely due to the development of science. The laws of nature that
governed the world prompted people to doubt the unseen cause. Adam Smith recognized
such a need when he claimed that economic prosperity was indispensable and social
order would be better served if they were causally related to observable phenomena
rather than intangible qualities such as virtues and wisdom.41 Another important
attitudinal change palpable in modernity is the recognition of mutual cooperation. Kant’s
categorical imperative identifies the inescapability of the need for mutual cooperation
among human beings. But most of the political thinkers of the eighteenth and subsequent
40

Max Weber, Protestant Ethic, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Trans. Talcott Parsons,
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1958. p. 181.
41
Taylor, pp. 69-73. Taylor cites Louis XIV who claims that the show of respect for the monarch is in
return for the offer of protection and justice to the people. According to Montchretien, a good ruler has
to be a guiding force to the economy of a state by enacting good policies.
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centuries have been content with the prudential imperative of Kant.42

Weber’s and Tönnies’ diagnosis of the inexorable triumph of purposive rationality
also anticipates mutual cooperation based on mutual benefit. Weber attributes the
development of political associations and cities in Western Europe in the Middle Ages to
the realization of the potential of mutual cooperation to economics. Economics and
politics are inextricably related. Taylor argues that in modernity, political institutions
adapted to the changing scenario of crumbling social hierarchy and growing democracy
by facilitating mutual cooperation. Interestingly, the reflexivity of the civil society in
Europe and America was not reflected in their economic and political exchanges with the
third world countries. The third world countries were not deemed sufficiently civilized to
warrant an attitude of mutual cooperation.

A sense of solidarity, which ensures the social imaginary of any social
organization, and subsidiarity, which indicates mutual cooperation, cannot be dissociated
from each other. Thus, the subsidiarity of a society is in a hermeneutic relation with the
solidarity of its constituents. Such solidarity could be organic or politically forged as
witnessed in the development of democracy in the United States. There are two
possibilities if the equilibrium between solidarity and subsidiarity is disturbed. They are:
1) the notion of subsidiarity would become predominant in a society with excessive
emphasis of individual rights and property. As a result, economics becomes increasingly
a citadel of powerful corporate interests. Hence, intervention of government through law
42

Immanuel Kant, The Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals, 2nd edition, Trans. Lewis White Beck,
New York: Macmillan/Library of the Liberal Arts, 1990.

38

enforcement to curb malpractices and other predatory market tendencies increases. This
is an extreme result of Locke’s social contract. Neither Hobbes nor Locke envisaged such
a scenario. 2) If a tendency to emphasize solidarity predominates, then nationalistic
fervor, secessionism, religious fanaticism, and ethnic cleansing are distinctly possible
results. It is my intention to explore a middle path between the afore-mentioned options.
Consensus makes such a middle path possible.

The notion of equality that spawned the concept of mutual cooperation is the
cornerstone of a discourse aimed at achieving consensus in the Western societies. In the
Akan society in Ghana, personhood and human rights are intuitively recognized. In status
societies such as India, solidarity needs to be redefined in terms of contemporary social
imaginary. Subsidiarity needs to be oriented with respect to newfound solidarity and
social imaginary as a nation. Hitherto, subsidiarity was based on a code of conduct in a
caste system, religion, language and ethnicity.

There are structural differences in an asymmetric lifeworld that preclude any
rationally motivated agreement. A theory of civil society must create conducive environs
of intersubjective interaction among the members of a society. The power structure and
relations between various strata of a civil society defines its strength as a society. If a
civil society is robust, then the rights of individuals in a society are guaranteed and vice
versa. For corporate civil societies that exist in countries like Japan and some South East
Asian countries, individual rights are subservient to the welfare of the society. In such a
situation, a notion of order is paramount and the individual rights are less important in
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comparison to the common welfare.

In countries such as India, which have had a cultural continuum of over five
thousand years and a rigidly stratified society, structural transformation of a communal
society into a democracy, that respects individual rights, has not been without difficulties.
Especially, reciprocal relationships and mutual cooperation have had different
connotations because of the unequal caste-class relationships. Reciprocity and mutuality
were always considered in the background of individual duties within the ambit of caste
duties. Hence, before the terms reciprocity and mutuality are considered within the
framework of equality of social status, there is a need for votaries of democracy and
liberalism to evaluate the social conditions of those countries that are forced to become
democratic. The question that arises here is: Does democracy restore equality of social
status? Or is equality of social status a must for democracy? In a culturally diverse
democracy, it is imperative that the political discourse is not reduced to majority-minority
framework. The cultural interstices or the intermediary viewpoints, which straddle the
center-periphery, majority-minority, and first world-third world, and social-communal
categorizations, would go a long way in initiating a process of rapprochement. I will
discuss the philosophy of cultural interstices in the fifth chapter.
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Chap 2
Intersubjectivity and the Problem of Cultural Identities

In this chapter, I will be arguing in support of a reflexive approach to intersubjective
communication in a consensual activity. Intersubjective communication creates optimal
conditions for achieving consensus while debating controversial issues. Institutional
safeguards such as strictures against any form of verbal or physical coercion or stifling
discussion that guarantee formal conditions of a debate only prevent abuse of the
individual rights of the participants. Formal conditions of consensus such as ideal speech
situation or the original position ensure that a debate is democratic. But the will to create
a moral bond between interlocutors demands much more than the formal conditions of a
discourse. In order to achieve a consensus or a tentative agreement, the interlocutors
ought to engage each other at an inter-personal level. A relaxed and cordial atmosphere is
more conducive for a discussion of difficult issues. Absence of personal rapport or the
presence of mutual distrust more often than not derails negotiations. Hence, civility is one
of the basic requirements of a discourse. Civility also encourages an ethic of mutual
recognition.

In this chapter, I have discussed two approaches to intersubjective interaction
aimed at achieving consensus. One approach is that of Hans Georg Gadamer who
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advocates hermeneutical understanding of intersubjective communication. The other
approach is that of George Herbert Mead, who is a proponent of social behaviorism.
Mead emphasizes mutual adjustment of behavior as the basic condition of a successful
communicative activity. I will illustrate how Gadamer’s hermeneutical approach is more
accommodative of differences. An asymmetrical concept of consensus necessarily
requires recognition of differences in the conceptual and cultural understanding of those
individuals who are participating in a consensual activity. Gadamer’s idea of
communication is a fusion of horizons of autonomous human beings. Communication is a
participatory activity for Gadamer. Hence, the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ have an equal,
reciprocal, and independent relationship.

Gadamer and Mead approached the concept of intersubjectivity as a process of
dynamic inter-relation between human beings. Hence, their theories of intersubjectivity
are essentially theories of understanding the ‘other.’ I characterize the ‘other’ as the
‘Thou.’ It is necessary to have an understanding of the ‘I – Thou’ relationship for an
asymmetric idea of consensus in contrast to Habermas’ idea of consensus as a rationally
motivated agreement. A dynamic notion of ‘I – Thou’ relationship prevents
hypostatization of human interaction. Mead and Gadamer emphasize intersubjective
interaction that unveils problems associated with a teleological approach to human
relationship.

George Herbert Mead and Hans Georg Gadamer considered the problem of
intersubjectivity to be pivotal in explaining concepts such as language, culture, history,
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science, and religion. George Herbert Mead’s method is avowedly scientific because it
germinated from the methodology of science espoused by celebrated pragmatists such as
William James and John Dewey. Mead wanted to understand the nature of human
interaction and thereby control the factors that hamper the establishment of a smooth
process of communication. Mead’s method is teleological because it is tailored to achieve
success in communicative activity. [For example, if there is a vexatious economic issue,
internalizing the perspectives of one side by the other will foster a better understanding of
the problem.]

Mead, as a social behaviorist, believed in connection between impulse, stimulus,
and response in any communicative activity. Therefore, if a general schema of how
individuals react in a particular situation could be framed then Mead felt that mapping
human behavior and achieving success in communication and avoiding conflicts would
become easier. Mead’s analysis of a successful communicative activity emphasizes direct
and free interaction between the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ or between various interlocutors
participating in a debate or a dialogue.1 But the ‘I – Thou’ relationship involves
internalization of various roles performed by the social actors in various roles of ‘I’ and
the ‘Thou.’ As a behaviorist, Mead analyzed the behavior of social actors by observing
and mapping their interactions among themselves. Mead writes as follows: 2

1

Mead does not use ‘Thou’ in his works. Mead uses ‘I’ and ‘me.’ By ‘I’ Mead refers to the individual
subject and by ‘me’ the social self. Mead also uses ‘we’ and ‘other.’ ‘Thou’ is my usage to represent ‘the
other.’ In both second person and third person application, I think that ‘Thou’ is more evocative than the
‘other’ or ‘You.’
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Social psychology has, as a rule, dealt with various phases of social experience
from the psychological standpoint of individual experience. The point of approach
which I wish to suggest is that of dealing with experience from the standpoint of
society, at least from the standpoint of communication as essential to the social
order. Social psychology, on this view, presupposes an approach to experience
from the standpoint of the individual, but undertakes to determine in particular
that which belongs to this experience because the individual himself belongs to a
social structure, a social order.

In contrast to Mead, Gadamer treats the ‘other’ as irreducible to the ‘I’ or vice
versa. Gadamer’s analysis of the ‘I – Thou’ relationship is in terms of a hermeneutical
understanding emphasizes the inexhaustible or unique nature of the ‘other.’ Gadamer
conceptualizes the ‘I – Thou’ relationship as unproblematic within the framework of
historical consciousness and as a fusion of horizons as the paradigm of hermeneutical
consciousness. In this chapter, I will explain the structural difficulties associated with
Mead’s analysis of the ‘I – Thou’ relationship. Gadamer’s analysis addresses problems
that arise out of a behavioral approach by a contextual interpretation of all intersubjective
activities. For Gadamer, the ‘I’ cannot transcend its own conditionedness and know the
‘other’ in its entirety. Any attempt at reducing the ‘I’ to the ‘other’ or the vice versa
violates the moral bonding that exists between the individuals whose relationship is based
on mutual respect and recognition of freedom. In this sense any observation and response
to the ‘other’ is only an interpretation of the gestures, actions and communicative activity
of the ‘other.’ Hence, an objective spectator of Aristotle is non-existent for Gadamer
because any understanding of the ‘other’ as an interpretive activity is laden with
assumptions or prejudices (vorurteil).

2

George Herbert Mead, Mind Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, Ed. Charles W.
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Mead’s Social Behaviorism
Mead’s behavioral method is based on an observation of human behavior in different
situations, gestures, and roles. In order to come up with a schema that denominates
common factors shared by people, Mead formulated concepts such as ‘significant
gestures,’ ‘generalized other,’ and role formation, which is the ambit within which
understanding of the ‘other’ could be grounded.3 The ‘significant gestures’ are normally
verbal gestures that elicit responses because of their deliberate nature and directedness.4
Mead emphasized the fact that only if the proponent of an idea assumed responsibility for
his/her verbal proposition, communicative activity would move forward. With the help of
‘significant gestures,’ Mead sought to thematize the concept of role-formation. According
to Mead, one’s knowledge of other human beings is possible only by understanding
others through the roles assumed by oneself. For example, one’s idea of a teacher is
plausible only by an introjection of the role of a teacher. Furthermore, one assumes the
role of a teacher while internalizing ideas about teaching. Only in this way, could
knowledge of other human beings be possible, that is, as teachers, doctors, engineers,
singers, and dancers. This is what Mead means by role-formation.

The logical corollary of role-formation, in Mead, is the ‘generalized other.’ Mead
defines the ‘generalized other’ as “taking the attitude of others toward himself and of his

Morris, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934. pp. 1 - 8.
3
I have used the ‘other’ to indicate the independently existing human beings without being subordinated to
the ‘I.’ In the case of Gadamer, I have used the ‘other’ more frequently because Gadamer does not collapse
the ‘other’ into the ‘I.’ While explaining Mead, I have used ‘others’ more frequently in the common sense
of the term which indicates that which is not ‘I.’
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finally crystallizing all these particular attitudes into a single attitude of standpoint.”5
Mead avers that in order to understand the attitude of others toward oneself, one must
understand the attitude of oneself towards others. Only if a person takes the attitude of
others towards oneself, would he/she be in a position to see a problem from different
angles. Once the conceptual horizon of a person is widened, then conflicts could be easily
resolved because of better communication and shared understanding. In furthering
knowledge and scientific understanding by observation and control of social behavior of
human beings lies the teleology of Mead’s social behaviorism. Mead believed that a lack
of proper understanding of the behavior of other social actors complicated
communication. In Mead’s social behaviorism, human interaction consists of three
factors:

1) The views of the individual about oneself
2) The views of the individual about others (role-taking), and
3) The views of the individual about the views of others about the individual (the
generalized other)

Relationship between two individuals is always hyphenated with the ‘I,’ for Mead.
Hence, the ‘other’ or for that matter the ‘I’ is never separated from one another. Thus, the
‘Thou’ exists only as how the ‘I’ views the ‘other,’ which is in turn dependent on how the
‘I’ views itself as viewed by others. The above-mentioned thesis of human interaction of
Mead reduces the ‘other’ ultimately to the views of the ‘I.’ Thus the ‘Thou’ never exists
4

J.L. Austin’s illocutionary speech acts would serve as good examples of significant gestures.
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on its own. Mead also assumed that through concepts of role-taking, significant gestures
and generalized other, the ‘Thou’ could be understood and human interactions controlled.
Mead staunchly believed that an individual could objectify oneself and take the attitude
of the society towards oneself, which would educate the individual to effectively remove
irritants in the process of resolving conflicts.

Mead believed that the future could be determined by the present from the lessons
learnt from the past. Social progress, for Mead, is possible by tailoring one’s actions in
response to the interests of others. In order to gain knowledge about people, Mead wanted
to observe and gather knowledge of the social actions of people. Once knowledge about
social acts and social actors is categorized then the facilitation of a cooperative approach
to solve problems would be simpler, according to Mead. Concepts of mind,
consciousness, language, meaning, and self are possible only as social acts. Thus, social
action is imperative to any individual activity. Since all individuals are also social actors
it becomes easier to observe and categorize social behavior. For Mead, science of “social
psychology” is “the study of the experience and behavior of the individual organism or
self in its dependence upon the social group.”6 The individual has the power to change
the future of the society, according to Mead. Mead’s social behaviorism is situated on his
firm belief in the theory of evolution, the principle of continuity, and human
development.

5
6

Paul P.Fuetze, The Social Self, New York: Bookman Publishers, 1954. p. 76.
Pfuetze, p. 36.
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As an advocate of evolutionary biology, Mead assumes that human beings are at
the zenith of evolutionary cycle, which is typified by the capacity to communicate with
each other and share information. Language is the defining feature of the human beings.
Language is the tool of socialization and socialization is a behavior peculiar to human
beings. Language consists of gestures and symbols. Gestures are the bedrocks of the ‘IThou’ relationship. By analyzing the linguistic behavior of human beings, Mead also
adduces reasons for the religious, social, political and economic behavior of human
beings in his theory of understanding.

Mead views the formation of mind and self as products of social activity. Both
mind and self arise out of social activity. Mind is natural while the social activity of the
mind gives rise to the self. Mind is a biological form and when mind assumes a social
attitude it becomes a self. The formation of a social attitude includes linguistic
communication, role-taking, and mutual adjustment.7 For Mead, mind is the capacity to
interact verbally, through gestures and symbols. Communicative activity between
individuals is deliberate and intended to evoke a response. Thus, a self is a socialized
mind. The need for a social mind arises out of the need to communicate with others.
Communication is possible only through gestures. Mead distinguishes between ‘ordinary
gestures’ and ‘significant gestures.’ Ordinary gestures are those gestures that do not bind
the individual to own responsibility for his/her gestures. Mead gives an example of the
gestures of children. In the case of significant gestures, they are deliberate and aimed at

7

Pfuetze, p. 61.
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eliciting responses from the hearer. Business activity is a good example of significant
gestures.

Significant Gestures
Society comes into existence only when individuals share a common perspective,
according to Mead. A common perspective consists of not only the perspectives of
individuals but also the perspectives of members as a group. A common perspective
objectifies social goals; it also helps in creating a social organization. Social organization
is possible only if social actors take the attitude of others or only if they are able to
internalize the viewpoints of other members of the social group.

Mead introduces the notion of comprehensibility, which is pivotal to his
conception of communication and common perspective. Mead’s emphasis is on the
relation between individual perspective and common perspective. Mead’s theory of
interpersonal relationships is based on two assumptions:

1) Interest based interaction
2) Cooperative interaction

In the first category, Mead analyzes the common environment of ants and bees. The
dwelling place of ants is the anthill while bees live in hives. Mead argues that there is no
communication among the ants or bees. In communication, deliberate intent to discuss an
issue is displayed by both the speaker as well as the hearer. Under the second category,
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the speaker or the gesturer commits himself or herself to sincerely involve the hearer in a
discourse. Thus, cooperative activity is facilitated by the ‘significant gestures’ in the form
of communication. Mead gives an interesting definition for the concept of ‘significant
gestures.’ ‘Significant gestures’ are defined in terms of communication. Mead writes as
follows:8
It does not become communication in the full sense, i.e., the stimulus does not
become a significant symbol, until the gesture tends to arouse the same response
in the individual who makes it that it arouses in the others. The history of the
growth of language shows that in its earlier stages the vocal gesture addressed to
another awakens in the individual who makes the gesture not simply the tendency
to the response which it calls forth in the other, such as the seizing of a weapon or
the avoiding of a danger, but primarily the social role which the other plays in the
cooperative act. This is indicated in the early play period in the development of
the child, and in the richness in social implication of language structures in the
speech of primitive peoples.

Mead avers that an individual becomes socialized only when he or she assumes the
attitude of the others towards himself or herself, respectively, whereby the individual
assumes an objectifying attitude towards one’s own actions. This attitude of others
towards oneself is known as the ‘generalized other.’ Mead also claims that only if the
mind is able to take the role of the ‘generalized other’ that a self is formed. There are two
factors that make the role-taking attitude possible in the individual. One is
comprehensibility and second is intelligibility. The aforementioned factors are
responsible for the two most important developments that made possible the sociality of
human beings.

8

George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, Phoenix: Open Court Publishing Company, 1980.
pp. 167-168. fp. 1932.
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1) In the early stages of communication, human beings assume the attitude of others
and thus become an object to themselves, becoming a self in the process. The
same attitude also constitutes the other too.

2) The next stage is that of the generalized other in which the individual is known by
the roles played in the society. The individual is always known only as a
‘generalized other.’

Mead explains the concept of the “generalized other”, with an example based on
property holding. Mead points out that unlike squirrels, which store the nuts gathered
from the ground, property is not only acquired but also protected and maintained. In
buying a property, an impulse is transformed into a stimulus-response framework. The
impulse present in a person to buy a property elicits an expected response from the seller.
“An offer is what it is because the presentation is a stimulus to give. One cannot
exchange otherwise than by putting one’s self in the attitude of the other party to the
bargain.”9 The core concepts of Mead’s social behaviorism can be explained with the
help of the example cited above. They are as follows:

1. The conversion of a mind into a self happens as a result of the buyer assuming the
attitude of the seller and vice versa because of the participation of the buyer and the
seller in the social act of property exchange. Only when the subjective mind assumes
the objective attitude about itself does a mind become a self.
9

G.H. Mead., The Philosophy of the Present, p. 183. Hereafter, TPP.
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2. By assuming the role of a buyer, the seller puts himself \ herself in the shoes of the
other. The buyer also assumes the role of a seller while bargaining for a property.

3. The role-taking attitude is possible only as a generalized other. Human beings know
others only in the variegated roles played by people in the social setting. In order to
understand the roles played by others, it is imperative to know the roles assumed by
the individual in the social setting. If the self is objectified and its roles analyzed,
then the roles played by others are understood better. The different roles played by
the individuals as teachers, doctors, mothers, fathers, engineers, etc., are first known
in terms of one’s own actions and then generalized into a framework about the other.
This is the concept of the ‘generalized other.”

4. Before proceeding to the concept of the “generalized other” one needs to stimulate a
response in the people who are part of a social act. This is possible only in terms of a
shared linguistic understanding. Such a linguistic understanding is a part of the social
act.

In the four aforementioned steps, I have traced the development of a self in the
descending order. The emergence of a self from the mind is preceded by the notion of
the ‘generalized other,’ which is preceded by the concept of role-formation. The roleformation is possible only when the complex linguistic communication comes into play.
A meaningful linguistic interaction is known as ‘significant gestures.’ A social act,
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which is a part of the social organization, is not possible without any of the abovementioned four steps.

Social Act and Social Organization
Social act is possible only if the individual introjects social roles. Introjections of the
roles of others into one’s own understanding is a process of becoming a self, that is, an
individual organizes his\her response with respect to the tendencies of the others to
respond to his\her act.10 A social act is possible only if the individual and the common
traits move into each other, in a manner akin to the “fusion of horizons” of Gadamer.
When an individual takes the attitude of others, that individual becomes the object of
study for oneself. Mead takes great care to emphasize the ineluctable relationship
between the parts and the whole, the individual and the social. The individual becomes
an individual only in lieu of the social. The social is the common reservoir of all
individual tendencies. Thus the self-consciousness or the ‘I’ consciousness is never
divorced from the other consciousness or the ‘Thou’ consciousness. Construction of a
self is a dynamic process that is made possible by language, which operates as the bridge
for communication. According to Mead, language is the social stimulus that makes
possible the same response in the hearer that a speaker would expect of herself for the
same stimulus.

10
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Mead elucidates the beginning of the ‘I – Thou’ consciousness in terms of an
example of a play and a game. Interestingly, Mead and Gadamer have similar views
about the analogy of a play and a game. Given below is Mead’s analysis of a play and a
game. In a child’s play, the child takes the attitude of different social actors, viz.,
teachers, mother, father, sister, brother, friends, etc. The child acts all these attitudes
towards itself while at the same time internalizing the actions of himself/herself towards
others. The ‘I – Thou’ attitude in a play arises simultaneously and does not really involve
social actors in a real life situation. Hence, a child’s play remains as a prototype for
social roles played by the individuals.

In a game, there are rules and regulations to be followed meticulously. An
individual has to match wits with social actors. Only if there are commonly agreeable
ideas, can the individual communicate successfully with other actors. In a game,
reactions to the stimulus are more organized and hence the advent of the ‘generalized
other.’ Every action takes into account the social reaction. Thus, the individual has an
overarching idea of the ‘generalized other.’ Concepts such as rights, law, religion,
education, culture, and other institutions take into account the concept of the
‘generalized other.’ Mead even goes to the extent of saying that a breakdown in the
schema of ‘generalized other’ leads to war. According to Mead, if only people would put
themselves into other’s shoes, conflicts could be reduced significantly. Mead cites the
examples of the League of Nations, the International Court and other kindred
organizations that try to settle disputes as the result of the notion of the ‘generalized
other.’ Thus, Mead sees the application of the concepts such as ‘generalized other,’
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significant gestures [language], and role-taking in augmenting social controls that serve
the society better in managing conflicts.

For Mead, communication and interaction are tools for social control. Social
actions of human beings are reflected in the social behavior of the individuals. Thus,
Mead applies his conceptions about the ‘I - Thou’ relationship to control the social
behavior of human beings. On the other hand, Gadamer accords more freedom to the
‘other’ and holds that objectification of the ‘other’ leads to problems of power and
ethical dilemma about the treatment of the ‘other’ as a tool to achieve a goal. The lack of
contextual situatedness in the analysis of Mead becomes a major impediment in
analyzing cultures and processes about which we do not have prior experience. Hence,
Gadamer suggests a more encompassing and empathetic hermeneutical consciousness
that treats the ‘other’ as a free entity without being reduced to a ‘me’ which is the
‘objectified self’ for Mead. The ‘objectified self’ is the social self that is known in its
various roles as the ‘generalized other.’

Gadamer - The Nature of Intersubjective Experience
In contrast to social behaviorism of Mead, which lays emphasis on observation and
control of social behavior of human beings, Gadamer’s approach is humanistic. An
understanding of social phenomena is a part of the human experience, for Gadamer.
According to Gadamer, the ‘I – Thou’ relationship is a hermeneutical relationship and not
a historical relationship. In the hermeneutical view of the world, the ‘other’ is not
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reducible to the ‘I’. While advocating hermeneutical understanding, Gadamer follows the
Kantian principle of not treating others as means to an end. Thus by stipulating the
inviolability of the freedom of the ‘other’ Gadamer also delineates the guidelines for an
ethics that recognizes the value of the ‘otherness.’

According to Gadamer, understanding encompasses both what is agreeable to us
and what is contrary to our beliefs. Gadamer thus recognizes the sovereignty of the
‘other.’ Since Gadamer does not believe in absolute truths, the views of the ‘other’ stand
on its own strength instead of gaining its validity in the altar of an absolute truth. Thus
understanding, for Gadamer, is not a power over the ‘other’ gained through the
knowledge of the ‘other.’ The ‘other,’ thus, cannot be understood in its entirety. Thus, the
experiencing of the ‘Thou’ is a moral experience whereby the ‘other’ is not objectified. In
understanding a person, what must be kept in mind is that the person, with whom we are
interacting, ‘is in relationship with us.’11 Gadamer is very particular about respecting the
subjectivity of the person whom we seek to understand. Gadamer delineates three forms
of ‘I – Thou’ relationship. They are as follows:

1. The ‘other’ is experienced by the observation of his or her behavior.
2. The ‘other’ is assimilated by the ‘I’ reflectively and co-opted and preempted.
The ‘other’ is understood in terms of one’s own behavior.
3. The ‘other’ is given a voice. The ‘other’ is experienced as an independent
individual ‘Thou.’
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The first two ways of understanding are based on what Gadamer calls the historical
consciousness. In a historical consciousness, the ‘I’ purveys the ‘other’ as if the ‘other’ is
historically objectified. The historical situatedness of both the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ is
neglected in the first two ways of understanding the ‘other.’ Only in the third form of
understanding the ‘other’ is the historical situatedness of the ‘I’ is also taken into account
so as to consider the views of the ‘other.’ Only as an equal interlocutor does the ‘Thou’
stand a chance of being represented as it is. Mead’s analysis of the ‘I-Thou’ relationship
falls under the second category of ‘I-Thou’ relationship.

Gadamer distinguishes between theories of experience that are based on scientific
methodology and those that are historico-critical in nature. Scientific theories of
experience neglect the inner-historicity of individual experience and objectify
experience. In this sense, the scientific method is a-historical. The historico-critical
method takes into consideration the historicity of experience and interprets experience
critically and contextually. But the historico-critical method also objectifies experience.
Gadamer criticizes both scientific and historico-critical methods for their unswerving
emphasis on repeatability.12

According to Gadamer, the verificationism inherent in the scientific method is not
applicable to the lifeworld. Repeatability is concomitant with verification and
11
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objectification of experience. Gadamer cites Francis Bacon as the ideologue non-pareil
of the method of science. Bacon went as far to suggest that language muddles thinking
by distracting the mind to pour over empty conventional forms.13 Gadamer criticizes the
unidimensional and unidirectional experience advocated by science. He also defends
language through which we experience the world. Even though Gadamer concedes that
problems exist in language due to conventions and other systematic distortions, he
reiterates that the lifeworld is governed by linguistic behavior.

Gadamer expresses his reservations about the application of the methodology of
natural sciences in human sciences. The specific goal-oriented activity of science
straitjackets human experience. Scientific experience does not encompass the whole
gamut of experience and it is situated on everyday experience.14 For science, only the
positive experience, which successfully fulfils the objective of a scientific method, is
acceptable. For human sciences, all kinds of experiences are acceptable. Experiencing is
itself a learning activity, for Gadamer. Hence, the characterization of an experience as
positive or negative is constrictive. For the natural sciences, any theory is valid only as
long as it continues to remain unfalsified. [Gadamer indicates the similarity to Karl
Popper’s theory of falsification in this context.]15
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Language, for Gadamer, illustrates the multi-dimensional nature of experience.
Experience is not reducible to those that conform to our expectations alone. There are
new experiences, always. In a manner akin to Mead, Gadamer writes:
In his Phenomenology of Mind he (Hegel) shows how the consciousness that
would be certain of itself has new experiences. For consciousness its object is the
in-itself, but what is in-itself can be known only as it presents itself to the
experiencing consciousness. Thus the experiencing consciousness has precisely
this experience: that the in-itselfness of the object is in-itself “for us.”16

Gadamer takes a very catholic view of experience by designating openness to variegated
forms of experience as the primary condition of gaining knowledge. The validation of
experience must not be biased and dogmatic. Experience must always welcome new
insights. Gadamer writes: “The dialectic experience has its proper fulfillment not in
definitive knowledge but in openness to experience that is made possible by the
experience itself.”17

One of the most important aspects of lifeworld experience is the role of tradition.
Tradition is the treasure-trove of experience. Tradition makes experience possible as the
continuum of events. Tradition adduces meanings to identities, cultures, and languages.
The lifeworld is inextricably entwined with tradition. Tradition is the landscape in which
hermeneutical consciousness, which is not only historical but also open and undogmatic,
validates its experience. There is an unceasing fusion of horizons between tradition and
hermeneutical consciousness through language. Tradition is a ‘Thou’ that always forms
the backdrop of a dialogue, interaction, andcommunication. But traditionary meaning has
16
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an existence of its own. Tradition is not reducible to the opinion of others or opinions
about others. Gadamer thus criticizes those approaches that objectify social roles. In such
approaches, tradition is seen as an aggregate of individual opinions. This critique of
Gadamer applies to Mead’s role-taking attitude. Gadamer avers that tradition becomes
universal because it is always a partner in all activities and it is accessible to all in
different ways. Tradition is not a person and hence personal relationship is not
emphasized. In ‘I-Thou’ relationship the ‘Thou’ is always a person and hence moral
questions arise when interacting with others.

Experiencing the ‘I-Thou’ relationship
Gadamer distinguishes three types of ‘I-Thou’ relationships. In the first type, a person
tries to categorize the behavior of his/her fellow beings. The behavior of other people is
then categorized in several ways. These categories are used to predict any future
behavior. Gadamer writes: “We call this a knowledge of human nature. We understand
the other person in the same way that we understand any other typical event in our
experiential field – i.e., he is predictable.”18 Gadamer disavows such an analysis on the
basis of the Kantian categorical imperative, which forbids any one from treating fellow
human beings as means to an end. When a person is treated as an object of knowledge,
the humanity of that person is not acknowledged. Thus, the other, ‘Thou,’ is used as a
means to gain knowledge, which is the end.

17
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According to Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness, the relationship between
the individual and the other (I – Thou) must not be subordinated to each other. The
problems in such approaches, as we see in Mead, could be traced to the dogmatic
emphasis on the method and the objectivity of knowledge.19 Because of the emphasis on
the method, the historicity of the experience in question is not acknowledged by the
scientific and the historico-critical methods. It is impossible for a person to experience
tradition in a detached manner shearing himself \ herself from the tradition which is the
underlying framework. Gadamer attributes this method of isolation of facts to the
methodology of social sciences borrowed from the eighteenth century scientific methods,
whose progenitor was Hume. The scientific method only accepts as knowledge what is
‘typical and regular in behavior.’20 Gadamer criticizes this method as a-historical
because it purely depends on induction; from a known behavioral analysis accruing from
observation of human behavior, the future actions of human beings are predicted.

In the second type of ‘I-Thou’ relationship, the ‘Thou’ is recognized as a person.
But the ‘Thou’ is always understood in terms of the ‘I’. The dialectical relation between
the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ is deduced from the way the ‘Thou’ is understood through the ‘I’.
Under this process of understanding, the proponent of an idea is countered by another
idea, emanating from the opponent, and this is the way all forms of communication are
carried out. The dialectical relation is only reflective and hence this opens up the
floodgates for the understanding of the ‘other’ through one’s own categories. Mead’s
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concepts such as role formation and ‘generalized other’ fall under this category. Mead
assumes without any compunction the uniformity of mental structures. As a result, Mead
concentrates on explaining the knowledge of self with the help of the knowledge others.
The mind gathers information about the behavior of others by assuming various roles
donned by others. The self is formed when these experiences about the behavior of
others are introjected. Mead does not have any qualms about coopting and preempting
any reflection on the part of the other.21 Mead uncritically assumes that the ‘I’ can know
about the other without any questions being raised about the mediacy or immediacy of
such knowledge.

Gadamer traces the dialectical analysis of the ‘I-Thou’ relationship to the struggle
for mutual recognition that characterizes human interaction. Gadamer cites the example
of a Master-Slave relationship that Hegel uses so effectively to illustrate the dialectical
relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou.’ But, the dialectical relationship between the
‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ is very complex and multi-dimensional. The dialectical relationship is
not just a calculated evaluation of human behavior but a commensurate reaction, which
also has what Gadamer refers to as the ‘negative element.’

Gadamer avers, “The experience of the ‘Thou’ attained here is more adequate
than what we have called the knowledge of human nature, which merely seeks to
calculate how the other person will behave.”22 Mead’s analysis of the ‘I – Thou’
relationship is more concerned with the knowledge of human nature and only less
21
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remotely with the dialectical mode of interpersonal interaction. Gadamer’s critique of the
dialectical model of ‘I-Thou’ relationship is that reciprocity that governs the relationship
is not always apparent to the interlocutors. Individuals are not self-conscious in the
dialectical model. Gadamer gives the example of a servant who tyrannizes the master by
serving him as a slave. The servant does not know that he is tyrannizing the master by
his unswerving allegiance. In another interesting example, Gadamer also maintains that
welfare and charity work strip away the individuality of the person to whom they are
directed.

The dialectical model of reciprocal relationship is the bulwark of historical
consciousness. The otherness of the ‘other,’ the past, and the understanding the ‘other’ as
a person is assumed to be unproblematic for the historical consciousness. The historical
consciousness aspires to transcend its own conditionedness in search of certainty in
knowledge. Gadamer addresses the above-mentioned lacunae in the historical
consciousness in his concept of hermeneutical consciousness.

The Hermeneutical Consciousness
Gadamer emphasizes the role of hermeneutical consciousness in understanding third
form of ‘I – Thou’ relationship. In the hermeneutical consciousness, incompleteness of
the knowledge of human nature and the dialectical mode of understanding human
relationships are recognized. The prejudices (Vorurteil) in viewpoints are inescapable
22
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according to Gadamer and hence neutral knowledge free of all prejudices is impossible.
This makes the hermeneutical consciousness historical too. The mutuality of the ‘I –
Thou’ relationship is emphasized in the hermeneutical consciousness. The hermeneutical
consciousness is the consciousness of the presence of tradition as the refractory crucible
in which all interactions are validated or invalidated. By accepting the commitment to
treat each other mutually, the moral bond is cemented. Gadamer says, “A person who
reflects himself out of a living relationship to tradition destroys the true meaning of this
tradition in exactly the same way … To be situated within a tradition does not limit the
freedom of knowledge but makes it possible.”23 The most important of the hermeneutical
experience is its emphasis on a reflective relation to tradition. In this context, Gadamer
argues that the ‘Thou’ has to be seen as a partner and it must be allowed to voice its
opinion without being constrained by the ‘I.’ Gadamer explains openness to tradition as
follows: “Openness to the other, then, involves recognizing that I myself must accept
some things that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do so.”24 As
against historical consciousness, which is not critical of the historicity of the knowledge
of historian, Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness recognizes its historicity, its
prejudices, need for openness and the empowerment of the ‘Thou.’

Mead and Gadamer : Behavioral Versus Hermeneutical Perspective
Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness enshrines the role of tradition, intersubjectivity,
historicity, openness to opinions of others, fallibility of knowledge, power of the
23
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negative, and the entitlement of the ‘Thou.’ Gadamer lays emphasis on the irreducibility
of the ‘Thou’ to the ‘I.’ The ‘I – Thou’ relationship in Mead is restricted to what
Gadamer calls the first two levels of his categorization of ‘I-Thou’ relationship. Gadamer
subsumes all types of ‘I – Thou’ relationship examined by Mead and goes a step further
by a critique of historical consciousness. Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness
advocates the treatment of the other in its own immediacy without reducing the ‘other’ to
the ‘our.’

In Mead, self-consciousness is possible only through the consciousness of the
‘other.’ But the ‘other’ is accessible to the ‘I’ without any problems of mediacy or
immediacy, for Mead. If the social roles of others are internalized, then the
understanding of the ‘other’ is possible in Mead’s social behaviorism. Activities
involving intersubjective enterprises like language, society, tradition, economics, and
religion are all reducible to stimulus-response framework in Mead. Even though Mead
himself criticized the scientific method for being mechanical in its application without
any window for interpretation, he is entrapped within the scientific method. Mead
introduces the future-oriented approach to his method of observation of human behavior
but the scientific method is causal in character and hence not open to negative results.
Only a successful response is gratifying to a stimulus. Hence the historicity and the
multifaceted nature of knowledge are neglected.
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Mead introduced concepts such as novelty and cooperation in the ‘I – Thou’
relationship. But there is an uncritical assumption inherent in Mead’s schema that the ‘I’
and the ‘Thou’ are equally empowered in terms of status (mental, social, political and
economic). Since Mead fails to show how the ‘Thou’ could be understood immediately,
problems persist in the individual – social relationship. Furthermore, Mead also readily
assumes that any knowledge-driven activity is good and the society is willing to
participate in communicative activity to solve problems. The aforementioned
assumptions are only ideals whereas Mead installs them as the pillars of his theory of
sociality. Mead, though he concedes that experience has to be historical in taking into
consideration the past, the present and the future, does not successfully explain how a
universal framework is possible for the interpretation of the social and the individual.
The only interaction possible is through the ‘generalized other.’ Mead, perhaps, assumes
that ‘generalized other’ is a universal concept. But the ‘generalized other’ is a
signification and not a symbol as Mead claims because communication is not perfect.

Gadamer argues that there are no custodians of knowledge in hermeneutics.
Knowledge is an event, which is never complete. Only universality is the hermeneutical
situatedness. Tradition is the only horizon into which all other horizons merge. All
knowledge arises only inside tradition. Historicity is an integral part of the tradition.
Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness opens new vistas in ethics, law, philosophy, and
art. By empowering the ‘other’, Gadamer gives a voice to the unheard. The
empowerment of the ‘other’ dismantles the structures of domination. Gadamer’s
emphasis on the openness to the ‘Thou’ has enormous significance for cross-cultural
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interaction, religious tolerance diverse interpretations of history, political dialogue and
economic liberty. Gadamer’s non-teleological approach unfetters him from any
transcendental goals. But, even for Gadamer, resolution of conflicts while
accommodating divergence in viewpoints is a problem because a disourse has to end in a
consensus.

A consensus necessarily means that one opinion is considered superior to another
and hence more correct. Gadamer’s and Mead’s conception of the “I – Thou”
relationship has great significance in multicultural dialogue with respect to liberal
democracies. But liberal democracies have a strong economic focus, which emphasizes
competition in the promotion of individual interests. A majority promotes social interest
only as an aggregate of individual interests in the form of legitimation.

Dialogue and Cultural Tradition
Dialogue is a pivotal part of interpretation. Interpretation is possible only in the context
of language. Unlike Habermas, who initiates a shift in paradigm from ‘consciousness’ to
‘language,’ Gadamer does not accord foundational authority to language.25 While
Gadamer entirely agrees with Heidegger that language is the dwelling place of being,
language is a product of tradition. Every epoch is defined by a cultural paradigm and vice
versa, which is representative of dominant ideas informing that epoch. A cultural
paradigm of a period is its social imaginary. Social institutions of an epoch embody its
25
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cultural paradigm. By stipulating a cultural paradigm, other important aspects of a culture
are marginalized. Based on the determination of a paradigm of a culture, cross-cultural
comparisons are performed. In order to illustrate the democratic character of a dialogue,
Habermas differentiates the monological character of traditional communities and the
dialogical character of the Western societies on the basis of social rationalization. The
underlying assumption in Habermas’ comparison is that social conditions influence the
dialogical framework. While linguistic development is also a part of the process of social
transformation, it does not entirely exhaust the cultural paradigm. Habermas assumes that
Western civil society has been transformed structurally and hence un-coerced dialogue is
indeed possible. A direct-access society, which according to Taylor the liberal democracy
is, seems to indicate a social transformation that has given rise to a civil society, which is
capable of making better social choices. According to Max Weber, such a civil society is
the resultant of social rationalization.26

Max Weber has described the path of the social, political, and cultural
transformation of the public sphere in Western Europe in his mammoth Economy and
Society. Max Weber’s analysis of the quantum leaps achieved by the Western society
during a particular epoch also delves upon various social, political, religious and cultural
aspects. Science and technology have been a part of the market and hence have a rhythm
of their own in development and consumption. But democracy, as anticipated by Lyotard,
has been outflanked by globalization. Hence, there is a need for more openness to other
traditions. Democracy as a tradition needs to be hermeneutically questioned. The
26
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question that needs to be answered is whether democracy has become hypostatized. As
the individual-social relationship is being constantly redefined, Gadamer’s broader
perspective with emphasis on conversation and dialogue rather than a political system
that is based on majoritarian rule facilitates consensus in a democracy. Gadamer’s
emphasis on a convergence of horizons accommodates cultural particulars and universals.
In this respect, Mead’s strict scientific methodology excludes the issue of cultural
particulars, differences in human capabilities, emotional persuasion, rhetoric and strategic
action. The assumption that after the Enlightenment, some how, people have been
transformed into rational beings intent on achieving a consensus was pervasive. But in
other disciplines such as science, technology, politics, and business that encounter ethical
issues only in terms of social responsibility conducive to a successful enterprise, reason
never assumes an emancipatory function. Hence, in those disciplines consensus is
contractual agreement.

Gadamer indicates that the nature of scientific methodology and scientific enquiry
does not successfully explain the realm of the social sciences and art. Imbedded in
Gadamer’s emphasis on tradition is the relation of the self (I) to the notion of the ‘Thou,’
which is possible only as a part of the culture (Bildung)27. Gadamer says, “What remains
important is the concept that a self can be formed without breaking with or repudiating
one’s past and that this formation cannot be achieved by any merely technical or
methodical means.”28 Interestingly, Gadamer discusses two kinds of experience, one is
Erlebnis and the other is Erfahrung. With respect to the Erlebnis, Gadamer speaks of
27

Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. xii.

68

aesthetic experience or experience of works of art. Erlebnis has a subjective tinge. With
reference to the Erfahrung, Gadamer discusses experience that pertains to the lifeworld
and perspectival horizon. It is within this experience that the ‘I – Thou’ relationship
needs to be situated. According to Gadamer, Erfahrung is a constant fusion of horizons,
integrating new experiences.

In Habermas’ search for a postnational constellation there is an urgency towards
universalization of horizons, which does not allow a role for subjectivity. Gadamer warns
against such a hasty generalization in which the individual moments are tyrannized in
search of the universal. By defining experience as shades of Erlebnis and Erfahrung,
Gadamer addresses the issues of being and becoming respectively. The ‘I – Thou’
relationship in Gadamer is one of creative interrelation. Such a dynamic interrelation
between two interacting subjects could be understood from Gadamer’s views on
communication. Communication is akin to excavation of historical sites. In a
communication, the subject matter (Sache) becomes mutually accessible.29

Habermas’ emphasis on the illocutionary force of arguments in a normative
regulated action has the telos of uncoerced consensus. But in spite of universal
pragmatics, which emphasizes communication aimed at mutual understanding, discourse
is not mutually accessible to the participants with strategic and dramaturgical motives.
While a self-imposed code of conduct emphasizes coherence of intentions and
declaration of intentions, which is epitomized by the illocutionary speech acts of Austin,
28
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normatively regulated discourse has an expressly practical telos. Truthfulness, truth, and
rightness are associated with validity claims that are contested in a discourse. But
truthfulness or sincerity is not the defining feature of a normative discourse. Truthfulness
or sincerity, which is the hallmark of a concept of authenticity, cannot be institutionalized
except in a religious discourse because of its subjective nature.

Everyday discourse is authentic in its sphere and there cannot be a generalized
account of authenticity, which is epoch defying.30 In Habermas’ normatively regulated
action, only filtering cultural differences in an “ideal speech situation” ensure personal
autonomy, which is incumbent on the rationality of human beings. Mead explains the
social situatedness of communication. He says,

The social environment is endowed with meanings in terms of the process of
social activity; it is an organization of objective relations which arises in relation
to a group of organisms engaged in such activity, in processes of social
experience and behavior. Certain characters of the external world are possessed
by it only with reference to or in relation to an interacting social group of
individual organisms; just as other characters of it are possessed by it only with
reference to or in relation to individual organisms themselves. The relation of the
social process of behavior -- or the relation of the social organism-to the social
environment is analogous to the relation of the processes of individual biological
activity-or the relation of the individual organism-to the physical-biological
environment.”31

Accessibility of language camouflages inequalities and differences that a culture
injects into the language. Here, Gadamer’s critique of Habermas’ emphasis on rationally
motivated consensus is especially valid. According to Gadamer, language conceals more
29
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than what it reveals. Habermas’ emphasis on the illocutionary force of an argument is
based on the concept of authenticity belonging to the Enlightenment epoch. But in a
decentered world of understanding, any attempt at universalization is paradoxical. On the
one hand, universalization is possible on the basis of objective and empirical
observations. On the other hand, universalization is anti-thetical to a decentered
understanding. In Lyotard’s parlance, there are only petty narratives and not grand
narratives. Habermas seeks to conjoin petty narratives and grand narratives in a
decentered lifeworld. In this sense, Habermas’ has effected a change in the paradigm
from ‘consciousness’ to ‘language.’

Mead clearly distinguishes an ideal discourse from a socially situated discourse.
He also mentions that a social discourse is influenced by economic, religious, and
political factors. Mead says,
Universal discourse is the formal ideal of communication. If communication can
be carried through and made perfect, then there exists the kind of democracy to
which we have referred, in which each individual would carry just the response in
himself that he knows he calls out in the community. That is what makes
communication in the significant sense the organizing process in the community.
It is not simply a process of transferring abstract symbols; it is always a gesture in
a social act which calls out in the individual himself the tendency to the same act
that is called out in others.
What we call the ideal of a human society is approached in some sense by the
economic society on the one side and by the universal religions on the other side,
but it is not by any means fully realized.32
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Both Mead and Habermas envision a state of perfection even though philosophically they
realize the vacuousness of such an idea whether it is a perfect democracy for Mead or
“ideal speech situation” for Habermas. Thus, a theory of consensus constructed upon a
theory of perfection in an atmosphere of imperfection is bound to be exclusionary.
Gadamer refuses to acknowledge such a state of perfection even though language as a
paradigm is not inimical to a hermeneutical understanding of the tradition.

Consensus must necessarily take into account individual interests and values.
Mutual cooperation must not neglect individual aspirations. In this chapter, I have
discussed two approaches to interpersonal communication. One is an interest-based
interaction and the other is mutual cooperation. Mead’s theory of social behavior is based
on the success of internalization of the perspectives of other actors. Hence, it restricts the
scope of the otherness. Gadamer’s approach recognizes the autonomy of the other and
requires the interaction of the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ as independent but culturally informed
actors who cannot be reduced to each other. I favor Gadamer’s treatment of en-worlded
subjects who as historically situated and hermeneutically conscious agents have to come
together and discuss mutually important issues. An asymmetrical process of consensus
does not stipulate rationality or an ideal social choice. Preferences become values or vice
versa in the course of a consensual activity. Values and preferences evolve only in the
process of consensus. Thus, cultural particulars are dialogically contested.
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Chapter 3
Consensus in the Realm of Science

Science – Cultural Paradigm of Democracy
In this chapter, I have attempted to explain the triangular relation between science,
culture, and liberal democracy. The dominant cultural paradigm in the Western
hemisphere, which is science, informs the background understanding and shared
lifeworld in social, political, and cultural spheres of interaction. Consensus in the
Western hemisphere is to be understood within the framework of the dominant cultural
paradigm.1 Charles Sanders Peirce emphasized the importance of science for the
betterment of society. Charles Sanders Peirce’s writings on community of observers and
unlimited community indicate his interest in the social relevance of scientific method.
Peirce argued that an experimental method devised along the principles of science would
facilitate convergence of beliefs. Peirce applies an experimental method, which is similar
to Karl Popper’s theory of falsification in order to verify the logical certainty of beliefs.
Kwame Anthony Appiah asserts that science as a paradigm questions existing social and

1
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cultural beliefs, while stipulating what is and what ought to be believed.2 Synchronous
questions such as what is scientific and unscientific, justification of scientific hypothesis,
and diachronous questions such as the historical development of the discipline of science
inform the discourse about society, politics, education, and economy in the Western
hemisphere.

In advanced liberal democracies, science is the context of justification for
important issues. Our attempt to achieve a consensus is dependent upon science, which is
the context of justification. I will also examine Rawls’ theory of justice, which applies the
method of hypothesis but without the supporting premises. Rawls neglects the impact of
science on the lifeworld. I will show how Peirce and Popper accepted the historicity of
science while Rawls begins with the ahistorical conception of politics in his theory of
“Original position.” Rawls is thus guilty of theorizing for an entirely different lifeworld.
His theory of justice is theory laden but suffers from the lacuna of positing an ahistorical,
stationary, and isolated social thought experiment. In order to explain the effect of Peirce
and Rawls’s theories on liberal democracy, I will utilize Stephen Turner’s writings on
liberal democracy. I will show how the method of hypothesis is conducive to achieve
consensus in scientific and social spheres.

Karl Popper claims that disciplines such as psychology and history are afflicted
by demarcation problems. Disciplines such as psychology and Marxism were considered
to be scientifically justifiable in the early twentieth century. Popper argues that scientific
2
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predictions are not possible in the afore-mentioned instances and only a negative
utilitarian (reducing the misery instead of increasing the happiness) thesis is possible.
Popper’s social and political thought is characterized by his theory of falsification, which
will be discussed more elaborately in the course of this chapter. Popper believed that in
order to test the validity of scientific theories, they must be subjected to the attempt of
falsification. Unlike the post-Enlightenment optimism of an emancipated society, Popper
has a very moderate projection of social advancement, which he calls “piecemeal
engineering.”3 Popper attributes historicism and holism to the natural yearning of human
beings to control their lives with the knowledge of future events. Popper argues that
society is not static, isolated, and recurrent like the solar system.4 Hence, according to
Popper, future-oriented social programs are not scientifically justifiable. But Popper
concedes that scientific advancement impacts education and hence social and political
changes have occurred. Popper, himself, was a staunch advocate of liberal democracy.

Lakatos and Putnam criticized Popper’s theory of falsification for simplifying the
process of critical evaluation of a scientific hypothesis.5 Lakatos argued that Popper’s
disjunction of falsification/corroboration does not encapsulate how major theories in
science are corroborated. Only repeated experimental failures could undermine the
scientific validity of major theories of science. Unless a theory fails to satisfy both simple
and complex experimental applications consistently, only the auxillary hypothesis to the
established theory is altered.
3
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Popper’s philosophy of science has direct influence on his social and political
thought. According to Popper, applying the method of natural sciences in social sciences
would encourage totalitarianism. Popper admits that science is the major social paradigm.
By denying science of the task of predicting historical development, Popper seeks to
preempt social engineering. Popper emphasized the importance of creativity and heuristic
motivation in scientific research. Similarly, Charles Sanders Peirce also emphasized the
methodology of science in understanding the phenomenon of the world. In order to
cultivate the habit of scientific thinking, Peirce envisaged a community of observers. For
Peirce, scientific research was a social activity and hence a need for consensus among the
scientists was necessary for the development of critical inquiry.

There is a stark difference between the consensual activity of a group of scientists
working on a specific scientific problem and a group of scientists who are working on a
problem that involves multi-lateral levels of understanding. An example of the former
would be nuclear scientists and the latter environmental scientists. Another example is
that of a group of medical scientists discussing an epidemic. In the field of science, there
is a contrast between the cognitive understanding of the expert and the audience. For a
specialized group of professionals, linguistic and communicative competencies about
their field are immediate. For the group of experts who observe the process and
development of a theory, product, or policy, results are explainable in terms of structural
factors within their discipline. But, the non-experts resort to a belief in the authority of
the experts, which is tenaciously clung on to by them. The cognitive understanding of the
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expert is identified by her proximity to the process of structural changes within a
particular paradigm where as in the case of non-expert it is defined in terms of an ardent
adherence to the principles laid down by the experts.

The clash of paradigms within a culture is due to the conflict between the
expertise and non-expertise aspects of theorization of knowledge within a scientific
discipline. Instead of characterizing the debate between science and other disciplines as
theory – practice problem, it is imperative to recognize the chasm between the status of
experts and the audience. Russ Hanson argues that all observations are theory-laden.6
Hence, Hanson refutes the existence of a theory-practice problem. The cognitive
authority of scientists emanates from their expertise. Since there is no real plausibility of
direct access to the citadels of scientific knowledge for the non-experts, only avenues of
fixing beliefs are that of authority, tenacity, and a priori forms. The non-expert audience
understands science, as an alien paradigm, in terms of other accessible paradigms. In
several ways, the process of understanding science by non-scientific audience stunningly
resembles Plato’s “allegory of the cave” and the Indian parable of “five blind men and an
elephant.”7

Expert Versus Audience
The expert or the non-expert tag is dynamic and interchangeable when paradigms change.
Depending upon the esteem need of the society, expertise is valued. A doctor is a nonexpert when she learns music or dance from an artist and vice versa. But there is a tacit
6
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understanding of the hierarchy on the social scale. For all the popularity and fame, in the
corridors of power, scientific, economic, and legal experts have more political clout than
artists. There was an epoch when art was considered divine. During that epoch, even
management was considered to be an art. Martial art is a classic example. Now, martial
art is called martial science. What was considered to be a divine individual talent is now
harvested scientifically. Social rationalization has transformed many an art into a science.
John Dewey’s writings on aesthetics bespeak of the importance of education and training
in art, sport, law, psychology, and science.8 This could be attributed to the
disenchantment of the lifeworld due to a change in paradigm to science and the
democratization of the public sphere. Religious bewitchment of the intellect has given
way to the scientific mastery of the environment. Science is about universals and hence
cultural particulars have played a limited role. Or science can also be explained as
essentially a bourgeoisie steering mechanism from the viewpoint of the left.9 Science has
been an effective justificatory context for the communists and the capitalists alike. My
objective in emphasizing the scientific method and science as a cultural paradigm is to
explain that symmetrical conception of consensus in based on an idea of rational citizen
who is heuristically motivated to know the reality. Democracy and science have
transformed the process of achieving consensus.

In the Middleages, as long as science did not challenge the existing paradigm,
which was religion, there was an uneasy peace between them. In some sense, the
paradigm conflict between science and religion was also a clash between religious and
8
9
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scientific bourgeoisie, in which the proletariat were the infantrymen. As Turner points
out, the masses are ensnared by the sentiment of self-denial and whichever paradigm
portrays itself as the epitome of self-denial that paradigm would be respected. In a liberal
democracy, there are institutions and processes to legitimate paradigms and the most
important avenue for legitimating is by discussion. To some extent, knowledge
associations, boundary organizations, and commissions bridge the distance between the
experts and the audience.10 But the question that is upper-most in our midst is whether
consensus achieved via knowledge associations is a surrogate-consensus?

Expertise – Transformation of the Cultural Paradigm
Kwasi Wiredu emphasizes the need to recognize the objective of a dialogue that seeks to
achieve consensus. According to Wiredu, questions about cultural particulars in religion,
ideology, and ideals can be intractable. The objective of a consensual activity is to arrive
at an agreement on ‘what needs to be done.’ A debate about ‘what ought to be done’
would never end. The everlasting struggle between the proponents of various ‘ought’
positions is based on dogmas and hence positions that are at variance cannot be
reconciled without a complete transformation of the belief systems of the participants in a
dialogue. Hence, Wiredu insists on the separation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ issues in the
epistemological realm from social and political issues while attempting to reach a
consensus. The testability of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ positions is logical in the realm of
epistemology and more specifically science. In social and political realm, what Peirce
calls the methods of fixing beliefs such as tenacity, authority, and the a priori operate
10
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along with the experimental method. In the social realm, logic is a heuristic tool.
Wiredu’s position is very similar to Rawlsian theory of avoidance and his separation of
political idea of justice as fairness, on the one hand, and metaphysical, religious, moral,
and subjective conceptions of justice, on the other. But Wiredu does not advocate an ideal
situation in which social and historical conditions must be suspended in a political
discourse.

Pragmatic Consensus
Charles Sanders Peirce’s writings on fixing beliefs, clear ideas, and necessity elucidate
the need to have guiding principles or provisional hypothesis, not only in science but also
in everyday transactions, rather than absolutely indubitable principles as the starting
point.11 Science is a discipline that emphasizes common skills, training, and common
discourse.12 Turner points out the monopolistic nature of scientific expertise and its
inalienable connection with politics. The general tenor of Turner’s argument that
scientific expertise is political could be extended to other forms of expertise such as
religious, economic, literary, artistic, and therapeutic. Expertise in its nature is
monopolistic. As Turner points out, what Ulrich Beck terms as demonopolization is never
plausible in any form of expertise.13 A political consensus on subjective, emotive, and
vexatious issues is even more intractable. Hence, what Turner calls self-denial is
indispensable for achieving a political consensus on issues pertaining to individual
interest such as income tax, distribution of resources, agricultural subsidies, affirmative
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action, and healthcare.14 Consensus becomes even more difficult when the paradigm is as
asymmetric as social justice, ethnic diversity, multiculturalism, and terrorism. Let us
discuss the prospects of applying scientific models in social communication.

Most of the early pragmatists such as Peirce, James, and Dewey believed that a
functional model of science could effectively solve the problems of authority,
dogmatism, and a priori modes of ascertaining beliefs. Peirce suggested an interesting
idea of what could be termed as working hypothesis, which resembles the theory of
falsification suggested by Karl Popper. According to Popper,15

The result of tests is the selection of hypotheses which have stood up to tests, or
the elimination of those hypotheses which have not stood up to them, and which
are therefore rejected. It is important to realize the consequences of this view.
They are these: all tests can be interpreted as attempts to weed out false theories to find the weak points of a theory in order to reject it if it is falsified by the test.
This view is sometimes considered paradoxical; our aim, it is said, it to establish
theories, not to eliminate false ones. But just because it is our aim to establish
theories as well as we can, we must test them as severely as we can; that is, we
must try to find fault with them, we must try to falsify them. Only if we cannot
falsify them in spite of our best efforts can we say that they have stood up to
severe tests. This is the reason why the discovery of instances which confirm a
theory mean very little if we have not tried, and failed, to discover refutations. For
if we are uncritical we shall always find what we want: we shall look for, and
find, confirmations, and we shall look away from, and not see, whatever might be
dangerous to our pet theories. In this way it is only too easy to obtain what
appears to be overwhelming evidence in favor of a theory which, if approached
critically, would have been refuted. In order to make the method of selection by
elimination work, and to ensure that only the fittest theories survive, their struggle
for life must be made severe by them.
14
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According to Peirce, both deductive and inductive inferences do not need absolute
certainty.16 As MacIntyre describes in After Virtue, problems concerning generalization
of predictions in social sciences could be traced to their tendency to model their methods
on the basis of the mathematical models of natural sciences.17 In the natural sciences,
there is an ‘Original position,’ which is, according to Peirce, provisional and
hypothetical. Peirce’s aim was to discover a method of forging an agreement in the realm
of community and not just individuals. The most important tenets of Peirce’s pragmatism
are as follows:

1. Beliefs are identical if and only if they give rise to the same habit of action.
2. Beliefs give rise to the same habit of action if and only if they appease the
same doubt by producing the same rule of action.

The underlying assumption in Peirce’s pragmatic definition of belief as a habit is the
emphasis on the motivation for action. Only that which motivates a person to act is a
belief. By tracing the pattern of beliefs, one can also anticipate the path of action. The
scientific methodology imbedded in this approach appears to be hampered by
stereotyping action-habit-belief patterns. But as John Murphy points out, there can be
different beliefs, which produce same actions. This is the iconic method of signification
of Peirce. The meaning of an action is dependent upon the result it produces. According
to Peirce, “ … we come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of
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every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may be; and there is no
distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference in
practice.”18 An allied aspect of Peirce’s pragmatism is his experimentalism. Peirce
wanted to cultivate a habit of thinking as a question of experimentation as it is thought in
the laboratories. In his “The Fixation of Belief” he delineates four methods of fixing
beliefs. They are as follows:19

1. Method of tenacity
2. Method of authority
3. A priori method
4. Experimental method.

A true belief, for Peirce, is the one, which elicits general agreement. Peirce’s
experimental method emphasizes a concomitant relation between habit, action, true belief
and consequences. Peirce’s experimentalism is incumbent on scientific realism. While the
experimental method poses several important questions about religion, culture, customs,
and manners, it is not directly applicable to issues that have a long and torturous history.

Scientific consensus that was sought by Peirce is easier to achieve in a laboratory
setting in which heuristic motivation is an important factor. But in politics, the emphasis
is not on knowledge but power. For politics, science is an instrument of power, which has
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replaced religion. A scientific consensus, which is a broad consensus about a scientific
finding, is different from a consensus among scientists. The former is an informed
judgment, which is more debatable. Stephen Turner gives the example of global
warming. There is a broad consensus among scientists about global warming while on the
other hand there are wide variances in conclusions drawn in different studies on global
warming.20 A good example of consensus among scientists would be a group of medical
professionals who discuss the most effective treatment to epidemics and arrive at a
consensus.

Peirce, while trying to clear the cobwebs of metaphysical muddles, suggests the
application of the model of consensus among scientists to non-scientific realms. The
community of observers who are more scientific in their approach would have to contend
with conflict of interests in social, political and economic spheres. While an emphasis on
functionality could redress metaphysical muddles, which paralyze society, especially in
the religious realm, into inactivity, it could also create new modes of reality that is
scientifically constructed.

In the laboratory, scientific procedures that are adopted need an objectivating
attitude. It is impossible to adopt such an objectivating attitude to social and political
issues because people have different beliefs on which they are prepared to act. (It is to be
noted here that Peirce was an anti-foundationalist and believed that knowledge was
historical.) Habits of action have become ingrained in people’s minds. In the public
20
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sphere, there is no ground zero (theoretically) in contrast to what a scientist has in the
laboratory, especially with respect to vexatious religious, social, economic, and political
issues. However, for the purpose of consensual activity, the tenor of Peirce’s
experimental method could be utilized. The concept of non-teleological activity with
emphasis on procedures rather than final ends could be a viable alternative. In the postmodern epoch, is it possible to have a purposive activity as practiced in Aristotelian
polis? It appears impossible to have a concrete purposive goal for a society or a
community without subordinating the individual goals to the common goal. In a liberal
democracy, the assumption of inviolable individual liberty is both a boon and a bane. For
the protection of individual rights and facilitating individual cultural development, an
emphasis on individual rights is inevitable. But, how are the social goals to be reconciled
with the individual goals? There is an inherent contradiction in liberal democracy. By
emphasizing absolute inviolability of individual rights, a position of compromise is
preempted.

Ian Hacking argues that there are problems related to the scientization of moral or
ethical issues. Hacking explains how the concept of child cruelty was medicalized into
the phenomenon of child abuse.21 In the 1960s, a group of physicians in Colorado
decided to define child cruelty in medical terms. Thus, the scientization of child cruelty
began deliberately in an effort to take it away from the realm of ordinary discourse to the
realm of scientific discourse. In course of time, most of the developed Western countries
promulgated laws and elaborate procedures to address the issue of child abuse. Hospitals
21
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and law enforcement agencies were inundated with reports of child abuse. Since, the
occurrence of child abuse is not akin to traditional criminal activities, the help of the
society was enlisted to inform the police and child-care agencies about plausible cases of
child abuse. While the process of determining whether a child has been abused was
scientifically analyzed, the process of affixing the blame was carried out in a haphazard
manner. Thus, scientific method does not ensure fairness.

One of the problems that Peirce did not envisage with the scientific method was
the evolution of technology as the business engine of science. As long as science
remained as the pursuit of knowledge, the fruits of its endeavors trickle down to the
public sphere only as a movement from above. On the other hand, with the inextricable
matrimony of science and technology, science has also lost its perceived emancipatory
telos that it gained during the Enlightenment epoch. The aim of reason to emancipate the
humankind from the throes of despair into which it was thrown by religion was frittered
away once again with the intervention of politics. Religion, as long as it did not attempt
to legislate what reality was, had an important role in constituting a goal for human life.
But with the ascent of reason, it gradually abdicated its authority to science. Science, as
long as it was concerned with the discovery of the wonders of nature, had an
emancipatory telos. But, once science started constituting reality by mastering nature and
altering the balance of nature, it became a dominating force. Science has effectively
replaced religion as the new religion.
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As monarchy, oligarchy, timocracy, and tyranny were the political expressions of
a religious-communitarian society, democracy is the expression of a scientific society.22
Democracy and science, together, constructed the world of freedom and suffrage. As
religious institutions of the West fervently proselytized in foreign lands and on many an
occasion engaged in forcible conversions, which were justified in terms of superior
knowledge and culture, the present day democracies of the West justify the
proselytization of democratic practices based on a scientific methodology. But Peirce’s
experimental method is not aimed at the construction of an infallible foundational
ideology. But still it suffers from a failure to recognize the infelicities and abuses that
would have ensued from a total emphasis on experimental methodology.23 Peirce
explains that synonymous sentences could be used to explain different beliefs and
antonymous sentences could be used to express similar beliefs.24 Ultimately, the behavior
determines the efficacy of the belief. Peirce seems to anticipate perlocutionary speech
acts of Austin.25 While Peirce’s theory explains the problem of beliefs in a refreshingly
explicit manner, the variance between beliefs could cause gargantuan problems. The
society is, at once, dogmatic, authoritarian, and speculative. The experimental method
assumes a community of observers who share the same goals and aspirations. Peirce’s
provisional hypothesis is applicable to a situation in which interlocutors share values. But
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in a civil society, consensus is difficult to achieve because interlocutors are culturally
diverse. One can only find adherence to laws of the society, which are guaranteed to elicit
penal actions from law enforcement. Laws are the religious rituals of liberal democracy.

Peirce’s Community of Observers
Charles Sanders Peirce viewed the experimental model of science as the pragmatic
technique for clarifying the meaning of ideas.26 Peirce was opposed to metaphysical
system building and hence questioned whether determinism should be the postulate of
science rather than indeterminacy. In his philosophy of evolutionary categories, Peirce
emphasizes the role of tychism (chance), synechism (continuity), and agapism
(evolutionary love). In several ways, Peirce’s philosophy has phenomenological leanings.
Peirce likens people who are unsettled by doubting a concept of truth in science or
religion to Ostriches that bury their heads in the sand. Doubt is identified with weakness
and truth with certitude. For Peirce, ultimately, the problem of doubt pertains to the
community and not restricted to the individual alone. So, Peirce identifies method of
tenacity with individual belief. The second method of fixing beliefs is that of authority.
Peirce says that the method of authority is the chosen method of upholding theological
and political doctrines. In a manner similar to the tirade of Socrates against Athenian
citizens, Peirce derisively remarks:27

Let the people turn out and tar-and-feather such men, or let inquisitions made into
the manner of thinking of suspected persons, and when they are found guilty of
26
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forbidden beliefs, let them be subjected to some signal punishment. When complete
agreement could not otherwise be reached, a general massacre of all who have not
thought in a certain way has proved a very effective means of settling opinion in a
country. If the power to do this be wanting, let a list of opinions be drawn up, to
which no man of the least independence of thought can assent, and let the faithful
be required to accept all these propositions, in order to segregate them as radically
as possible from the rest of the world.

Peirce claims that the method of authority thrives on religious and political power. The
individual right is always subordinated to the community need. A feeling of sympathy
and fellowship creates a very strong bonding which creates an intoxicating social feeling,
which demands absolute servitude. Such servitude as demanded by institutions such as
religion, guild, and aristocracy spawns an emphasis on authority. Peirce tellingly points
out the scheme of intellectual slavery initiated by organized faiths. Peirce’s examples are
also multi-cultural. The monumental stone structures erected in the name of religion in
Siam and Egypt illustrates the power of the social feeling of fellowship that characterizes
religious fervor. Peirce cites the institution of priesthood in religions as the best example
of authority. The method of authority is challenged by cross-cultural interaction, which
poses questions about the superiority of the belief perpetrated by the religious or political
authorities. A reflection on the veracity of knowledge-claims of religious or political
institutions also causes authority as a method of fixing beliefs to flounder.

A more complex method replaces the method of authority and it is called the a
priori method. The emphasis on the agreeableness to reason is the basis of the a priori
method. A description of the a priori method resembles that of the search for an essence
during romanticism. The uncanniness inherent in human beings would naturally decide
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what is reasonable in “harmony with natural causes.”28 Peirce refers to Plato’s reasoning
that “the distances of the celestial spheres from one another should be proportional to the
different length of the strings which produce harmonious chords.”29 The afore-mentioned
relation appears reasonable but it is not factual. Another universalization that Peirce
indicates is “the doctrine that man only acts selfishly-that is, from the consideration that
acting in one way will afford him more pleasure that acting in another.”30 The latter
observation could be construed as an attack on utilitarian emphasis on pleasure. Peirce is
skeptical about the a priori method because it depends on social sentiments, accidents,
and instinct. Only distantly, the a priori method is connected to observation and
verification of facts. Inductive generalizations are rampant in the a priori method.

Methods of fixing belief such as tenacity, authority, and a priori are capricious
and unsystematic. Demonstrating external certainty is not possible in the afore-mentioned
methods of fixing beliefs. Science obeys laws that are not individual but common to all.
The modes of reasoning in science are not inspirational but factual. Hence, Peirce claims
that the method of science is the only valid form of inquiry. According to Peirce, science
resolves the problem of doubt by illustrating practically and objectively the cause of such
a doubt. On the other hand, Peirce also pointed out that isolated experimentation would
not contribute to the corpus of scientific knowledge and hence science needs a
community of observers. Interestingly, Peirce also encouraged the process of formulation
of scientific hypothesis that would be a precursor to actual experimentation. In this
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context, he called the process of trial and error method of formulating successful
hypothesis abduction. For Peirce, beliefs were not infallible but probable or provisional.
What Peirce called “critical common sensism” is a perfect example of conjoinment of
teleological and deontological understanding of the process of science.31 The term
“common sensism” in terms of reflecting the “sense of the commons” is not critical. But,
“common sensism” as recognition of the commonly understood but in the backdrop of a
critical method, which is the scientific method, defines pragmatism as a philosophy, for
Peirce. The process of consensus among the community of observers operating upon a
provisional hypothesis enables the confluence of reason and experience. Reason allows
experience to manifest itself, which results in the phenomenology of the given. Thus, in
Peirce’s scientific method, procedures, application of procedures and consistent
readjustment of hypothesis have great importance. Peirce’s emphasis is on the inferential
relation between the premise and the conclusion of a scientific hypothesis. Peirce
contends towards the end of “How To Make Our Ideas Clear” that even though there are
variations in the results in the experimental method as more perfection is achieved, the
results will tend to converge rather than diverge.

Peirce’s method of logical inquiry could be applied to the process of achieving
political consensus. Peirce rejects the need for ultimate foundations in fixing beliefs and
clarifying doubts.32 Even though Rawls insists on the need for tolerance of variegated
beliefs and a phenomenological suspension of judgment in the form of ‘veil of
31
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ignorance” unlike Peirce’s theory of inquiry, Rawlsian theory of justice is handicapped
by an ascetic approach which does not engage but withdraws from the world. In some
ways, Rawlsian approach mirrors that of Romanticism that searches for a deeper self or
true meaning by valorizing one perspective of a theory of justice.33 On the other hand, the
scientific objectivating attitude necessary for social rationalization makes Rawlsian
theory of justice very much a product of the Enlightenment thinking. Rawls utilizes
economics and sociology to explain inequalities in the distribution of goods. In this
context, Ronald Dworkin contests Rawls argument that the original position would lead
to equality of resources. Dworkin argues that only equality of resources would lead to the
original position.34

In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Habermas discusses the
development of moral consciousness in relation to the process of learning and behavior.
Habermas analyzes moral rationalization on the basis of developmental psychology of
Piaget, Selman, and Kohlberg.35 The first stage of moral development is based on the
success or failure of an action and hence at the physical realm. In the second stage, the
paradigm is “Do unto others that you want to be done to you,” the Golden Rule. Not
surprisingly, the Golden Rule has been applied in all cultures and religions. Habermas
criticizes Mead for not going beyond the second stage, even though Mead proposes
mutual cooperation. The third stage is the Kantian categorical imperative “Never use
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others as means to an end.” The last mentioned is the deontological perspective in which
success or failure of desires becomes immaterial. Only the means of an action becomes
paramount. The rectitude of the means, especially in the sense of Kantian duty, attains
foremost importance. In Rawlsian and Habermasian approaches to issues such as justice,
the deontological perspective predominates. The other two realms as discussed above, is
not accorded as much importance as the categorical imperative of treating everyone as
ends and not means. Concepts such as “ideal speech situation” or “overlapping
consensus” or “reflective equilibrium” target the realms of esteem needs and not the
preliminary levels of moral development explained by Kohlberg and Sellman.36

For the purpose of achieving a consensus, is it possible to ground the process on
the supposition of highest moral development? Applying Peirce’s thesis of provisionality
of hypothesis, a strong emphasis on an emancipatory or altruistic course of moral
development appears illogical.37 But, Peirce believes very strongly that chance plays an
important role even in science. The physical world, which is governed by laws, according
to Peirce, also changes. In Peirce’s logic and scientific method, probability occupies a
special place. The Hegelian identification of the manifestation of reason in the state and
the Marxian subversion of the state as the repository of false consciousness seems to lurk
beneath the surface of most liberal theories. It is in this sense that Peirces’ provisional
hypothesis about fixation of beliefs is necessary. But, Peirce vehemently argues for
unconditional love, self-sacrifice, and unlimited community in his ethics. There is a
36
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strong sense of asymmetric and communal relationship. Even while discussing the
problem of evil, Peirce advocates unadulterated love.

Peirce’s ethics has a strong deontological component. In an almost Kantian tenor,
Peirce says, “The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim.”38 In another context
while pursuing his idea of ‘unlimited community,’ Peirce says,39
…the very first command that is laid upon you, your quite highest business and
duty, becomes, as everybody knows, to recognize a higher business than your
business, not merely an avocation after the daily task of your vocation is
performed, but a generalized conception of duty which completes your
personality by melting it into the neighboring parts of the universal cosmos.

Peirce’s passionately claims that one’s duty is to expand the ethical horizons to
embrace the whole world. Ethics, for Peirce, is a science of ideals. As a habit, ethical
action is desirable and logical. Since conduct is a rational action that aims at the ideal
good of the society, even self-sacrifice must not limit its horizons. In this sense, Peirce
advocates universal love. He calls evil a limited and imperfect stage of love. In that sense,
Peirce also separates science and ethics. A question of justice for Peirce, thus, would be
asymmetrical. Peirce’s conception of an “unlimited community” stems from the finitude
of human beings and the illogicality of hatred and destruction. Hence, Peirce’s
deontology is based on the purposelessness of fighting over issues that are ephemeral.
Peirce’s realism is evident when he emphasizes unconditional love for all. One can sense
almost Buddhistic non-attachment to the triviality of individual desires vis-à-vis common
good. Peirce strongly argues that the welfare of the community defines individual goals.
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The Original position – Precondition of an Overlapping Consensus
Rawls’ theory of justice emphasizes the liberal notion of the inviolability of individual
rights. In the same breadth, Rawls also propounds a proviso, which ensures equal
distribution of opportunities and resources in a manner advantageous to the underprivileged groups in a society. The original position, according to Rawls, is the initial
situation. Rawls says, “These principles are those which rational persons concerned to
advance their interests would accept in this position of equality to settle the basic terms of
their association.” Later, Rawls claims, “The original position is defined in such a way
that it is a status quo in which the parties are equally represented as moral persons and the
outcome is not conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social
forces.”40 In the following quotation, Rawls refutes the utilitarian theory of the greatest
good of greatest numbers. According to Rawls,41

Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of
a society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of
justice for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not
allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of
advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the rights secured by
justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.

Rawls’ afore-mentioned emphasis on deontology is aimed at preempting purposive
rationalization, that is, a theory of justice as a confluence of individual interests. An
emphasis on purposive-teleological rationality encourages individual pursuit of
happiness. Rawls, by emphasizing the deontological aspects of theory of justice, ensures

40
41

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 102-104.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 3-4.

95

an overlapping consensus based on shared consent, mutual respect, reciprocity, fairness
in terms of equality and opportunity and other primary goods. But Rawls’ ‘difference
principle’ is akin to the Lockean proviso that characterizes his theory of property.42
Rawls acknowledges the existence of inherent inequalities in a society. But by
propounding the condition of ‘Original position’ which when characterized by a ‘veil of
ignorance’ leads to the two principles of justice, Rawls ignores the historicity of the
social understanding of democracy.

A Lockean program for the colonization of the American continent was based on
the justification of acquiring landed property on the basis of labor.43 Equality and human
rights were not universal ideals during Locke’s era. But it is quite clear that for Hobbes,
Locke and Rousseau, slavery was not as unproblematic as it was for other philosophers
and thinkers of their era. There is definitely a paradigm shift from ‘what ought to be’ to
‘what is to be done,’ especially, in Hobbes and Locke. A strong emphasis on individual
rights and property was a great leap in political philosophy for the reason that a less
comprehensive doctrine of social and political conceptualization was being introduced in
the West. The British society, during the period of Hobbes and Locke, was governed by
strict religious dictates that spawned the entire spectrum of life. Hence, horizontal sociopolitical associations and voluntary associations were available only to the upper classes.
But with a common law ensuring the safety and security of the individuals without
reference to the class or creed of the people brought about a great revolution in Britain.
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By ordaining the state with the responsibility of guaranteeing safety and security
of the individuals, social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke engineered a formula
that benefited both the state and the citizens. Hitherto, the state was corporate and hence
encumbered by lugubrious inefficiency on account of its monumental administrative
tasks. Since, religion, education, sports, arts, economy, and foreign policy were all
concentrated in the hands of the state the task of administration became cumbersome and
unwieldy. With the diminution of religious and social tasks, which were to be followed
by the liberalization of trade, the state became more efficient in delegating authority
whereby ensuring responsibility. Thus, social contract and later democracy rescued the
suffering state. With social responsibility vested in the individuals, social values
underwent a tremendous change. Institutions that were more democratic and reciprocal
such as constitution, parliament, congress, courts, and elections gradually replaced the
elite political systems that installed institutions and established values.

One can deduce the unmistakable imprint of the Enlightenment reason, which had
quashed the divine rights theory or even a theory of privilege masquerading as a theory of
natural selection. In many ways, Socratic polis is a paradox and reveals the maladies of a
comprehensive and centralized state. Socrates also assumes an original position in the
form of selection and training regimen for the auxillaries. The laborers and
handicraftsmen are naturally bereft of qualities that are to be found in the guardians and
auxillaries. The Socratic Republic indicates the failure of a totally deontological system
and the need for teleological action. A Republic exists as a just state, which is
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purposive.44 In order to maintain the sanctity of the Republic, those factors that do not
assist in the betterment of the Republic have to be weeded out.

For Rawls, the original position entails the foundation of an equitable system of
social equality and freedom. Rawls assumes those conditions as a given in a liberal
democracy what Hobbes and Locke envisioned as proposed guarantees. In Rawls’ theory
of justice, the goods that were so important for Hobbes and Locke are already enshrined
in a constitutional democracy and hence the ascent to the next stage is that of justice for
all. Hobbes and Locke enunciated a social contract theory, which also assumed certain
shared qualities of human beings. Both Hobbes and Locke were influenced by Newtonian
mechanics, particularly, and science, in general. Hence, the concept of ‘becoming’
assumed more importance to that of ‘being.’

Rawls does not accord importance to the process of expertization of the liberal
public sphere. But Rawls did not apply the methodology of science because of an
inversion in the conception of politics. Aristotle’s good life in a polis is not the basis of
Rawlsian minimal conception of the role of politics. Instead of integrating the horizontal
(an emphasis on addressing those issues that affect the society in the present) and vertical
concepts of development (future-oriented objectives), Rawls precludes politics from
social reality by performing an epoche on everything except what could be simplified as
food, clothing, and shelter. Thus, politics, which is hailed as the mother of all sciences by
Aristotle, has been reduced to a discipline that can arbitrate issues, which do not brook
44
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emotional or ideological responses. Thus, in Peircean parlance, Rawls’ theory of justice
only aspires to be an a priori theory of fixing beliefs in the political arena.

Rawls’ theory of justice operates on the concept of arriving at a consensus, which
faintly resembles Peirce’s experimental method of inquiry. The foundational principle of
Rawls’ theory of justice is the ‘Original position.’45 The ‘Original position’ is a situation
in which individual interests are kept in abeyance and only a rational approach to
common interest is suggested. Among a community of believers in the rectitude of
reason, the two principles of justice, namely, the principle of equal opportunity and the
difference principle will be the final rational evolutes. Rawls believes that there would be
consensus in the process of distribution of resources because of the absence of individual
interests. A veil of ignorance is the self-imposed restriction on rationalization on the basis
of individual interests and goods. According to Rawls, in the Original position none will
be advantaged or disadvantaged by social or natural contingencies. While Rawls’
approach is less comprehensive, the procedural approach itself is a long-term approach. A
procedural approach to the concept of social justice demands a very strong commitment
to the process, which is not debatable. While Rawls does not define a hierarchy of ends,
rational interlocutors would decide for themselves whether the principles chosen to
represent the process of realizing justice is fair to all. Rawls tries to conjoin rational
foundations and pragmatic functionalism.
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The theory of justice is comprehensive because it follows a causal argument
ensuing from the concept of impartiality of reason and scientific objectivity. Rawls’
theory of justice is comprehensive in terms of cultural universals and not in terms of
cultural particulars. Rawls’ thought experiment is thoroughly an Enlightenment ideal
recast in the mold of twentieth century liberal democracy. A concept of Aristotelian
eudaimonia with the social conditions of a Greek polis is more comprehensive while
Rawlsian approach is less comprehensive because of the triumph of individual rights and
right to property in a democracy. The foundational principles of Rawls’ theory of justice,
principle of equal opportunity and the difference principle are constant. Only a process of
institutionalization of justice in the form of laws, institutions, and government policies
could usher in social change. Reflective equilibrium, the state of theory merging with the
practice, which is asymptotic to the say, the least, maintains an emphasis on the
principles of justice.46

Rawlsian theory of justice needs both empirical and theoretical justification as
indicated by Dworkin.47 By neglecting theoretical justification of a theory of justice,
Rawls does not accord importance to the critical evaluation of empirical justification. A
theory of justice encounters great difficulties when faced with ethical dilemma, scientific
issues, and political decision-making. While Rawls might eschew a comprehensive
theory of justice in order to avoid controversial and vexatious claims that are ideological
in nature, a compartmentalized view of human lifeworld into public and private spheres
has never been able to withstand the onslaught of media, government, religion, and
46
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technology. Unless Rawls proves the absolute separation of physical and mental qualities
of human beings, the attitude of avoidance amounts to an act of ascetic withdrawal from
the hostile world. As enworlded subjects, human beings do not have the luxury of
withdrawing from the world.

Most of the theories on justice are hampered by either an entirely comprehensive
or minimalistic approach. In order to have an effective theory of social justice, there is a
need for not only normatively regulated approach but also a theory of justice that speaks
to people both at the individual and social realms. That is a theory of justice or good have
to be of interest to the society as well as the individual. There have been several attempts
from Plato to Rawls to situate a theory of justice as a communal virtue or as an individual
motivational principle. In all these approaches, there is a tacit assumption that people
want to live in a certain way. Interestingly, Chanakya and Machiavelli also arrived at the
conclusion that people yearn to live peacefully with their families and aspire for wealth.
There is a tendency not to consider human life as a mixture of both good and bad. Liberal
democracy is an approach, which harnesses the good and discourages the bad with
respect to individual rights. Any absolute frame of reference for good and bad is not
amenable to addressing problems addressing social justice at different levels, as the
paradigm of religion proved. Religious faith sought eternity in an ephemeral world.
Hence, Rawls constructs his theory of justice on a soft consensus that ignores social
situations.
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Problems in Peircean and Rawlsian Models of Consensus
I will first discuss the problems associated with Peirce’s experimental method and then
Rawls’ procedural method. In Peirce’s method, the appearance-reality problematic of
Plato remains alive. While science is not a vain search for Utopia, for Peirce, it is
inherently better than other methods of affixing beliefs such as tenacity, authority, and
the a priori method because of its provisional foundations and critical methodology. But
on the other hand, science is also a social construct and it battles other disciplines for
being the tool of social change. What Peirce also considers the convergence of logical
thinking and scientific knowledge necessarily requires the eclipse of methods of tenacity,
authority, and a priori. I emphasize that even scientific method contains appeals to
tenacity, authority, and a priori justification since science is institutionalized. This was
the reason why Karl Popper recommended falsification as the method of ascertaining the
validity of scientific theories.

In the course of time, science also spawned institutions akin to religious institutions.
Religious institutions had the priestly class, the oligarchic patrons, powerful rulers, and
loyal followers.48 Science has effectively replaced religion with its own hierarchy with
the experts on top of the hierarchy. As Lyotard predicted, governments and experts have
a mutually enriching relationship as long as the relationship is cooperative to the agenda
of the government. But with great technological advancements, governments need
technocrats and not just bureaucratic administrators. Such a class requirement only serves
48
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to cement the hegemony of the educated elites, which is meritocracy, admixed with
aristocracy. Such an arrangement led Plato to anoint Philosopher-King as the ideal
concoction of reason and spirit. In a society composed of “noble lies,” such a concoction
of qualities (Gold, Silver, Iron or Bronze) is plausible.

The dilemma of convincing the people about the imperative need to change a system
of governance underscores two possibilities. On the one hand, it takes a long time for a
system of governance to change procedurally. On the other, democracy, which is a
“government by discussion”, is problematic because of the universalistic ideals that
characterize a conception of democratic polity in general. One of the prime examples
given by Turner in Liberal Democracy 3.0 is that of Rawls’ theory of justice.

Rawlsian theory of justice takes into consideration a sample of people who are
already democratic and hence already into the scheme of social rationalization particular
to liberal democracy. Furthermore, the sample of people chosen also has an ideal though
minimal in the Rawlsian sense. Thus, whether one person or a group of persons
imagining oneself in the situation of the original position would come up only with the
two Rawlsian principles of justice. Rawls tacitly applies the experimental method of
Peirce and introduces an Aristotelian intent. Hence, Rawls wants to conjure a science of
morality. It is a vividly Aristotelian project sans social stratification. Even though Turner
criticizes Rawls for not taking into account the impact of science in determining the
character of liberal democracy, following the tradition of pragmatism, Rawls and other
political theorists have imbibed the scientific method adopted by both Peirce and Dewey.
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The ‘guiding principle’ and ‘provisional hypothesis’ of Peirce find an echo in Rawls as
original position and a veil of ignorance respectively. While Peirce is optimistic about his
experimental method and the application of the consensus among scientists to the realm
of everyday discourse, Rawls banishes science from the political realm. It is ironical that
Rawls says that the science follows a different methodology that cannot be discussed in
the political realm. But Rawls’ notion of a healthy liberal democracy assumes the
following about a good society.49

1. No sexual discrimination
2. No racial discrimination
3. No religious discrimination
4. No social discrimination

The afore-mentioned injunctions require laws supported by scientific procedures from
fields such as economics, statistics, biology, and physics, to name a few. Laws necessary
entail enforcement of penalties in case of infringement. Science disproves bogus theories
about evolution of human beings, sexual differences, and rational capacity.

Rawls assumes a pervasive sense of a humaneness as the foundation of a
democratic community as a given. In Rawls’monumental work on justice, one can find a
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divergence of good and justice. This divergence also impacts Rawls conception of natural
duties and institutional obligations. Rawls himself discusses how his theory of justice
takes an Archimedean standpoint because of its emphasis on long-term wellness of the
society. Rawls also emphasizes how individual desires that conflict with the principles of
justice are to be discouraged.50 But contrary to Rawls’ claim that justice supersedes good,
justice is also a good. Perhaps, as Socrates claims in the Republic, justice is the highest
good. As Joseph Raz, William Galston and Alasdair MacIntyre emphasize relentlessly, at
least a minimal perfectionism is necessary.51 In his chapter on “Justice in Political
Economy,” Rawls speaks of “embedding ideals in our working principles” which
encapsulates the necessary connection between short-term and long-term goals. But what
Rawls maintains as the independence of the theory of justice from the existing wants and
needs is not possible by a less comprehensive theory of fairness.52 I strongly argue that
the process of establishing a just society is a positive conception, which requires a
metamorphosis of the existing social conditions that ferment injustices in the society.

An ideal thought-experiment while functioning as a driving force needs an
overlapping consensus with the progressive elements of the various arms of the society
such as science, religion, law, and education. While disciplines such as economics, law,
and science have changed the conception of social reality, an emphasis on a political and
non-comprehensive theory of justice is based on a conception of a static self. Charles
Guignon describes the drastic transformation of even the conception of a social self from
50
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the pre-modern to post-modern epoch.53 Globalization has mandated the need for a
comprehensive re-evaluation of the concept of justice. Both Rawls and Peirce emphasize
deontology. But Rawls espouses a policy of avoidance while Peirce advocates active
engagement. Rawls posits an ideal beginning, which would lead to an ideal outcome.
Peirce’s scientific method is “a search for the laws demanded by the facts and inclusive
of them.”54

Feibleman claims that Peirce learnt from Kant’s observation that self-love propel
people to act. The logical connection begins with the individual and ends ultimately with
the universe. According to Peirce, human beings are driven towards the possession of
ecumenical things. But, paradoxically, everything in this world is ephemeral and the
community of such things, he calls an ‘unlimited community.’55

I conclude from the afore-mentioned argument of Peirce that a consensus in a
multiculturally diverse society must logically begin with the analysis of the metaphysics
of relations between conflicting practices and extend it to the ‘unlimited community.’
This is the ideal. But Peirce also claims that consensus could be elusive due to
interpersonal and social factors. This is the reality. Peirce’s paradox presages Kenneth
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which states that individual interests and social choices
are logically divergent.56 I have tried to argue in the course of the chapter that individual
and social components are integral to any social, political, or scientific enterprise. A
53
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consensus in the political arena necessarily needs a provisional hypothesis that engages
on the one hand, beliefs that emanate from tenacity, authority, and a priori reasoning, and
on the other, illustrates and justifies the superiority of the scientific method. Democracy
is entwined with the concept of provisional hypothesis because even ideal original
positions are subject to a provisional consensus. Based on the provisionality and
justificatory nature of the method of hypothesis when applied to a social and political
system, preparatory conditions of a partial or limited consensus are established. This is
the strength of any participatory democracy, whether it is communitarian or liberal.
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Chapter 4
Kwasi Wiredu – The Akan Conception of Communitarian Consensus

In the first chapter, I applied Charles Taylor’s framework of modern social imaginaries to
analyze the character of civil societies. Society, morality, and polity derive their
legitimacy from the social imaginary of a culture. In the context of the United States, the
bitter antagonism between the Democratic and the Republican parties reminds one of the
Ghanaian imagery of two crocodiles with one stomach and fighting over food. Partisan
politics in democratic societies emphasizes political success and not consensus. Because
of antagonistic relationship between different political parties intent on furthering the
interests of their supporters, social imaginary is fractured. Such a fractured social
imaginary leads to a thoroughly confused civil society. The Democratic and the
Republican absorption with each other, prevents a more ecumenical understanding of the
world. Consensual politics, which is considered to be one of the defining features of
advanced democracies, is rare in the United States or any multi-party democratic politics.
In this chapter, I advance the thesis that plausibility of consensus is more in traditional
African communitarian societies than in multi-party democracies. I also explain the
equilibrium between solidarity and subsidiarity that exists in the Akan political system.
Solidarity is the unified social imaginary, which is broadly shared in a culture. The Akan
have a strong cultural identity. Subsidiarity is the element that cements mutual social
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relationships between individuals. It is a necessary condition for social cooperation, in
other words consensus.

The absurdity that prevents consensus in our lifeworld is epitomized by the
Ghanaian imagery of two crocodiles having the same stomach but fighting over food. The
Akan community in Ghana followed a system of consensual decision-making process,
traditionally. But the emphasis on consensus has suffered due to the shift in the social
imaginary of Ghana from traditional Akan community to colonial Ghana and then to
post-colonial Ghana. The sense of solidarity and subsidiarity that is organically fostered
in a communitarian society is entangled in the quagmire of competitive and avaricious
individualism that is alien to the Ghanaian social imaginary due to colonization. Thus,
African thinkers such as Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, and Kwame Anthony Appiah
emphasize the need for cultural decolonization of African thought.

Kwasi Wiredu especially emphasizes a system of consensual democracy with no
parties.1 Wiredu argues that traditional Ghanaian decision-making was non-majoritarian.
Wiredu further goes on to say that in parliamentary or other forms of majoritarian
democracy, only the winning political grouping has greater power on decision-making.
Wiredu says, “It is, then, from a consensus-oriented standpoint, a system that is
frequently deleterious of genuine representation, that is, representation beyond
parliamentary window-dressing.”

1
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The Need for Conceptual Decolonization of African philosophy
The conceptual colonization of African tradition has debilitated the conceptual schema of
African thought process. While manifestation of external influence is cause enough for
concern, dearth of scholars trained in traditional African thought in modern Ghana is far
more appalling. The superimposition of an alien thought-schema on traditional African
culture, language, religion, and political institutions has created conceptual complications
for African philosophers in distinguishing what is traditional African thought. An
impartial and critical analysis of the conceptual schema of native African thought
requires decolonization of modern African thought.

While educated Africans were twice removed from their own culture due to
colonization, scholars from erstwhile colonial powers have written extensively about the
African culture. The already de-Africanized post-colonial Africans have recourse mainly
to those texts written by non-Africans scholars about Africa. Some writings that were
inaccurate created artificial philosophical, linguistic, and religious muddles. Kwasi
Wiredu lists several concepts such as God, Reality, Being, Existence, Belief, Knowledge,
Faith, World, and Universe prevalent in African cultures, which have been distorted due
to conceptual inaccuracies in their rendition into Western languages.2 Kwame Gyekye
cites the works of Horton, which characterize entire African thought as collective, rigidly
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monolithic, lacking inter-theoretic competition and alternative possibilities.3 Wiredu
delineates three factors that cause conceptual colonization the most. They are as follows:4

1. Language
2. Religion
3. Politics

Wiredu cites the example of Cartesian skepticism, which is explicated by the famous
method of doubt. The Cartesian claim for explaining certainty is Cogito ergo sum [I
think, therefore I am]. Wiredu explains the complex process involved in unraveling the
philosophical import of the Cartesian doubt in Akan. Descartes’ attempt to illustrate
infallible certainty would be very difficult to formulate in Akan for the simple reason that
in the Akan conceptual schema, there is no place for infallible proposition. The Akan
discourse assumes that knowledge is possible without being infallible and at the same
time recognizing that certainty is not possible at all times. Hence, “I think, therefore I
am,” translates into a variety of expressions such as:5

1. I know very clearly or I know very clearly therefore I am there. [Minim pefee or
Minim koronyee enti mewoho ]
2. I very much know. [Minim papaapa]

3
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The level of conceptual colonization is evident from responses from John Mbiti who
argues that the Cartesian dictum ‘I’ must be replaced with ‘We.’ Leopold Senghor
averred that traditional Africans had a participatory view of knowledge and hence would
rather say, “I feel, I dance the Other; I am.”6 Alexis Kagame points out the absurdity of ‘I
am’ in Bantu since it always has to be followed by an attribute or an adjunct of a place.
Mind, in Akan, is conceived as an ability to think and does not the status of an entity.

Wiredu indicates the conceptual incongruity between traditional conception of the
universe as the place in which human beings exist and divining a mythology about the
creation of universe along the lines of Christianity which requires the postulation of a
creator God. While a religious affiliation or conversion to the religion introduced by the
colonizers does not indicate an abdication to colonial mentality, a steadfast refusal to
evaluate critically the beliefs of one’s religion does smack of irrationality. Wiredu argues
that an uncritical mixture of indigenous and foreign religions have led to severe
distortions in the African conceptual schema.7

The third avenue, which has been completely distorted by colonial domination, is
the political system of Africa. All African countries had their own system of governance.
Governing bodies were of two kinds; centralized and decentralized. In both forms of
governance, political representation of various groups was accorded importance. Wiredu
and Gyekye, specifically mention the political system of the Akans in Ghana that arrived
at decisions through consensus. The Akan system of decision-making emphasizes a
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political rule by consent through consensus, which is more rigorous than any modern
system of democracy.

Western democracies, especially, the Anglo-American system of democracy, are
attuned more towards transaction of daily business. The decision-making has to be short
and swift so that time is not lost in haranguing over disputes. Time is translatable into
money in Western democracies that are maintained by advanced liberal economies.
Hence, the market considerations are more important than humanistic considerations.
But, in Akan, for example, the political process could not avoid consensus. The
empowerment of each person as an indispensable part of a community supersedes any
other consideration. Since each person is considered invaluable as a member of the
community, considerations ranging from individual human rights, personhood, and
ethical obligations are imbedded in the process of consensual mediation.

In Akan, the person and the community are intertwined. Hence, there are no
separate armies; no bureaucrats; and no landowners. Land is jointly owned by the
lineage. Each person as a part of the community performs all the aforementioned
functions. Western democracies adhere to a majoritarian decision-making process. This
alienates a huge chunk of people who do not form a part of the winning majority. In
Africa, the traditional African form of government by consensus was not encouraged
during the colonial rule. The British government insisted on a multi-party democracy
with elections as a precondition for independence. Most of the African countries accepted
the system of multi-party democracy foisted on them only to get independence from
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ruling foreign powers. Once independence was attained, the elected rulers became
dictatorial and dissolved all opposition parties. One-party system was introduced in most
African states.

Even though Africa boasted of leaders such as Leopold Senghor, Kwame
Nkrumah, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere who were highly educated freedom
fighters, all of them banned other political parties and garnered power. The lack of
critical counsel and accountability, which was the defining feature of traditional African
political systems, severely damaged the cultural, social, economic, and political fabric of
nascent post-colonial African states. The quagmire created by despotic leaders of the
newly independent African states created incalculable amount of suffering.

Liberal Democracies and Adversarial Politics
Colonial powers such as Britain and France forcibly introduced majoritarian democracy
as a pre-condition for the independence of their colonies. Questions could be raised about
the rationale for laying down the precondition of democratization of traditional societies
that had a communitarian form of government. The political, geographical, and cultural
landscapes of the colonized countries have been ravaged beyond redemption. Hence, by
installing a system of democracy with which people did not identify what were the
chances of such a country surviving as a unified political entity? Democracy and colonial
rule being oxymoronic, what was the rationale behind the insistence of the colonial
powers on a democratic form of government as the precondition for freedom? Only the
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educated elite of the colonized countries had exposure to the process of that foreign style
of democracy while the vast multitude was never educated in that system of democracy.

In countries such as India, during the colonial rule, monarchy was operative and
the governance was based on village, town, and city administrations that still followed
the native system of governance. The British had taken over the top administration and
the Viceregal powers regulated the already existing forms of governance. The kings,
petty kings, and other regional rulers were made subservient to the British crown. The
British, who left religious, cultural and ethnic demography of India mostly unmolested,
undertook very limited structural transformation of the social sphere. Only for strategic
reasons, did the British encourage the Hindu-Muslim divide and later sow the seeds of
dissension between the Hindus, the Sikhs, and the Muslims. After decades of struggle,
the British granted Indians limited political participation at the state level while the final
decision-making authority was with the British. The British had also trained Indians in
the democratic system of governance and hence a transition to democracy was less
problematic compared to several other newly independent colonies.

But, in Africa as well as in Asia, what caused gargantuan miseries to the
population was the arbitrary division or formation of nation-states based on religion,
tribal affiliation and ethnicity. In some cases such as Nigeria, arbitrary grouping of tribes
into one nation has led to calamitous consequences. While colonial powers attempted to
religiously homogenize the colonies with the objective of civilizing the barbarous native
population in many countries, as the religious climate changed in the mother country
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giving way to democratic forms of political legitimation, those new ideas were
introduced into the colonies without any time for gradual assimilation or organic
development. Thus, within a space of a few decades, the conceptual schema of the
colonized countries underwent frequent changes, which totally unsettled the social and
political systems that evolved organically. Colonialism was also a cultural invasion. In
that sense, both good and bad aspects of the colonizing cultures intermingled with the
native culture of the colonies. After independence from the colonial powers, those
cultures that could not disentangle the complex web of inter-cultural miasma hurtle down
the path of self-destruction. The process of cultural de-colonization involves both
learning and unlearning that requires cultural self-reflection.

After democracy became the ruling form of government in all colonizing
countries, the logical corollary was to introduce the same system of governance in the
colonies. The colonies were devastated in the spheres of economy, politics, religion and
education after being ruled by foreign powers for several decades. Christianity was used
to “civilize” the native population of the colonies; democracy was also introduced as a
system of governance not with any consideration to the social and political framework of
the colonized countries but because it was the only system of political legitimation
known to the colonizing powers. The process of aggressive democratization undertaken
by Britain and the United States in the twenty first century also has a dogmatic element
but in a manner much different from the French and the British as colonizers.
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When Britain withdrew from India, Iraq, Pakistan, Ghana and other countries
after ending its colonial rule, all those countries were required to design a democratic
constitution. But, in the present climate, constitutional democracy has assumed the
proportions of a religious dogma. With the separation of the Church and the State, the
only good-in-itself whose specter lurks even beyond cultural, religious, and geographical
identities is democracy, the religion. Democracy has assumed a transcendental identity
and, in a manner reminiscent of all religious ideologies, shuns immanent critique.
Democracy is the state religion of the twenty-first century.

Wiredu rejects both multi-party democracy and one-party rule for Africa. While
the multi-party democracy is majoritarian and power-oriented, the one-party rule is more
despotic. Hence, Wiredu advocates a system of non-party democracy devised along the
lines of traditional African systems. Such a non-party system of democracy could be a
very important structural adjustment in diverse civil societies such as those found in
India, Nigeria and even the United States which is increasingly becoming a home to
multi-lingual and multi-ethnic population with more concrete-identities. Wiredu’s
analysis indicates the flaws in a bi-partisan political system found in countries such as the
United States.

In a two-party system, diverse interests are broadly classified and identified with
either of the parties contesting statewide and nationwide elections. Only those interests
that have powerful financial and political support achieve their ends whereas the voices
of people who belong to the downtrodden sections of the society are seldom heard. While
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the separation of the Church, the state, and the market has benefited the people in general,
the strong nexus between the market and the state prejudices the political authority. Even
civil society which in democracies plays a very pivotal role in galvanizing public opinion
on issues of common welfare does not have as much access to the corridors of political
power as the multi-national corporations. In most cases, issues such as health-care,
education, security, and social justice are debated endlessly and totally politicized in a
partisan manner. Proceduralism, unwittingly, contributes to the dilatory tactics of partisan
interests.

Procedurally, in a democratically elected body such as the United States Senate or
Congress, the Republican and the Democratic parties have to pass laws by a majority
vote. In an atmosphere vitiated by diametrically opposite interests, both parties wrangle
over the items that need to be added or deleted for a bill to pass in the Senate or the
Congress. Finally, when a compromise is reached, a skeletal law that is a pale
resemblance of the original draft of the law is passed. More often than not, the most
powerful interests would have influenced the outcome of the law or bill and the interests
of the common people would have been neglected.

The supporters of a competitive and adversarial politics of the democratic system
found in the United States would indicate the efficacy of the decision-making powers of
the Senate and the Congress. The deliberative politics in the United States is unequivocal
in ensuring legal safeguards, which guarantee the individual rights of the people. But,
even in the court of law, the legal process benefits those with access to good lawyers,
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financial support, media exposure, and the willingness to tenaciously pursue a lawsuit.
Even law is politicized in the United States because people elect judges, district
attorneys, and sheriffs according to their party affiliation. Thus, ultimately, procedures
that have been agreed to by the Democrats and the Republicans determine what is true or
false and good or bad.

The domination of corporate interests and emphasis on majority decision-making
is justified by an appeal to possessive individualism and ethical egoism, which
culminates in the reluctance to coordinate social actions on the basis of common welfare
interests.8 By encouraging ethical egoism, the welfare of less privileged population is
neglected. Such an emphasis on individual self-interest that evolves into selfishness could
be traced to the total inviolability of individual rights and property as instituted by
Locke.9 Hobbes and Locke also influenced Jefferson and Madison who encouraged
science, public schools, economic independence of individuals and a separation of
religion and state.10 Benjamin Franklin was a proponent of Republican ideals and
represented the mercantile interests of America quite admirably.11
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Clarendon Press, 1962.
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While Protestant religious ideals were a binding factor, economic interests
predominantly influenced American society because of an emphasis on property and
individual rights as envisaged by Locke. Even today, welfare measures of the government
of the United States always face opposition from the Libertarians because distribution of
property under any guise is an attempt to distribute property. Even the changing face of
the United States which has increasingly integrated people from scores of nations into its
society and the need for investments in social security, education, science and
technology, and infrastructural development has little impact on the Libertarians and the
Republicans who zealously protect their inviolable right to property. Thus, American
civil society is riven by a conflict between the republican and the liberal ideologies. Both
ideologies have allied with interest groups for support. In spite of the United States
having drastically transformed into a multi-cultural society, both conservative and liberal
ideologies do not encourage a system of coalition government democracy with more
representation from under-represented ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups.

Effects of Cultural Colonization of Africa
Wiredu’s non-party democracy could theoretically redress the problems of nonrepresentation or under-representation of several cultural, ethnic and racial groups that
feel disenfranchised due to a lack of recognition of their problems. Gyekye and Wiredu
concur on the conceptual reconstruction required to rediscover the cultural past of Africa
and chart a path to the future, through a turbulent present. Africa of the future needs
address issues that arise from colonization in the linguistic, cultural, and political spheres.
In this context, Gyekye analyzes problems inherent to the traditional African corpus of
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knowledge. Some problems discussed by Gyekye are technological skill, scientific
knowledge, rights of the spouses in the event of death of the other, one-lineage rule, and
women’s rights.12 Wiredu also mentions the disadvantages of a commentarial tradition
vis-à-vis written or scriptural traditions of philosophy found in the West and the East.
Gyekye evaluates both positive and negative aspects of post-colonial African culture.
Wiredu and Gyekye also recognize the need to challenge distortions of African
philosophical thought caused by the discoloration of African culture, language, and
religion during colonial rule. Okot p’Bitek lambasts Western studies of African religious
texts for their ulterior motives. Okot p’Bitek cites several instances in which incorrect
assumptions have completely distorted the meaning of religious beliefs.

Wiredu’s example of the Akan concept of “Anyamesom” will elucidate the lack of
linguistic clarity in English accounts of the Akan practices. The root of “Anyamesom” is
“Onyame.” Roughly translated “Anyamesom” means “service of God.” The word
“Onyame” translates into Akan “supreme being.” Christian scholars have translated Akan
religion as “Abosomsom.” “Som” means “service” and “Obo” means “stone.” Akan
religion is then translated as “the service of the stone service.” The Akans do believe that
some spirits reside in stones and natural objects. But they do not have any service for the
stones. They do not even worship Onyame, their supreme being. Hence, the JudeoChristian belief system has been unreflectively transposed on the Akan belief system.13
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P’Bitek attributes the flippant translations to the motive of defending colonialism and
demeaning African religions. As Wiredu believes, de-Christianization of African
religions is a very important step in disentangling the thread of colonization of African
culture. Religion and culture cannot be de-colonized without recourse to linguistic
devices. Hence, it is necessary for the Africans to philosophize epistemic and
metaphysical concepts in their own language.

Destructive Power of Colonial Myths
In the political arena, the most cataclysmic effect was brought about in Rwanda and
Burundi. The gradual injection of the Hamitic hypothesis into the psyche of both Hutus
and Tutsis was responsible for the eruption of genocidal violence.14 Mahmood
Mamdani’s work on the factors that contributed to the genocide in 1994 in Rwanda and
Burundi traces it to the strong belief in the Hamitic hypothesis of both Hutus and Tutsis.
The Tutsis were considered to be different from the Hutus on account of the former being
Hamitic. The Christian fables have a story about the curse of Noah who was the father of
Ham. Noah cursed Ham for showing disrespect to him. Thus, Ham’s son Cannon
purportedly was the progenitor of a clan of black people. The descendants of such a race
were the Tutsis according to the colonial masters. While the Tutsis were Africans, the
colonizers painted them as the descendants of Ham arguing that the curse made them
black. Since the Tutsis were the ruling clan in Rwanda, the Tutsis were hailed as Hamites
who were considered to be more of European stock than the native Hutus. All the while
Helen Buss Mitchell, Ed., Roots of World Wisdom, Canada: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999. pp.
106-111. Also refer to Kwasi Wiredu’s “The Moral Foundations of an African Culture” for Akan ethics
which places great emphasis on the interconnectedness of sociality and morality. pp. 331-341.
14
Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2002.
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the Hutus were being ruled by the Tutsis who themselves started believing in the Hamitic
hypothesis.

For the colonial masters, the Hamitic hypothesis gave ample ammunition to
support the Tutsis who were ruling the Hutus. After the independence of Rwanda, the
Hutus who outnumbered the Tutsis in Rwanda captured power and also the jobs. The
Tutsis who were sulking under the Hutu regime repeatedly attacked Rwanda in the name
of Rwandan Patriotic Front from the neighboring Uganda. This resulted in brutal reprisals
from the Hutus. To exacerbate the situation, just before the genocide, the Tutsi army
assassinated the Hutu President of Burundi. What followed were several raids of the RPF
into Rwanda. The Hutus started retaliating by killing several thousand Tutsis in Rwanda.
After repeated provocations by the proponents of the Hutu power, several hundreds of
thousands of Tutsis were killed in a clinical fashion. Thus, the genocide began and with
the assassination of both the President and the Prime Minister of Rwanda, there was no
one to stop the genocide in which the army, hospitals, colleges, schools and Churches
participated as a community ritual. Such a situation arose as a result of colonization and
the resultant distortion of history that poisoned the relationship between the Hutus and
the Tutsis.15

Intersubjectivity in Akan Philosophy
The eyepiece of African culture has been the colonial past, thus far, and hence an entirely
different discourse is needed to balance the colonial past and the post-colonial future. It is
not entirely possible to revisit the ancient African culture because of the irreversible
15
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changes that have taken root in the African society such as Western education,
Christianity, urbanization and political system of multi-party democracy. But there are
ways of incorporating traditional African procedures that would foster a consensual mode
of arriving at political decisions. The traditional Akan emphasis on consensus has
underlying strong moral and communitarian assumptions. Morality in Akan is not
individual but communitarian and hence always has a strong “I-Thou’ (intersubjective)
connotation.16 Intersubjective relationship also ensures reciprocity that is a defining
feature of the Akan conception of personhood.

A process of introjection of social roles is natural to the Akan conception of
personhood, which is connected with being a responsible member of the Akan
community. Proverbs such as the following emphasize the reflexive nature of Akan
interpersonal relationships, morality and polity.17 They are:

1. If you do not allow your neighbor to reach nine you will never reach ten.
2. Somebody’s troubles have arrived; those of another are on the way.
3. It is a fool that says, “My neighbor is the butt of attack not me.”
4. The stick that was used to beat Takyi is the same that will be used to beat
Nyankomago.
5. One person’s path will intersect with another’s before too long.
6. Do not do unto others what you would not that they unto you.

16
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Wiredu argues that the golden rule of doing unto others what one wants to be done to
oneself is enshrined in Akan injunctions against selfishness and egoism. Deontic theories
of ethics of which Rawls was one of the most recent proponents do not address issues of
social inequality effectively and consequentialist-utilitarian ethics of happiness neglects
the need for a social structure and the ineffable nature of happiness. Akan communitarian
ethics allocates roles for a conception of duty as well as happiness within the confines of
Akan community.

Wiredu calls the Akan ethics humanistic because of its emphasis on the
importance of coordination and cooperation within a community without reference to a
God or other supernatural foundations of ethics. In the Akan community, the notion of
personhood required procreation as a necessary qualification. The youngsters were
expected to reverential obey the elders. The strong communal identity itself depends on
traditional agrarian rural culture. In liberal capitalism, civil society replaces traditional
communitarianism.

Consensus and the Political Structure of the Akan Community
The Akan notion of consensus is communitarian in nature. Akan notion of community
stems from concepts such as mogya (blood principle), onipa (person), and okra (life
principle.) The okra is also the divine element that is present in all human beings
according to the Akans. According to the Akans, human beings are naturally endowed
with the qualities of equality and dignity. The Akan society is matrilineal. Members of
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the Akan lineage are found far and wide in Ghana and the Ivory Coast. The Akans
believe that human beings are interdependent. From childhood till death, people need
help from others and hence the individual is always beholden to the society. Some Akan
sayings to this effect are as follows:

a) A human being is not a palm tree so as to be sufficient unto himself.
b) A human being needs help.
c) It is because of the need to have someone blow out the speck of dust in one’s eye that
antelopes go in twos.

There are several adages in Akan that emphasize the need for mutual cooperation,
interdependence, reciprocity, and equality of status of human beings. Akans also
repeatedly indicate equality of human beings in their religious outlook. God bestowed
responsibility on the Akans as masters of their own destiny and at the same time also
vested the individuals with the duty of social responsibility. Akan communitarianism also
stems from a dependency on land. Since agriculture was the main occupation land was
not owned by individuals but by the community. Even the Akan lineage chiefs did not
have the right to sell off land.18

The Akan political system was essentially composed of a council of lineages. The
council chiefs were the most experienced and respected village elders representing
various villages. While most of these positions were hereditary, they were subject to the
18

In the context of the Akans, a lineage is a family tree of a group of people who live in an Akan village or
town that traces its origin to a woman. There are several lineages in Ghana. For example, Ashanti is one of
the lineages of the Akans.
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will of the people. Some positions such as the ‘leader of the young men’ went to the most
eligible young man of the village who represented the village in the council of chiefs. He
had the right to speak fearlessly about the issues such as those relating to the nonperformance of chiefs. The Akan community strongly enforced the rule that the chiefs
were selected according to the will of the people. The Akan towns had a council of
village heads with the Chief of the town accorded the role of the chairman. The office of
the chief was both hereditary and elective. Out of the group of eligible leaders from a
lineage, the Queen Mother selected a candidate based on factors such as experience,
reputation, military prowess and integrity from a pool of candidates. But finally the
decision to appoint a chief was in the hands of the council and popular consent.
Deserving candidates from other branches of royal lineages were also given an
opportunity to participate in the political process.

The title of the ‘chief of the young men’ (Nkwankwaahene) was given to a person
who did not belong to the ruling lineage but who had the support of the population of the
village in general. Such a person was authorized to raise objections and convey the
misgivings of the people about a candidate for the title of the chief of the council and on
any other issue. The Akan political system had confederacies at both state and national
level and the paramount chiefs serving at the level of a group of states were in charge of
the administration of the whole nation.19

The Akans recognized the need for an administrative head of the state while at the
same time instituting a system of checks and balances that mirrors the attempts of modern
19
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day democracies. By making the office of the chief accountable to the council of elders
and also popular consent, tyranny was preempted. The decision-making in the council of
village elders achieves its fruition only when a consensus was reached. Such a consensus
became the view of the chief and not vice versa. Since great efforts were made to hear all
views without dismissing or marginalizing any strand of opinion, the final decision was
totally binding on all members of the council. Public criticism of consensus achieved by
the council members was viewed with reprobation. Only the popular representative who
did not belong to the council of elders could question the decision of the council even
after a decision was reached.

In the event of a chief failing to adhere to the rules of political governance, he
faced the prospect of being ‘destooled.’ The Akan equivalent of a throne is the stool. The
office of the chief had sanctity. But the chief was considered to be a spiritually endowed
person only as long he followed the rules of the political governance. Thus, one can
discern an apparently seamless relation between village, town, state and national
governance. Because of a strong local organization and a federal structure at the central
level that emphasized participatory decision-making at all levels, the Akan system of
governance ensured that local issues were resolved at the local level. Instead of
proceduralizing issues and taking them to a separate judicial authority, issues were
resolved within the community with the aim of establishing peace rather than demanding
retribution.20 Another important individual right enshrined in the Akan community is the
right to trial. No punishment is meted out without a trial. Wiredu mentions an instance in
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which even the dead-body of a person who committed suicide and suspected of some
wrongdoing was tried posthumously.21

The Akan concept of right to land is not based on individual ownership but
lineage ownership. The land belonged to the lineages and not to the individuals. No land
could be sold or bartered away. Only the chief has the right to reallocation of possession
in times of distress for a lineage while other lineages have more than what they require.
But the right to the redistribution of the land also requires the cognizance of the lineages
concerned and cannot be done arbitrarily by the chief.22 In spite of Akan practices such as
right to trial accorded to everyone, community land ownership, non-discrimination,
religious freedom and political consensus, there were social practices which appear
anachronistic such as ritual killing of people to accompany the dead chiefs and the total
supplication demanded of the non-adults as they were not considered mature enough to
voice their opinions. Some of the positive traits of the Akan culture have been ravaged by
colonization, modernization and greed of the chiefs. Wiredu laments the lack of moral
rectitude that has led to the cultural and political chaos in Ghana in particular and Africa
in general due to the collapse of traditional communitarianism.

Some of the modern African leaders such as Senghor, Nyerere, Nkrumah, and
Kaunda took advantage of the traditional emphasis on non-party democracy to install
themselves as unquestioned leaders and established one-party rule. By obfuscating the
distinction between a non-party democracy and one-party rule, despotic African leaders
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justified their rule on the basis of traditional communitarian political system of Africa. As
Wiredu points out, one of the most cherished rights of the African culture, the right to
representation in political decision-making, has been denied by despotic regimes in
outright defiance of the UN Human Rights declaration. But more recently, because of the
tremendous pressure exercised by the UN and other member countries on military
dictators and other tyrannical rulers, Africa has multi-party democracy in several
countries. Wiredu argues that even though a multi-party democracy is better than
tyranny; it only breeds adversarial attitude and not consensual decision-making because
of the emphasis on majority vote. While the ethno-centric approach of the colonizers to
political, social, economic and religious affairs of Africa has contributed to a large extent
in the ensuing political instability of those African states that gained independence in the
second half of the twentieth-century, a dearth of African leaders with a vision for better
Africa and also the collapse of traditional political institutions and the post-colonial pangs
of anxiety have contributed to the desuetude.

Difference between the Akan and the Western notion of Consensus
The notion of consensus has different connotations in the Western and African contexts.
In the Western conception of a notion of consensus idealized by Habermas, which is
designed on the Enlightenment idea of reason, people debate an issue aiming to arrive at
an understanding with the only deciding factor being the force of arguments (rationally
motivated agreement). Every person will be allowed to speak without being coerced. The
process of argumentation and discourse will require people to be linguistically competent,
rational, and democratic. All these prerequisites demand Western education, linguistic
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skills, and a particular type of rationality. Such a notion of consensus in which the best
argument wins the day does not take into account variations in linguistic competence,
social practices, political system, education, and cultural traditions. Moreover, by
stipulating the necessity of a winning argument, the other parties feel excluded and unrepresented. Thus, by reducing the rationality to the outcome of an argumentation
process, the resultant agreement does not qualify as a consensual agreement.

The Western notion of consensus is arriving at an agreement without recourse to
extra-verbal remonstrations. Disagreements are to be resolved within the framework of a
discourse and the discursive framework has been agreed upon before the commencement
of the debate. Hence, only those arguments that stand out as rational will be acceptable to
the people who are chosen as interlocutors based on their communicative competence.23
Thus, a concept of consensus in Western democracies, according to Habermas, is only
aimed at arriving at a mutual understanding among free and equal individuals. The
Western concept of consensus depends upon the conception of individuals as capable
actors who can engage in rational argumentation. But a consensus among variegated
ethnic, linguistic, racial and religious groups requires genuine compromise and
understanding. The asymmetrical nature of multicultural dialogue would be best served
by adopting a path of consensus similar to the Akan notion of consensus.

Thinkers such as Wiredu and Gyekye refer to an entirely different conception of
consensus in their writings. The African notion of consensus that Kaunda, Nyerere,
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Wiredu and Gyekye talk about is related more to a compromise that is achieved as a
result of detailed consultation on thorny issues in which people from all sections are
represented by delegations at various levels of the government. Among Western
countries, the United States of America practices a form of democracy in which two big
parties (the Republican and the Democratic Parties) contest elections and the power
changes hands between them. While legal and constitutional safeguards are in place, all
sections of people are not represented, especially minorities, handicapped, and women.
The decision-making power rests with the party that has more members in the Congress
or the Senate. Every political decision boils down to a power game between the
Democrats and the Republicans. Finally, in order to transact business in the House or the
Senate, there is a need for compromise, which is more often than not based on
expediency. The acrimony and antagonism that is created between the two political
parties is matched only by the apathy shown by the suffrage due to the cynicism arising
out of the irremediability of the situation.

A large portion of American voters believes that the Republican and the
Democratic parties are only after power and not common good. Since there are no
alternatives because of the domination of two major political parties in the United States,
the Democratic and the Republican parties, it is not possible for small political parties
such as the Green Party or the Libertarian Party to advertise their message adequately to
the general public. Bipartisan consensus is more akin to the concept of interest-based
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democracy and not the Habermasian ideal of deliberative democracy.24 Even fundamental
issues such as education and health-care are contentious because of the procedural
incompatibility between the liberal and the conservative strands of American political
system. Max Weber’s characterization of the Western bureaucracy as driven by
purposive-rationalization has been consummated in the American political system.25

Reductionistic analysis in terms of good-evil, friend-enemy, and rationalirrational categories have gained such a stranglehold on the American populace that a
third option is never considered a viability.26 More often than not, Habermas’s ideal
consensus operates even rarely in the rarefied atmosphere of the board meetings of
multinational companies. On the contrary, paradoxically, Habermasian consensus unlike
in the highly rationalized societies is possible only in communities such as Akans in
Ghana.27 The underlying assumptions in Habermas’ “ideal speech situation” based on the
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categorical imperative of Kant have become supererogatory in the post-modern scenario.
Hence, consensus along the lines of Habermas’ theory of communicative action is
ironically out of place in advanced liberal societies such as the United States. Unlike
interest-based democracy, Africans especially in Ghana practiced a form of delegacy, a
form of consensual communitarianism that was non-party.

The consensual form of governance that was prevalent in African groups such as
the Akan, the Zulu and the Swazi have a long history of successful resolution of conflicts.
According to Wiredu, a need for consensus indicates conflict and a successful consensus
is in the resolution of the conflicts taking into account the views of all concerned. Unlike
the Western notion of consensus that has been constructed around the Hobbesian social
contract that is negative in connotation, the African notion is positive. In the Western
notion of consensus, the innate assumption is the vacuousness of involving all sections of
the populace in the consensual decision-making process. Another negative assumption
that characterizes Western debates is a sense of disbelief in the ability of people to come
together to resolve conflicts, which could be due to the failure of the Enlightenment ideal
that reason would free the world of all its ills. The classic example of such a mutual
distrust is the doctrine of mutual destruction practiced by the erstwhile Soviet Union and
the United States of America. Perversely, the tenuous peace that lasted for more than
thirty years between the Soviet Union and the United States validates both Hobbes and

structural transformation is indisputable but Habermasian postnational constellation has been theorized
only from the viewpoint of advanced liberal countries and a global economy. The prospects of the twentyfirst century appear to be more daunting and more catastrophical and with the absence of a doctrine of
mutual deterrence, however sinister it then appeared, the world looks even more dangerous and selfdestructive. Thus, Habermas’ oxymoronic ideal espouses a universal communitarianism, which is antithetical to liberal individualism, which would require a Sisyphean sadomasochistic self-denial on the part
of the entire population of the world.
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Socrates. The fear of awesome retribution acted as a deterrent for both the USSR and the
US while extraordinary amount of restraint and back channel diplomacy also bespeaks of
some last vestige of goodness that prevented the respective governments from taking
extreme measures. While any direct strike on the US or the USSR was deterred, it did not
preclude both the US and the USSR from waging proxy wars in different parts of the
globe. The cost of those proxy wars has been colossal for both the USSR and the US.
Especially, in the case of the US, it culminated in the events of September 11th 2001.

A doctrine of mutual deterrence, strict surveillance of people, an adversarial
political process, and a society that encourages competition than cooperation is not the
best setting for consensual interaction. While the African consensual process presumes an
intention on the part of the interlocutors to arrive at a consensus irrespective of their
positions, the Western notion of consensus has too many mandatory requirements to even
qualify to be a part of the consensual process, which stipulates necessary cultural
prerequisites.

The imagery that characterizes the Akan rationale for a consensus is that of a
crocodile with two heads and one stomach fighting over the food.28 The colourful
imagery portrays the paradox of the people belonging to a same group with same interests
fighting over matters that could have been resolved amicably if only they had understood
that the final destination or the ultimate objective is best achieved by working together.
The crocodile imagery scoffs at the stupidity of human beings caused by selfish motives.
Another striking example of the Akan openness is the statement “even a fool is entitled to
28
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be heard.”29 Any consideration of social status, intelligence quotient, or any other
discriminatory factors have been dismissed by the edict that everyone needs to be heard.

While the preparatory process of an Akan consensus is laudable for its emphasis
on equality, the procedural part of a consensual process is even more rigorous. Any
vexatious issue would have to be discussed at various levels such as villages, towns,
cities and finally amongst the king and the advisory council. Instead of a process that
imposes the will of a numerical majority on everyone else, the Akan process of consensus
necessarily involves the participation of the people at every level.30 But, does the Akan
process of consensus lead to unanimity? While K.A. Busia nostalgically remarks about
the emphasis on unanimity among the interlocutors, Wiredu argues that the condition of
unanimity is meant to be only an ideal objective of a consensual process.31 Unanimity is
the avowed goal but not if it is forced. A consensus is achieved through compromise
between clashing viewpoints on social issues. Epistemic and ethical issues have
underlying assumptions about truth and value respectively. These are assumptions that
are shared by all cultures. Hence, they are known as cultural universals. An example of a
cultural universal concept is human rights. Epistemic or ethical issues need to be justified
critically and rationally. But on social issues, compromise leads to consensus. A general
broad-based consensus presages unanimity while the particulars and the specifics are
open for further discussion. “Unanimity is the perfection of consensus. But consensus
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does not call for unanimity.”32 Wiredu clarifies that while unanimity of opinions will
solve all conflicts, it is next to impossible to arrive at unanimous decisions while tackling
thorny issues. Hence, consensus is a peaceful reconciliation of differences by taking into
account various ideas voiced by the affected people. Even if the process takes more time,
the objective of a consensus will have to be pursued to its logical end. A consensual
decision-making process, in the African context, is very close to a decision-making
process by consent.

Democracy - A Government by Consent
In a democracy, individual opinions are supposed to be valued. But, in Anglo-American
forms of democracy, the majority group enjoys total political power. Democracy is
identified more with the possession of decision-making power than a form of governance
that takes into consideration the common good. Since winning elections is the only form
of power, the whole process is categorized by competition, jealousy, and rivalry. The
winner take all policy is not representative of all sections of people and this leads to
alienation amongst people who are not part of the winning party. Wiredu also points out
the lack of representation from various sections of the electorate in spite of various
committees, commissions, and other constitutional safeguards guaranteeing a voice for
the minorities.33 The minority has Hobbesian privileges of rights to self-preservation and
Lockean rights of property while the majority has the power to enforce their social and
economic policies on the minority.
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In the case of African traditional societies such as the Akan, the Zulu and the
Swazi, the aim of a consensual process of decision-making is not triumph or defeat but
amicable settlement of problems. The majority opinion does have its significance but the
minority needs to be heard and its concerns noted. If the minority is convinced by the
sincerity of majority opinion then there is no objection to implement the majority
decision. But the majority opinion cannot be imposed as a decision on minority based on
the numerical strength of the majority.34 The main objective of democracy is to protect
individual freedom from the tyranny of the majority.35 Wiredu constantly reminds us of
the perils of a contentious and adversarial form of democracy encouraged in Britain and
the United States. But democracies in the United States and Great Britain, while situated
on the ideal of common good for all, are influenced by public opinion or vested interests.
In a rights based democracy, any infringement of individual rights would have to be
fought procedurally.

The Weberian analysis that the movement for democracy has been influenced
heavily by monetary and mercantile considerations can be applied to the interest-based
forms of democracy practiced in the United States. It has been widely recognized that
economic interests determine the political clout in especially countries such as the United
States. If an individual has wealth, then he/she has access to power and vice versa. The
macro-economic trickle-down theory is the predominant economic principle that is aided
by a strong procedural streak embedded in the United States political system. A partisan
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war is fought on several fronts in the United States political system such as immigrant
rights, welfare, health insurance, education, social security, foreign policy and trade.

While the conservative right and the liberal left both recognize individual liberty,
their interpretations of the concept of liberty are different. While the liberals emphasize
negative liberty with non-interference from the government, the conservatives emphasize
positive liberty with non-domination as the guarantee of the individual rights.36 Thus,
economic liberty is paramount for the conservatives while the liberals value individual
rights in terms of sexual orientation, body, and religious beliefs. While the libertarians
avowedly oppose any intervention in both economic and individual rights, the
Republicans support the trickle down economy of neo-classical capitalism while the
liberals want social security, unions, education and health-care all affordable to ordinary
citizens.37 There is a subtle class conflict but more complex than those found in the mines
of England in the mid-nineteenth century.

The salutary effect of proceduralism, even while producing alienation and
individuation, is that it protects the social fabric of capitalistic economies, by creating a
complex web of bureaucracy, entertainment, courts and elections, from descending into
the Hobbesian state of nature. The governments in such democracies have to perform a
balancing act between various interest groups and hence are necessarily majoritarian in
policy implementation. Such governments do not have a holistic view of common good.
As Wiredu rightly points out, the basic premise of such democracies is based on the
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assumption that there are not many possibilities for arriving at a consensus in order to
solve problems. In order to expedite the decision-making process, the majority opinion
necessarily overrides minority sensibilities.38 Even though, in some sense, most
democracies are interest-based democracies, majority opinion has greater procedural
force in the United States. Hence, there is minimal scope for a government by consent or
consensus in adversarial democracy practiced in the United States.

Democracy – A Government by Consensus
Traditional African societies such as the Akan, the Zulu, the Swazi, the Banyankole, the
Tallensi and several others have had either centralized or non-centralized forms of
governance.39 Wiredu analyses the system of political governance in the Ashanti group of
Ghana to illustrate how consensus is achieved. The Ashantis, who are a subgroup of
Akan, are matrilineal. Every Akan town or village is composed of several clans. A
lineage from one of these clans constitutes the royal lineage and the people of the town or
village accept the royalty of the lineage. From this lineage, the chief is elected. A lineage
comprises of individuals who are linked by kinship relationship. Every town or village
constitutes a political unit and together the villages and towns for a paramountcy, a state
(oman), namely, the Asante state or Akim Abuakwa state headed by a paramount chief,
the omanhene. While selecting the chief of a state, the council comprising of village
chiefs and the ‘commoners’ Asafo company have to authorize the selection out of a pool
of worthy men. Thus, a chief cannot be imposed upon the Akan community.40 The chief
does not have an agenda apart from the one given by the people. The chief publicly takes
38
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an oath assuring the people that he would implement and adhere to what has been
ordained by the people of Akan. Some of the demands imposed by the people on the
chief are as follows:41

We do not wish that he should curse us.
We do not wish that he should be greedy.
We do not wish that he should be disobedient [or, refuse to take advice].
We do not wish that he should treat us unfairly.
We do not wish that he should act on his own initiative.
We do not wish that it should ever be that he should say to us, “I have no time,” “I have
no time.”

The above-mentioned dictates of the people illustrate what is meant by the concept of
‘democracy by consent.’ While the people have invested political authority in the chief,
he/she cannot act unilaterally without consulting the people at every level of the Akan
political organization, be it the village or the state. The council of elders, who are
themselves chiefs or lineage heads of the villages or the towns, will have to consult their
constituents before taking the matter to higher levels. The chief will then act on the
advice of the council of elders. Thus, the chief does not exist apart from the people and
the people demand a part in the decision-making process. Any violation on the part of the
chief invokes the punishment of de-stooling.
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While the rule by the consent of all is a sublime ideal, the question is how to
translate consent into practice. Or in other ways, how does the consent of people manifest
into political action? The answer is through consensus. While the consent of the people is
sought at every stage of decision-making, divergent views are processed at the crucible of
consensus. Consensus brings about a compromise between various options. The Akan
system of governance fervently believes in collective thinking. Adages such as “One
head does not go into council,” and “Wisdom is not in the head of one person,” betray a
strong sense of participatory decision-making that is supposed to be the hallmark of
modern democracies.42 Since the people of the Ashanti community did not feel
themselves alienated from the political process, a separate system of checks and balances
was not needed.

In the final analysis, African ethnic groups such as the Akan, Zulu, Tallensi, and
Swazi fostered a system of governance that could be viewed as democratic, broadly.
Some of them had centralized governance, for example, Akan, and some did not such as
Logoli and Tallensi. But, the emphasis on consensus is found in many groups such as the
Akans. For Akans, consensus is the only way to resolve conflicts and no other way is
better. Consensus is the only avenue for cementing the consent of the people.
Majoritarian democracies of the Anglo-American model do not rule by the consent of the
people by any stretch of imagination. Consensus in such democracies operates at the level
of deal making or compromise on what is acceptable to both parties in conflict. A change
of cultural paradigm is not possible from such positional negotiation process. Two sides
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involved in a debate dogmatically hold on to their foundational ideologies and hence a
solution outside the existing paradigmatic framework fails to emerge.

Wiredu captures the essence of the sense of deprivement and alienation that
permeates the being of the vanquished political party and its supporters.43 Wiredu also
suggests that the democratic models of governance found in Switzerland and Belgium are
better models than those found in the United States and Britain for the simple reason that
the government includes people belonging to political parties representing different
sections of the people.44 The inability of the Anglo-American models to include diverse
interests and the stranglehold of the business interests on the government has resulted in
adversarial politics and the neglect of the process of rapprochement between eternally
feuding political parties. While the system of traditional governance in Africa,
theoretically, took into consideration the will and the welfare of the people, modern
democracies attach more importance to the system of administration. While individual
liberties and rights are enshrined in the UN Human Rights Charter and in the constitution
of various countries, translating rights into practice is seldom smooth. In traditional
African societies, protection of individual rights was coeval with governance and hence
there was little need for a separate charter of human rights.

African Communitarianism and Post-Colonial Political Ideology
Post-colonial Africa produced several leaders such as Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor,
Kenneth Kaunda, and Kwame Nkrumah, who utilized their Western education to suit the
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African context. All the afore-mentioned leaders were trained in Western cultural
environment and also received advanced Western educational training. Julius Nyerere
espoused an indigenous approach to social organization and economic development
similar to traditional African form of communitarianism, which he called Ujaama
socialism.45 As the President of Tanzania, Nyerere pursued an agro-based economy and
encouraged cooperatives that would be supported by communitarian African society.
Leopold Senghor, who ruled Senegal as its President for more than two decades,
advocated a strong blend of native African culture of Senegal and the acquired
knowledge in science and technology from Europe. Senghor also accommodated religion
in his philosophy. Senghor was a Christian leader in a predominantly Muslim country.

In his writings, Senghor was refreshingly candid about the foibles of African
culture and the benefits of European scientific development and the need to strike a right
balance between European education and African culture.46 Senghor’s European
education influenced his political ideas. Senghor’s words encapsulated his thoughts about
the concept of a nation: “What makes the Nation, is a common will for a life in
common.”47 Senghor’s approach took a critical view of European capitalism as well as
Soviet-style socialism. Senghor’s avowed idea was to integrate the contributions of
European socialism with African traditional values.48
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Julius Nyerere, who was the first President of Tanzania, endorsed
communitarianism and opposed capitalism. Nyerere felt that only a shared enterprise
characteristic of African communitarianism would be suitable for Tanzania. Hence,
Nyerere was more interested in state participation in the distribution and sharing of
wealth than in state ownership of the means for the creation of wealth. “The Arusha
Declaration” clearly outlines Nyerere’s emphasis on rural development and cooperatives.
He disavowed the economic theories of both Adam Smith and Marx. While Adam Smith
is considered to be the high priest of capitalism, Marx’s theory of class conflict between
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie created a crevasse between various sections of the
society. Nyerere and Senghor, both contest the relevance of the proletariat-bourgeoisie
dichotomy in the African context.

Kwame Nkrumah, who was the first President of Ghana, was a sworn Marxist but
tailored his ideology to the Ghanaian topology. Since Nkrumah did not have to contend
with the Marxian binary opposition between the bourgeoisie and the exploited proletariat
in Ghana, Nkrumah went on a reckless spree of mechanization in Ghana that brought
disastrous consequences. Nkrumah did not find any contradiction between religion and
Marxism. For Nkrumah, the Marxist revolution was only contingent upon the situation.
During the Ghanaian freedom struggle, Nkrumah charted a course of non-violent protests
and strikes rather than espousing armed revolution. It is ironical that Nkrumah advocated
revolutionary socialism while in exile after he was deposed in a coup in 1966. It was
convenient for Nkrumah to talk about armed revolt since he was deprived of political
power and wanted to recapture power. Nkrumah exhorted his compatriots to rise in revolt
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against the people who deposed him. Hence, the Marxian element of inner-contradiction
in capitalism and also the tension between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are not a
part of the political ideology of Nkrumah, in a true sense.

All the afore-mentioned leaders were culpable of identifying communitarianism
in non-partisan traditional African societies with one-party system of democracy, in
which alternative processes of electing leaders were scuttled. A despotic leader forcibly
imposed the one-party system on the populace in order to perpetrate a system of
governance without a choice for alternatives. While Nkrumah was unscrupulous in
changing strategies to consolidate his political power, Nyerere truly believed in the
efficacy of African communitarianism and systematically implemented measures to
encourage people to get involved in rural reconstruction. Senghor understood the lacunae
in Western socialism and capitalism and hence advocated self-reliance, cultural
rejuvenation and pooling of resources. Senghor’s Mali Federation was an idea in
promoting federalism amongst Sudan, Senegal, Upper Volta and Dahomey. Upper Volta
and Dahomey did not join the federation as the referendum failed to muster support and
later they joined Niger and Ivory Coast in the Counseil de l’Entente.49 Senghor also tried
to initiate a federation of twelve West African states with the exception of Madagascar.

Senghor’s integration of West African states is based on the concept of negritude.
The concept of negritude defines Senghor’s communitarianism as African collectivity.
Nkrumah contributed little or nothing to strengthen the notion of African
communitarianism in Ghana. Nkrumah dreamed of a federation of African countries. But,
49
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Nkrumah’s drastic measures to indiscriminately industrialize Ghana in a short span of
time and revitalize the economy by huge imports proved to be a disaster in the long run.
Nkrumah, who was a despotic ruler, neglected Ghana’s traditional system of governance,
which symbolized communitarianism.

Nyerere is the best example of an African leader who designed his whole political
enterprise on the concept of communitarianism. But Nyerere also ruled Tanzania with an
iron hand under a one-party system. The Akan concept of communitarianism, which
encompasses personhood, human rights and consensual political decision-making,
distinguishes communitarianism from individualism.50 The Western notion of
communitarianism is rights-based and treats community as an aggregate of individuals.
Gyekye rejects any such description of African communitarianism and also asserts the
proviso of individual value imbedded in the collective decision-making process of
communitarian African groups such as Akans.51 Gyekye refers to Senghor’s moderate
stance on African communitarianism and his simultaneous emphasis on the importance of
the role of individuals in a community. Hence, African communitarianism is not inimical
to individual development.
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Chapter 5
Political Consensus – Intra-cultural and Extra-cultural

In the postmodern epoch, the originary or foundational categories have been replaced by
the interstitial spaces of the binary oppositional categories such as subject-object, blackwhite, colonizers-colonized, and capitalist-communist discourse. While globalization has
created a common market, post-colonial and post-modern frameworks have created a
sense of the present in terms of subjective-identities. The post-colonial and minority
groups have started experiencing the presence while advanced liberal democracies are
oriented towards the future. Hence, there is a phase-difference in the conceptualization of
concepts such as democracy, religion, economy, justice, and education and what they
signify for the developed and developing countries. The tyranny of the universal, which
was total in the pre-modern and modern cultures, had camouflaged the interstices, which
epitomize difference and instead constructed a canopy of illusion of universality.1 In this
chapter, I have argued that a process of consensus cannot avoid cultural differences,
conflict of identities, systematic distortions, and a clash of social and individual
imaginaries. Conflict between cultural universals and particulars afflict both intra-cultural
and extra-cultural discourse. In intra-cultural discourse, a debate on cultural

1

Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, New York: Routledge, 1994. p. 1. I will refer to it as LOC.

148

universals and particulars depends on a shared social imaginary within a culture. In an
extra-cultural discourse, there is a clash of social imaginaries of different cultures. In the
former there is confusion about what constitutes cultural particulars and universals. In the
latter, there is a need for conceptual clarification of social imaginaries. In order to
facilitate consensus, I propose cooperative action, which aims at partial or limited
unanimity, a joint venture in pursuit of agreement, recognition of cultural differences,
mutual adjustment of viewpoints, and a flexibility in initial and final conceptual
positions.

While there is always the danger of panoply of individual identities dissolving
into egoism, at the individual level, and ethnic conflict, at the social level, celebration of
individual identities have immensely contributed to the colorfulness of world in terms of
variegated cultures, languages, customs, and religions. It must be noted that as Cornel
West and Bell Hooks averred, historical descriptions of pre-modern, modern and postmodern epochs have differing significance depending upon social contexts.2 The aforementioned contextual framework is emphasized by Amartya Sen as evaluator-relative
ethical framework.3 Homi Bhabha argues that there is a cultural consciousness of the
interstitial and that of the presence that characterizes the postmodern firmament. Bhabha
writes as follows:4
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It is in the emergence of the interstices – the overlap and displacement of domains
of difference – that the intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness,
community interest, or cultural values are negotiated. How are subjects formed
‘in-between’, or in excess of, the sum of ‘parts’ of difference (usually intoned as
race/class/gender, etc.)? How do strategies of representation or empowerment
come to be formulated in the competing claims communities where, despite
shared histories of deprivation and discrimination, the exchange of values,
meanings and priorities may not always be collaborative and dialogical, but may
be profoundly antagonistic, conflictual and even incommensurable?
While Bhabha’s description would encapsulate the Indian post-independence cultural
experience to a nicety, it is also true of most advanced countries that are addressing the
issue of multiculturalism. Michael Dummett’s writings on the plight of economic
refugees in European and North American countries have revealed glaring deficiencies in
addressing the issues of economic and political asylums.5 Bhabha refers to an underlying
process of cultural hybridization that has cultural difference at the center. Cultural
differences are recognized and respectfully engaged. According to Bhabha, “The
borderline engagements of cultural difference may often be consensual as well as
conflictual; they may confound our definitions of tradition and modernity; realign the
customary boundaries between the private and the public, high and low; and challenge
normative expectations of development and progress.”6

Bhabha reiterates constantly that internationalism must be a ‘middle passage’ that
does not totalize individual experience. A lack of recognition of cultural hybridity and the
presence of the interstices have had incalculably damaging consequences as witnessed in
Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, Rwanda-Burundi, and Palestine, to name a few. Totalization of
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particular cultural experiences lead to exclusionary lifeworlds. Bhabha argues that the
postcolonial epoch is a celebration of cultural hybridity and interstitial spaces. The
concept of fusion of horizons brilliantly explicated by Gadamer has a hoary history. Kant,
Hegel, Marx, Husserl, Levinas, Benjamin, Adorno, and Heidegger have been the
torchbearers of the ethics of mutual recognition.7 Of all the above-mentioned pantheon of
philosophers, Gadamer and Levinas have given the most positive and constructive
reconciliation of the theoria and praxis of the ethics of mutual recognition.

Intersubjectivity and Cultural Hybridization
The approach that characterizes Gadamer’s and Levinas’ theories of alterity is the
warmth and comfort exuded vis-à-vis the ‘other.’ Heidegger grounded the Dasein as the
dynamic being-in-the-world that straddles the ontic and the ontological level. The
ontological level is not an abstraction from the ontic level.8 But Gadamer and Levinas
take the concept of intersubjective relationship to a new level by creating the optimal
non-instrumental conditions for a mutual interaction between the ‘I’ and the ‘other.’9
While Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics desists from a categorical incarceration of
the ‘other,’ Levinas makes the ‘I’ completely subservient to the ‘other.’

I would characterize Levinas’ inversion of the Enlightenment prejudice towards
the ‘I’ as the tyranny of the slave. This would probably engender a dread that Sartre
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perceives in the other being the enemy.10 Levinasian conception of the ‘other’ could also
in a remote sense lead to concepts such as reverse colonization, which does not
necessarily follow from Levinas’ enthronement of the ‘other’ vis-à-vis the ‘I.’11 On the
other hand, Levinas’ enthronement of the ‘other’ to the detriment of the ‘I’ could inflame
the fear of the ‘other.’ Hegel frequently describes a mediational relationship between the
‘I’ and the ‘other’ in his political writings. Even his much maligned master-slave
relationship has a reversible moment.12 What Gandhi characterizes as a ‘cycle of
repression’ cannot be indiscriminately applied to what Hegel terms as master-slave
relationship. On the other hand, structural violence and internal colonization are very
much plausible in a state that does not ensure inviolable individual rights. Perhaps,
Levinas wants to prevent what is traced to the supremacy of the self, perpetrated by the
Enlightenment, by establishing the supremacy of the other.13

The failure of the Enlightenment to reconcile reason with reasonableness and to
acknowledge the historicity of the theory-practice relation has created conceptual
muddles. Bhabha’s claim that Goethe’s analysis of the unconscious character of
progression of history of the peoples necessitates a philosophy of the interstitial cultures
and cultural hybridization appears to be both nostalgic and romantic. In some sense what
Bhabha describes as the voice of the unhomely is exploited brilliantly by the forces that
10
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drive the process of globalization.14 The question that haunts most of the procedural
political theorists such as Habermas and Seyla Benhabib is whether a genuine consensus
is possible in such an unhomely atmosphere. Seyla Benhabib argues that a discursive
consensus is possible in culturally variegated societies and that procedural democracy is
amenable to overlapping consensus. Benhabib also qualifies her description by stating
that she has late capitalistic societies under consideration.15

In the late capitalistic democratic framework, relation between market and civil
society is very clearly defined. In early capitalistic and developmental economies, the
state regulates markets and civil society is dependent upon the state. Moreover, because
of globalization the public sphere has undergone a startling metamorphosis. Social
categories such as center – margins are under attack. What Habermas considers central to
his project of communicative action, the linguistic-communicative competence has to be
reevaluated in lieu of the tectonic shift in the center-margin relations. Thus far, liberal
political theorists have analyzed the polity only in terms of the corporate-hierarchical and
civil society-horizontal (liberal) social formations. What C.K. Prahlad characterizes as
the bottom of the pyramid has not been the focus of political theorists because of the
yawning theory-praxis chasm.16
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Existing political theory cannot, because of the politics of liberalism, encourage a
drastic rearrangement of social and political sphere in advanced liberal democracies. On
the other hand, liberal society has become too fragmented to address issues within a
common framework. The emphasis on competition has an osmotic effect on both market
and public sphere. Even Habermas advocates a third alternative to the existing liberal and
republican conceptions of politics.17 So, in order to redress the problems engendered by
the estrangement of the public sphere, market, and the private sphere, a more cooperative
interpersonal relational framework is necessary. While the distinction between market,
civil society, and government stands in a broad sense, structurally the social sphere has
been transformed into a clash of alterities and unhomely selves. Even social
epistemologists such as Alvin Goldman are trying to grasp the cultural failures in terms
of a framework of responsiveness rather than in a deeper sense of cultural particulars
versus cultural universals as described by Wiredu. It is here that Gadamer’s and Levinas’
respect for the ‘other’ attains the status of an imperative. Even though Habermas
indicates the absence of advanced moral development in Mead’s philosophy of the other,
which is theorized on the basis of role formation, significant gestures, and the generalized
other because of its neglect of the post-conventional rationalization potential of the
human beings, it has great relevance at the level of everyday interaction and in multicultural exchange.

In a conflict resolution process involving multicultural interlocutors, the ground
condition for a dialogue is recognition of mutual interests. Multicultural dialogue is
17
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asymmetric because it involves theoretical, practical, and aesthetic issues,
simultaneously. Habermas’ stipulation for a successful dialogue aimed at a consensus
such as comprehensibility, redeemability, justifiability, and discursivity could be
combined with Mead’s method of social communication.18 In multicultural exchanges,
the conventional level of social rationalization has greater utility than the postconventional. It is interesting that while Habermas criticizes Hegel for subjectivizing the
‘I-Thou’ relationship in the analysis of master-slave relation, the post-conventional moral
understanding is an abstraction. The post-conventional stage of moral development
espoused by Habermas must necessarily encompass the pre-conventional and
conventional stages and there must be a vertical movement among the three stages both
synchronically and diachronically. At any juncture, each member of the public sphere is
at different levels of moral understanding and there is a grid of cooperation and
competition that intersects each actor’s life in different ways. The post-conventional stage
of rationalization of Kohlberg, endorsed by Habermas, is not a linear category.19 It
assumes a shared cultural history, egalitarian social environment, motivational factors,
and organic development but neglects the vicissitudes of individual experience. In its
extreme, the post-conventional stage is fit only for a Buddha, a Jesus, or a Gandhi.

Consensus – A Need for Asymmetric Communicative Action
The concept of symmetry is applied in this chapter with respect to the disparities in
epistemological, conceptual, linguistic, and physical aspects of the participants in a social
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discourse. As Habermas points out in Communication and Legitimation of the Society
(1979), a social equilibrium is assumed as an underlying condition in theories on
achieving a consensus through a dialogue. Habermas avoids strategic action or discourse
because the former is overtly consequential while the latter is overtly procedural. Hence,
there is a hiatus in the process aimed at arriving at an understanding in asymmetrical
ituations. In the event of such a breakdown both tacit and explicit assumptions about
culture, knowledge, and politics are scrutinized.

More often than not, there is a need for paradigm shift, which is not recognized in
political discourse. Social epistemology, which Alvin Goldman defines as the impact of
knowledge acquisition on society, is mostly assumed as unproblematic in political theory
as long as the existing cultural paradigm has wide currency.20 Howard Zinn claims that
people are responsible for changes and not governments. Zinn’s observation is logically
correct. But the question is: Who are the people responsible for social change? For the
sake of convenience, let us divide the society into three classes. They are: the upper class,
the middle class, and the lower class. In the history of humankind, the cultural paradigm
has always been the bastion of the upper class. Even though, the above-mentioned
observation appears to be a hackneyed expression of Marxian historical materialism,
Zinn’s statement implies that the government is the last to realize the need for a social
change.21 It is only a logical corollary that the government is the last to awaken to the
need for social change because it is far removed from the civil society and the market.
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The upper class is always advanced in terms of science, technology, political
authority, economy, and philosophy, which are the deciding factors of a cultural
paradigm. Because of the disparity in the epistemic levels in the society, an idea takes a
long time to evolve into a social policy. An idea developing into a social or public policy
is coeval with the awareness of people at the lower strata of the society, because only if a
majority of the population realizes that it needs to create a change in public policy is the
government forced to act. Otherwise, the benefits of individual enterprise would never be
shared equitably even in a democracy. From the above analysis, it can be surmised that
the chasm in expertise and power on the one hand and non-expertise and powerlessness is
impossible to bridge.22 There are several plausible reasons for the failure to maintain
what Rawls would call a reflective equilibrium in a society.23 Some of them are:

1. Group knowledge versus Group rationality (Goldman’s comparison)

22

Cornel West’s critique of the postmodern politics of difference as “prophetic criticism” emphasizes the
aspect of reductionism in terms of sociological, psychological or historical factors. West, while
acknowledging the critical consciousness of the demystificatory criticism, terms it one-factor analysis.
What is interesting in lieu of West’s criticism of the cultural politics of difference is the anachronistic
position of postmodernism. For some, in West’s case, people of color, the pre-modern, modern, and the
post-modern distinction remains meaningless. This is true of colonies and the third world economies.
23
Daniels, Norman, "Reflective Equilibrium", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/reflectiveequilibrium/>. “The method of reflective equilibrium consists in working back and forth among our
considered judgments (some say our "intuitions") about particular instances or cases, the principles or rules
that we believe govern them, and the theoretical considerations that we believe bear on accepting these
considered judgments, principles, or rules, revising any of these elements wherever necessary in order to
achieve an acceptable coherence among them. The method succeeds and we achieve reflective equilibrium
when we arrive at an acceptable coherence among these beliefs. An acceptable coherence requires that our
beliefs not only be consistent with each other (a weak requirement), but that some of these beliefs provide
support or provide a best explanation for others. Moreover, in the process we may not only modify priori
beliefs but add new beliefs as well. In practical contexts, this deliberation may help us come to a conclusion
about what we ought to do when we had not at all been sure earlier. (Scanlon 2002). We arrive at an
optimal equilibrium when the component judgments, principles, and theories are ones we are un-inclined to
revise any further because together they have the highest degree of acceptability or credibility for us.”

156

2. Liberal democracy versus Corporatism
3. Expertise versus Audience
4. Communicative actions versus Strategic action
5. Community versus Society
6. Solidarity versus Subsidiarity
7. Deontology versus Consequentialism

Most of the afore-mentioned categorizations are discussed with respect to the symmetric
nature of the lifeworld in liberal democracies. Most liberal political theorists have an
approach that is culture-specific. While liberalism does not overtly encourage self-denial
or sacrifice, social transformation from a stratified society to a direct-access society is
possible only at terrible human costs. In this sense, most of contemporary political theory
is synchronous and not diachronous.

Procedural democracy is intimately connected with historical conditions of
society. By abstracting the procedural from the teleological, the form is accorded
supremacy over content. Procedural theorists speak of liberal democracy as the Promised
Land that needs only a reflective equilibrium or an overlapping consensus with respect to
the internal dynamics of the process. As a process, procedural democracy is considered to
be the panacea for the ills of world. Habermas universalizes formal categories of
procedural liberalism through a theory of universal pragmatics. Universal pragmatics
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combines formal linguistic structures with everyday spoken language.24 It is also an
important aspect of Mead’s notion of role-formation and generalized other. Universal
pragmatics is also related to the post-conventional rational development of Kohlberg and
Selman. But there is a need to engage people not only at the level of the moral and
political but also at the cultural. Hence, there is a need for social action that emphasizes
cooperation, self-denial, good social consequences, and a procedural consensus.

The social action that I envisage encompasses Weberian purposive-instrumental
action and Habermasian communicative action. It also emphasizes truthfulness, rightness,
and truth, Habermasian criteria for successful validity claims. It supports evaluatorneutrality and evaluator-relativity, in a weak sense. I call such an action co-operative
action. In the realm of social action, there are several variables such as social choices,
individual circumstances, political process, and cultural factors. Hence, there is a need to
coordinate individual actions with social objectives. In achieving limited or partial
unanimity (Arrow’s terminology), co-operative action does not exclude different social
choices.25 The social attitude required is performative and not pedagogical but without a
sense of possessiveness or attachment to the pleasures of the favorable outcome as the
sole motivating force. Happiness, heuristic motivation, self-sacrifice, and personal
satisfaction are not prohibited in co-operative action. What is prohibited is internal
colonization and structural violence, which democracy is required to address. As Arrow
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repeatedly points out, individual and social choices cannot be reconciled under all
conditions.

Co-operative Action
Concepts emphasizing deontology tend to trivialize an emphasis on consequences, while
the converse is true for those concepts of action that privilege consequences, such as
utilitarianism. Co-operative action is modeled on the concept of non-attached action. The
concept of non-attached action emphasizes the performance of an action with truthfulness
and sincerity on the part of most of the participants. It emphasizes procedural fairness in
the pursuit of wealth, happiness, and success. Non-attached action is at once an individual
and a group action. In the context of The Bhagawad Gīta, non-attached action is a clever
reconciliation of the deontological with the teleological. As a treatise that emphasizes
social action within the confines of Indian caste system but at the same time recognizing
the need to transcend social barriers, The Gīta offers the solution of ‘renunciation in
action as against renunciation of action.’26 The context of non-attached action is a
battlefield in which cousins, uncles, teachers, and friends are on opposite sides. A
simmering feud assumes gargantuan proportions and culminates in a war between two
royal clans (first cousins), the Kauravas and the Pāndavas. Eventually, it becomes a war
in which friends fight with friends, uncles with nephews, and teachers with their students
because of what could be termed as a confusion of deontological dogmatism with social
responsibility, on the one hand, and extreme purposive-instrumental reason on the other.
Arjuna, the Pāndava prince, who is the recipient of the teachings of Lord Krishna on the
26
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battlefield described in the Indian epic of The Mahabhārata, is confused between his
sense of duty and sense of civility. Is killing some one even for deontological reasons
justified? Can one relinquish what is one’s duty to kill in the pursuit of justice and,
instead, sacrifice the desire to avenge what is perceived as a denial of justice? Should
injustice be tolerated and ignored without any opposition?27

In The Gīta, which is a religious text, the ultimate purpose is merged with God’s
will and the duty to adhere to fulfilling one’s role in achieving such a purpose. Hence, at
some level, deontology and teleology merges into God’s will. Hence, we are once again
revisited with the Socratic question of whether the Gods advocate an action because they
are just or actions are just because the Gods say so. The Bhagawad Gīta within its
context provides an answer that karma or one’s duty is to be performed at all costs on
account of the social responsibility attached to it. There is a causal link between
individual and social action. In the Vedas, the concept of ṛta or cosmic moral order is
connected to the dharma or righteousness of the individuals and the society. In order to
explain how an action that is purportedly both right and wrong (killing one’s own kin for
the sake of revenge or possessions, which is entailed by duty to protect one’s honor and
regain what is rightfully one’s property that was unfairly usurped by Arjuna’s cousins
and prohibited by one’s dharma not to kill one’s own kin for the sake of wealth). Lord
Krishna advises Arjuna to perform his duty, which is to lead the war since the battle has
been announced and the armies were facing each other.
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According to Krishna, Arjuna was concerned with the outcome of the war and the
blame that would be attached to him for his actions on the battlefield rather than the
rightness or wrongness of his actions. Hence, Arjuna was more mindful of the
consequences of his actions than the rightness of the means of achieving his goal.
Krishna also emphasizes that the war was not wished by the Pāndavas and that all other
avenues of sāma (discussion), dāna (concessions), bheda (warnings and threats), and
finally the time for the use of daṇda (force) had arrived. Hence, Arjuna cannot shirk his
responsibilities as a soldier to fight a righteous battle even if it was against his own
clansmen. That being said, attitudinally, Arjuna had to become involved with the process
of waging war. Here, Krishna introduces the concept of karma-yogi. A karma-yogi is one
who performs an action without an attachment to the consequences of an action.28 Here,
the consequences refer to self-interest and egoism.

One can argue that in the final analysis, deontological positions cannot be bereft
of common or individual good. The issue for the deontologists is whether an action is
procedurally correct irrespective of its outcome. Underlying such an approach is the
assumption that procedural correctness would ultimately lead to the right objective. Such
an act of self-denial is anathematic to the consequentialists and they emphasize the
primacy of the consequences more than procedural correctness. A secularized concept of
non-attached action, in the form of co-operative action, in which the actors must be
accommodative to self-denial as an exception but not the rule would not violate voluntary
28
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action encouraged in a democracy. The concept of co-operative action fuses subsidiarity
and solidarity together. As a deliberative action, co-operative action does not stipulate
conditions of linguistic competencies. The only pre-condition for co-operative action is
the freedom to voice opinions irrespective of the linguistic or communicative
competencies.

The aim of co-operative action is progressive betterment of any potential conflictproducing situation. Group decisions must not infringe upon individual rights unless
society is adversely affected in terms of shared goods. The aim of co-operative action is
to arrive at a consensus or a general agreement. The emphasis of co-operative action is
not on unanimity. Hence, Jane Mansbridge’s advocacy of rational persuasion could also
be accommodated.29 Mansbridge argues that rational coercion is inevitable in a
deliberative process. The underlying principles of co-operative action are non-violence
and truthfulness. While the consequences, both individual and social, are important, the
social impact of the consequences of one’s action must be reconciled with the benefits or
damages that accrue to the individual and the society. Once a decision about a course of
action is reached then it could be adopted as a social policy. But if the policy fails to
achieve its objectives, then alternatives must be pursued. Procedural dogmatism must not
be condoned. Procedures are adjusted according to their effectiveness in problem solving
and their social impact. If a group action causes harm to individuals, then the individual
must be compensated. Issues pertaining to individual, social, religious, and cultural
practices must not be a source of discrimination. Neither the valorization of individuals to
29
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the detriment of society nor society to that of individuals must be encouraged. Most of
the problems in the arena of politics arise due to the lack of understanding of the scope of
problems in social and personal spheres. A personal solution for social problems and a
social solution to problems pertaining to personal lives of people have caused tensions
between private and public spheres.

Co-operative action encourages cooperation as well as competition. Since, the
emphasis is on the optimal performance of an action rather than a victory, the
accomplishment of a task gives heuristic satisfaction. Accolades and benefits that accrue
out of co-operative action must not be coveted but need not be shunned. Thus, the enownment in terms of personal agency for the success of an action is exchanged with an
attitude of self-releasement. Thus, the emphasis is on accomplishing a task with desired
consequences with a sense of detachment to the fruits of action. This could be best
illustrated with the help of an example of driving on the road. Each driver who is driving
on the road must follow the rules of traffic. But in any given situation, there are
involuntary violations of traffic rules. Voluntary violations are penalized. A driver who
follows traffic rules assiduously and also constantly adjusts her driving according to the
traffic would reach her destination safely, barring any unforeseen incidents. On the other
hand, a driver who is always worried about delays, other drivers, and also about the
possibility of accidents, losing her way, being stopped by police, or driving too slowly or
too rashly, will more often than not commit serious errors which will cause problems for
other drivers and to herself.
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Ultimately, fruits of an action accrue when procedures and consequences are
calibrated and evaluated according to the situation. Violations of procedures occur only
when consequences of an action assumes more importance than procedural propriety.
This would lead to impropriety and avariciousness. On the converse, a dogmatic
adherence to procedures without a constant re-evaluation of consequences would be
meaningless. It would only lead to despondency and also impose unnecessary constraints
on fellow citizens. Co-operative action emphasizes consensus that does not require
specialized discourse. Hence, it is also effective in dealing with asymmetric cultural
discourse. For a consensus to be achieved should optimal conditions be established such
as a public sphere that is structurally democratized or a process of consensus has to
necessarily engage unequal and unhomely spaces? I strongly emphasize the need for a
provisional procedural and purposive frame of reference in order to facilitate cooperative
action.

Consensus – A Conflict of Identities
Bhabha’s reading of concepts such as nation or culture as containing the double moment
of being a part of history as well as the makers of history creates a convulsion in the
concept of civil society. It is this liminal conception of a dynamic, historical, and
ephemeral self that is imbedded in the ever-emerging interstices of the cultures of the
world. Can liberal democracy or republicanism encourage a discourse that emanates from
the margins and not the center? Both liberal democracy and republicanism are based on
the assumption of a nation-state, as a shared idea of a population. What happens to a
liberal discourse when there is a proliferation of cultures and not one dominant culture or
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religion? Can liberal democracy sincerely engage the shifting margins while staying in
the center? Bhabha writes:30

The people are not simply historical events or parts of a patriotic body politic. They
are also a complex rhetorical strategy of social reference: their claim to be
representative provokes a crisis within the process of signification and discursive
address. We then have a contested conceptual territory where the nation’s people
must be thought in double-time; the people are the historical ‘objects’ of a
nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pregiven or constituted historical origin in the past; the people are also the ‘subjects’ of
a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary presence of the
nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principles of the people as
contemporaneity: as that sign of the present through which national life is redeemed
and iterated as a reproductive process.
The struggle between the subjectivization and the objectivization of the population of a
nation contains the binary oppositional structure listed in the beginning of this chapter.
The advocates of liberal democracy more often than not fail to recognize the smoldering
fire in the interstices. In a liberal democracy that enshrines individual liberty and which
contains social shock absorbers such as courts, political institutions such as Congress and
Senate, secular polity, freedom to protest, religious freedom, lobbying groups, elections,
and referendums have successfully alleviated the problem of group violence.

It is interesting that group violence and rioting breaks out more often than not in
the under-privileged sections of the city in liberal democracies. Individuated human
beings who have been inculcated with conceptions of individual rights and property
inhabit the cities. Hence, the nature of crimes in a city is individual versus individual,
mostly. But in the third world countries and in the rural areas in the liberal democracies,
30
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the nature of the crimes could be classified into the group versus the individual, group
versus group, and very seldom individual versus individual. In ancient cultures such as
Africa and India, what Bhabha describes as the dual body politic is played at the vertical
and the horizontal levels; at the vertical level as social and economic stratification and at
the horizontal level as culturally diverse groups that are involved in a discourse aimed at
cooperative or coercive action. Bhabha also identifies the vulnerability of a discourse
because of its inability to confront its own historical contingency.

Bhabha describes the split in the narratives of national identities as the
pedagogical and the performative. The pedagogical totalizes people into a totality and the
social and political identities are defined in terms of a homogeneous and consensual
community. On the other hand, the performative is specific and addresses unequal
interests and identities within a population.31 Habermas, for the above-mentioned reason,
emphasizes the importance of universal pragmatics, in which formal and pragmatic
elements of the language are conjoined. Bhabha agrees with Claude Lefort’s description
of the ‘enigma of language,’ which is related to the internal and external referential
framework of language as the both reflexive and reflective. The construction of a self in a
language occurs only with reference to the other, which is very close to Mead’s
conception of the self. This view also reflects the independence of the text, a view that is
especially espoused by Gadamer.
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Can procedural democracy successfully surmount the problem of a split national
subject? Can liberal democracy meaningfully engage cultures that epitomize liminality of
identities? Bhabha cites Raymond Williams’ distinction between “residual and emergent
practices in oppositional cultures which require, he insists, a ‘non-metaphysical, nonsubjectivist’ mode of explanation.32 Habermas’ theory of communicative action that
emphasizes a perpetual thrust towards agreement also borders on the pedagogical. Why
should the world have a post-national central authority? As Bhabha argues, such a
conception of post-national authority is abstracted from the context of everyday
experience and remains a utopian ideal. Pragmatics is sacrificed on the altar of the
formal. Why is there a need for a consensus that culminates in the formal transcendental
idea of the post-national when even national identities are nebulous? Hence, there is a
need for self-releasement and non-attachment to a universal foundational principle.33
Instead of theorizing about absolutes, there is a need to thematize validity claims
performatively. Is the world safe from hypostatization and reification if the interstitial
becomes the cultural norm? What prevents the hypostatization of the non-consensual
cultural interstices? Are differences sufficient to ward off cultural homogenization? I
would argue that in terms of the individuation, interstices could be celebrated. But in
sociation, the interstitial is analyzable only in terms of the already hypostatized
categories. This has been proved in the Indian caste-system, which was anterior to the
class system but did not originate from it.
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Difference as the Absolute
The caste system that exists in India is the classic example of the absolutization of
liminality. Instead of effecting a cultural integration of the society horizontally, the social
distinctions were institutionalized and hypostatized. In a manner similar to the Socratic
‘noble lie,’ but in more earnest tenor, the concept of guṇas or qualities elucidated in the
Sāmkhya philosophy, has influenced The Bhagawad Gīta profusely. Unlike the United
States or other countries that had a national consciousness due to religious and cultural
identities, India’s diversity was both a blessing and damnation. Towards the later part of
the Ṛg Veda in the Puruṣasukta (hymn to the Puruṣa), the beginnings of the class system
based on occupation of priests, warriors, merchants, and laborers had begun. The outcasts
or pariahs attained notoriety only later. The word pariah literally means ‘drummer’ in
Tamil. At some point of time, the drummers were considered to be of lower caste and
thus they were relegated to the group of untouchables. In the Buddhist chronicles, there is
only a mention of the ruling class and the laboring class. Even when the Aryans and the
native dāsas first came into contact, the caste-system was yet to develop. There were only
the hunter-gatherer Aryan society and the agrarian dāsas. But social classification in
terms of the four afore-mentioned classes became hereditary in course of time and the
constant flow of people belonging to different cultures into the Indian subcontinent
created a miasma of social grid formation in the form of the caste system. Hence, the
diversity of India evolved organically but also in an unpremeditated fashion. A
procedure, which was justified on the basis of the quality of birth, was the caste system.
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Indian Caste System - A Systematic Hypostatization of Cultural Differences
Indian social organization was necessitated by a constant process of sedimentation of
cultures one over the other. Max Weber diagnosed the lattice-like social structure of the
Indian caste system, which was nurtured by the class system in the beginning but
overwhelmed the class system by institutionalizing occupational and cultural
differences.34 The minute nature of the caste system extends to social, political, cultural,
and religious practices of the individual, family, town, village, city, and the country as a
whole. Caste system was a total and absolute social organization, which in simple
terminology, what in Charles Taylor’s parlance could be termed as, the social imaginary
of India. A multi-culturally diverse cultural sphere differentiated by every possible factor
evolved into an oppressive system because of the very difference that has made India a
tolerant democracy.

Most writers on India have remarked that religious persecutions in India were
exceptions and not the rule. With such a strong grid-like social structure, internal
colonization and structural violence were localized. Religion was a superstructure while
social organization in the form of caste system was the base. Religious conflicts occurred
outside the sphere of the caste system. What is interesting is the fact that a modern shared
social imaginary that developed in the West was not possible in India because of the
fractious nature of the Indian society. But religion survived by incorporating various
native and foreign practices into an amorphous Hindu culture.
34
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The concept of India as a country can be explained only in terms of the
Upanishadic negation of neti, neti (not this, not this). Could Indian culture be explained
as indescribable (anirvaccaniya)?35 But while ineffability is a philosophically attractive
principle, politically it is potently dangerous. Manifestations of ineffability occur in
myriad ways and they are more often than not utilized to stultify the efforts of
unsuspecting masses while the elites inject ideologies that are imprinted indelibly into the
social psyche of the people. Ineffability is the magic wand that obfuscated social
inequalities. Ineffability paralyzed people into inactivity while poets and artists prospered
under its shade. Ineffability was nourished and nurtured by sacralizing language.
Habermas elaborately discusses the process of demystification of the ineffable by what he
calls the linguistification of the sacred.36

In American history, consensus required for enacting a law in the aftermath of the
American Revolution was channeled through two groups led by John Adams and Thomas
Jefferson. There was a shared common goal of individual freedom and protection of
individual property, which was the cultural paradigm of the independent American
nation. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century America, which was predominantly
racially homogeneous, language, culture, political institutions, and religion were common
factors that united the population. Contemporary political theorizing has not incorporated
changes in the essential character of American democracy. An interesting contrast would
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be the Indian Constitution, which is a document that has been designed with cultural
diversity and social inequality as the defining criteria.

The Indian Constitution was framed under the leadership of B.R. Ambedkar in
order to ensure peaceful coexistence of a secular, multi-religious, multi-cultural, and
multi-lingual population. In the case of ancient Indian society, due to a lack of horizontal
political system multicultural diversity was arranged in the hierarchical framework in
which each vertical division was horizontally expanded on the basis of the social status of
the new entrants. In ancient India, corporatism was the determining factor of the social
status and hence horizontal relation between various groups could happen only within a
particular grid. In the contemporary context, corporatism is the domain of the market and
the public sphere is characterized by democracy. In a sense, corporate market and
democratic public sphere are always in conflict. But because of a judicial system based
on common laws and free elections, most advanced democracies have ameliorated the
tension between the democratic public sphere and the corporate market, though not
entirely.

Caste system that unfortunately still exists in India is the best example of a
corporate system.37 Indian caste-system has been considerably weakened because of a
strong emphasis on individual rights, equality, freedom, and affirmative action after
India’s independence from the British. But the process of dismantling casteism,
empowering women, and establishing religious amity began almost two centuries ago.
37
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India needs to elevate herself to the next rung of the democratic ladder by strengthening
democratic institutions locally. India, still, does not have a culture of co-operation, but
only co-option. The culture of competition that is hailed as the central feature of
advanced liberal capitalism is very much absent in India. The concept of doing one’s
dharma (svadharma), contentment, non-attachment, and social responsibility has been
misinterpreted to exclude competitiveness as a moral good, thus making competition
deplorable.

On the contrary, The Bhagawad Gīta encourages a healthy sense of competition
by emphasizing the non-instrumental aspects of the process of achieving one’s objective.
In the absence of a coordinated definition of competition and regulatory bodies, the
cultural diversity of India spawned a culture of accommodation. Such an attitude of
accommodation gave rise to a culture of co-option. On the other hand, the fractured social
organization of India into various castes also institutionalized attitudes. Competition was
encouraged on the part of kshatriyas (warriors). Learning and religious practices were the
forte of brahmins, while unquestioned servitude in physical labor was assigned to the
labor class (sūdras). Acquisition of wealth was the domain of the merchant class
(vaishyas). The class distinctions mentioned above had a dual role. On the one hand, it
created a hierarchical society, which later became hereditary. On the other hand, even
during severe social unrest, the Indian society did not crumble because of the svadharma
of each class did not depend on the government but on the social organization itself.
Since social hierarchy was the structural foundation of the Indian society after the period
of the Vedas it was impossible to disentangle the hereditary nature of social classification.
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Even though, social policies of the Indian governments over the past fifty years have
been more populist than progressive and the bureaucracy itself wreaking of corruption,
the reason why India has grown into a stable democracy is because of the manner in
which social transformation was achieved by people such as Gandhi.

From the eighteenth century, there was a concerted effort to alleviate social evils
in India by progressive individuals and social movements. As Gandhi, repeatedly
stressed, Indian independence was both an internal as well as external freedom. Gandhi
called for a complete social change as the precursor to political freedom. For Gandhi,
political rights were meaningless without a concept of duty. Duty, for Gandhi, was to
strive for the development of the downtrodden people of India. Progress was a social,
political, religious, and economic activity. Hence, for Gandhi, a political transformation
was a spiritual transformation and vice versa. Moreover, the spiritual was intimately
connected to the welfare of the people around him. When India gained independence
from the British, the attitude of the majority had become sensitive to the plight of the
discriminated population. Only those states and regions that had feudal landholdings
continued to discriminate against the lower castes whereas in more literate states castediscriminations shrank significantly.

Affirmative action, which is called reservation in India, poses an interesting
problem for Bhabha’s politics of interstices. Ironically, before the reservation for lower
castes was passed into law by the Indian government, people wanted to advance their
castes in the social hierarchy, that is, aspired to be a part of the upper castes. But, with a
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strong emphasis on reservation in education, jobs, and promotions for the lower castes,
there is a downward trend. Quixotically, all castes including the Brahmin castes are
demanding reservation on the basis of their caste, minority, and economic status. Hence,
the institutionalization of the social interstices does not always alleviate problems of
social justice. Economic assistance program of the government of India has turned into
rentier rights based on heredity. For the brahmins, privilege has turned into a
disadvantage while under-privileged status for lower castes, have become a privilege.

The proponents of reservations for the lower castes such as Dr. B.R. Ambedkar,
who himself belonged to an untouchable caste, advocated reservation only for a certain
period resembling Rawls’ “difference principle.” A period of fifty years is not sufficient
to recompense the victims of thousands of years of discrimination. Only the top-tier of
the erstwhile-discriminated population enjoys the fruits of reservation while the poorer
section does not have access to quality education and employment opportunities. This
was partly due to what is derisively called the Hindu rate of growth of 3 – 4% in
economy.38 With economic liberalization and less governmental interference, India has a
healthier rate of growth of 6-7% for the past few years. But the private sector has not
encouraged reservation in employment either due to political implications or quality of
the work force. Only if the private sector encourages the under-privileged, would Indian
society surge forward. Hence, at least, metaphorically, the interstices must dynamically
interact with the centers of culture in India. Democracy is a passive phenomenon and not
an active phenomenon amongst the Indian population that still struggles with the
38
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problems of everyday existence such as water, electricity, transportation, jobs, housing,
and rampant corruption. Democracy in spirit is yet to pervade entire Indian population.

Cultural Melting-pot or Multi-cultural Democracy
India did not have a caste system during the early Vedic period. Only when the Indian
society became sedentary, did class divisions emerge in India.39 Ironically, there is a
reversal of privilege and caste hierarchy, at present. It is interesting to observe that
dynamic social interstices challenge cultural stereotypes and hypostatization while a
settled procedural democracy is less sensitive to socio-cultural changes and aspirations of
the margins. The philosophy of the interstitial that Bhabha advocates could be
institutionalized in a procedural democracy, for example, in the form of affirmative
action for cultural minorities and, hitherto, oppressed classes. But once the politics of
interstices is institutionalized, it ceases to be a philosophy of presence. Without a binding
principle or a social commitment at both institutional and individual levels, procedures
are ineffectual.

The melting pot or multi-cultural democracy as the ideal of America is a later
justification of the idea of America as a symbol of freedom.40 In any culture, immigrants
begin with a distinctive disadvantage of being treated as aliens. In the United States, legal
immigrants have more rights and are not discriminated overtly. There is a cultivated
sensitivity amongst the American populace with respect to immigrants. But events such

39
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as the September 11th 2001 could drastically alter the opinion of the people especially
against minorities from the Middle Eastern countries.

It is in this context that Arthur Schlesinger, Jr’s observation that there is an
obsessive search for the roots amongst the immigrant population of the United States
poses an interesting issue.41 While Takaki responds that multi-culturalism or multiethnicity could be an enriching aspect of the American society, it must be noted that
America and other countries that encourage immigrants need to have a social, political,
and cultural response to multiculturalism. In so far as there is a measured distantiation
between various cultures encouraged by the conception of negative liberty rather than
studied engagement with other cultures, a multicultural democracy is impossible
irrespective of whether a nation is a cultural melting pot such as India or an advanced
liberal democracy that encourages multiculturalism such as the United States.

41
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Conclusion

The necessary function of a successful political system is to establish consensus between
individuals, civil society, political hierarchy, and electoral institutions, not exclusively
procedural and symmetric, but responsive to the asymmetry of human relationships. I
discuss the reasons for disagreements on important issues such as affirmative action and
multicultural democracy in this chapter. I analyze the daunting challenges to multicultural democracies such as the United States and India and the need for consensus in
social, religious, economic, and political spheres. Both India and the United states have
multi-religious and multi-ethnic population. Hence, there is a pressing need to encourage
consensus in the public sphere. Subsidiarity or mutual social relationship rather than
frivolous legal wrangling is necessary for the peaceful coexistence of a diverse society. A
possessive individualistic society or an authoritarian community cannot engender
consensus. Only a mutual social relationship in which people are willing to give more
than or at least as much as they take and tolerant to cultural differences will be able to
support consensus.

In most of the academic programs that are actively engaged in research on multicultural issues, religions, and cultures one finds de-contextualization and essentialization
of alien cultures. The most significant de-contextualization occurs among already settled
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generation of the immigrant population themselves. There is a hypostatization of
imported cultures, which are completely isolated from the dynamic developments of the
native countries from which the immigrants themselves hail. More often that not, there is
a clash of cultures between the immigrant settlers and the countries of origin.
Fundamental factors that contribute to the organic development of an immigrant culture
are not present in the same degree in the United States as in the native countries. Hence,
there is a concerted effort to search for roots among the ethnic population of the United
States. There are several ways in which the multi-cultural question could be handled. I
will list some of them.

1.

The presence of English as the common language. Even though the
immigrants might have a different language as their mother tongue, the
dominant linguistic framework of English would evoke no challenges
from the immigrant population because of the functional and cultural
prestige attached to English.

2.

The two-party system. The American political system shifts the cultural
paradigm to that of class-issue from that of ethnic allegiance. In this
sense, the American political system needs to make compromises and
turn into a word-world fit to a world-word fit.1 Thus far, the word-world
fit has helped range the ethnic minorities within the two-party
framework, which has helped in the assimilation of the minorities. But

John Searle, Expression and meaning: Studies in the theory of speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979.
1
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as the minorities become politically more active, the polity needs to
become more sensitive to the ethnic divisions because of issues such as
dual-status citizenship, religious fundamentalism, and issues such as
terrorism.

3.

In course of time, the two-party system might undergo a transformation
into a multi-party democracy. Wiredu’s emphasis on a non-party
democracy supplies the best atmosphere for a government by
consensus. But, in a capitalistic environment, non-party democracy is
difficult to achieve.

4.

The question of universal pragmatics poses a very interesting challenge
to the multi-ethnic and multi-party democracies. Habermas does not
address the structural problems imbedded in a linguistically diverse
polity even when the emphasis is on universal pragmatics. As the
United States recognizes the need for training in other languages, then
the vexatious issues pertaining to a linguistically constructed lifeworld
will come to the fore. Linguistic construction of social reality differs
with cultures. Without self-denial in terms of a language, which is in
turn a denial of an en-worlded self, there is neither a concept of
universal pragmatics nor that of national unity.
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Habermas attempts to circumvent this problem by positing a post-national constellation,
which avoids problems of cultural relativism. But such an enterprise demands gargantuan
self-denial of individuals who belong to variegated cultures, religions, nations, and
languages. Institutionalization of such an idea into a political enterprise would definitely
engender what Lyotard calls the tyranny of the consensus. The problem posed by
Habermas’ grandiose conception of a post-national organization in the form of United
Nations Government resembles Nathan Glazer’s idea that the Constitution of the United
States must only guarantee equality of individuals and not redress inequalities of hitherto
oppressed ethnic groups.2 Such a formal notion of an egalitarian democracy is plausible
under conditions that resemble Habermas’ ideal speech situation.3

In the United States, secularism or multi-cultural acceptance has occurred in an
incremental manner. Inclusion of African American minorities into the political spectrum
happened in the course of time and not suddenly. Asian Immigration Act (1965) and
other legislations that were inclusive of the cultural differences indicate the gradual
cultural maturation of America. Concepts such as secularism, racial equality, antiapartheid policies, gender equality, and other concepts that enhance natural rights have
developed inductively. In the case of the United States, the original position as the status
quo ensuring equality that Rawls discusses is relevant because of the founding of a new
world influenced by the ideas of Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau. The
Ronald Takaki, Ed. Debating Diversity, Oxford University Press, 2002. Refer to Nathan Glazer’s article
on “The Emergence of an American Ethnic Pattern.”
3
Habermas’ notion of ideal speech situation has been elaborated in his article ‘Wahrenheitstheorien” which
has not been translated into English. In his later works, “ideal speech situation” has taken different guises
as communicative action, universal pragmatics, and discourse ethics. From a list of pre-conditions for a
successful communicative action, the “ideal speech situation” has metamorphosed into a more thematic
principle that is interlinked with the process of argumentation.
2
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American Revolution was a reaction against the abuse of power of the British monarchy,
which viewed America as one of the colonies. In many ways, the American Revolution of
1776 was an internal revolt that ended with the formation of a separate country, which
expanded on the basis of joint-business interests, not to mention the Bible
Commonwealth. Hence, the American idea of a socio-political consensus was centered
on commerce and individual rights. [It must be noted here that there was a strong political
movement in favor of republicanism. Great American personages such as Benjamin
Franklin and John Adams supported the republican ideals.] Nathan Glazer and other
claimants to the pristine American idea of non-ethnic liberal democracy have not
acknowledged the tacit understanding of a social imaginary underlying the ideal of
America.

In any social situation, the historicity of the prevalent cultural framework can
never be exorcised from any socio-economic analysis to create artificial conditions of
equality. Only through a culturally immanent dialogue can a consensus be achieved.
Whether a consensus achieved is a hard or soft-consensus depends upon the gravity of the
issues debated. Only in a discourse based on heuristic motivation can there be a hardconsensus. For example, hard consensus is plausible in a discourse among nuclear
scientists about a specific issue or a group of scientists working on a project. In a
discourse among warring groups or in the event of ethnic strife, a hard-consensus is
neither sought nor achieved. On the contrary, soft-consensus or provisional consensus is
preferable to a hard-consensus. Because of the differences in the cultural paradigm and a
possible abortive bid to forge a hard-consensus, the simmering differences between two
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divergent factions could lead to serious conflagration. In such situations, Habermas’
depth-hermeneutics would not be of great help but rather an aesthetic claim to the
truthfulness of subjective expression would thaw frigid interpersonal relationships. In
many ways, a type of co-operative action, which is a combination of self-denial, a belief
in progress, broad consequentialism, and broad deontology, is warranted. Weber’s
analysis of purposive-instrumental rationality emphasizes a strong sense of
consequentialism that is not necessarily utilitarian. On the other hand, Habermas’
emancipatory telos would be strongly deontological.

Habermas tempers the concept of emancipatory telos in his later works by
emphasizing socially contingent critical self-reflection and universal pragmatics. Thomas
McCarthy’s explains the role of systematic distortion in universal pragmatics as a tension
between those experiences imbedded in the unconscious of individuals and the social
dimensions of individual experience. Habermas calls these experiences historicohermeneutic critical experiences.4 A concept of consensus requires integration of the
individual-social experience at the level of depth-hermeneutics, according to Habermas.
When the interlocutors interact with each other at the level of depth hermeneutics, does it
really constitute a consensus in the ordinary sense of the term? Furthermore, at that level
I argue that a dialogue becomes argumentative, which Habermas seeks to avoid. On the
other hand, Parsonian social system seems to be restrictive to individual creativity
because of the conception of society as a system.

4
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Habermas’ objective was to situate his theory on an entirely new paradigm. The
paradigm of consciousness that characterized pre-modern and modern eras had to be
replaced because of the contingency of social conditions. Hence, Habermas builds his
theory of communicative action on the new paradigm of language. Habermas writes:5

What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know:
language. Through its structure autonomy and responsibility are posited to us. Our
first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and
unconstrained consensus. Autonomy and responsibility together (Mündigkeit)
comprise the only idea we possess a priori in the sense of the philosophical
tradition.

Habermas’ program of integrating the formal and pragmatic structures of communication
has important portends for the entire spectrum of social and political philosophy. The
structural conflict between a liberal civil society and a corporate system characterizes
advanced liberal democracies.

C. B. Mcpherson’s writings on possessive individualism that underlies liberal
capitalistic societies describe the tension between democracy and property.6 The
reduction of democracy to liberty in terms of individual human rights and individual
property rights precludes the necessity for a civitas. Mcpherson clearly does not accede to
the claims that procedural democracy could be the final solution to political issues. Jane
Mansbridge criticizes Mcpherson on his diffidence to endorse the importance of
democratic participation as the bedrock of a consensual polity. But democracy is an

Habermas, CES, Ibid. p. xvii.
C.B. Macpherson, Democracy and Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1962.
5
6
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ideology that needs critical self-reflection and it is not a state of emancipation.
Democracy facilitates critical self-reflection but does not necessarily demand it.

On the surface, Glazer’s claim is powerful, but only plausible in Rawls’ ‘Original
Position’ or ‘veil of ignorance.’ By declaring that everyone is equal, injustices cannot be
punished, deterred, nor corrected. Glazer also performs a Rawlsian epoche when he limits
political rights to individual rights and severs group rights. In the civil rights violations,
the question was blackness versus whiteness and not individual black versus individual
white. Another interesting but weak argument is that of exoneration from culpability for
past injustices due to a lack of deliberate design on the part of the perpetrators. Social and
historical conditions that prevailed during the period when atrocities were being
committed are claimed to be accidental. Those who do not belong to the pre-1964
generation claim that they have no culpability for what happened before 1964 and hence
they must not be penalized by affirmative action in the post-1964 era.

Liberalism imposed a divide between the individual and the social that has been
ingeniously utilized to champion causes such as gun-rights and anti-affirmative action by
questioning the constitutional authority of the Federal government to intervene in favor of
the minorities in the United States.7 The liberal conception of individual rights has
historicized the individual and hence has also encouraged an evaluation of history as
individual history (petty narratives in Lyotards’s words). But such an individuation of the

7

The afore-mentioned appeal to individual liberty is based on a liberalism of convenience rather than
ritualistic liberalism (Sidney Hook’s phraseology). This is a problem of pseudo liberalism and hence there
are no rational solutions.
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self is a post-modern conception. Post-modern conception of selfhood is a social
rationalization applicable for a group of people who have undergone the transformation
in successive stages from the pre-modern to the post-modern selves. But in the case of
stunted evolution of a historical self as witnessed in the discrepancies in the third world –
first world division and, even within a society, between the upper classes and the downtrodden classes, there is a need for self-denial on the part of the whole society, the
oppressors and the oppressed. Otherwise, what Gandhi refers to as the ‘cycle of
repression’ and what Franz Fanon proposed as what was an unavoidable recourse to
violence against colonial repression would destroy the social fabric. Rawls and Habermas
propose institutional solutions. But such institutional solutions guaranteed by liberal
democracy needs to be supported at the societal level by human leadership and sacrifices.
Such a responsibility rests on social integrates or the group of people who have an idea of
society as a collective.8

Democracy is neither a self-regulatory nor a self-righteous system. It was under
the eyes of the United States Constitution that slavery flourished. Even what Charles
Taylor considers modern social imaginary a only a self-projection of prevailing social
values of a society. Hence, modern social imaginary is a mirror image of a society. It is
not very clear whether a self-imagination of how one’s society is would eliminate the
social ills. History proves that all religions of the world proclaim charity, magnanimity,
honesty, non-violence and other venerable traits required by human beings. But in all
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parts of the world, wars, oppression of women, casteism, religious persecution,
colonization and slavery have been unabashedly condoned.

As Fanon argues, the oppressor and the oppressed have no shared beliefs in
humaneness. There is no human connection between the colonized and the colonizer.
Hence, for Fanon, the only solution possible is through violence.9 The encapsulation of a
situation of pathological loathing between the colonizer and the colonized is what Gandhi
refers to as the ‘cycle of repression.’10 Such situations lead to genocide. Democracy
provides a non-violent way of resolving conflicts. But constant checks and balances are
required to prevent the hypostatization of democratic institutions. Thus, liberal
democracy in its procedural forms is not free of systematic distortions. Unlike Habermas’
ideal speech situation, the entire political system is under the spell of a social imaginary.
Is it plausible for a society to be reflexive and transform itself or is it necessary for an
external agency to disrupt its inertia?

Social transformations have been brought about only by sustained opposition to
injustice and not only by self-evaluative political action. It is also very much possible that
in procedural democracies, injustice can be committed procedurally. Criminals, in order
to circumvent the consultative political process that is integral to liberal democracy, often
utilize ineffectual procedures and procedural loopholes. More often than not, it is difficult

Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, London: Penguin Books, 1978. In the book, Fanon advocates
the inevitability of anti-colonial violence on the premise that there is no human connection between the
colonizer and the colonized because the colonized do not acknowledge the human worth of the colonized.
10
Dennis Dalton, Ed., Mahatma Gandhi: Selected Political Writings, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Co., 1998.
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to respond to individual violations because of the universal nature of the procedures. In a
procedural democracy, individual responses need procedural validation. More often than
not, a false social imaginary about the procedural aspects of democracy could lead to
insensitivity about alien cultural paradigms. The deification of procedural democracy,
which Sidney Hook aptly calls ritualistic liberalism, has elevated the celebration of
American democracy to the level of religious fervor. The unquestioning acceptance of the
notion that there is a passionate yearning for democracy, in all cultures, stems from a lack
of critical self-reflection in the Western countries about their history.

The question that arises is whether the American style of a Democrat versus
Republican conception of liberty would be applicable in the third world context. In the
Searlean sense, America is a word to world fit. Searle claims that there are two kinds of
word-world relation. One is the word to world fit and the other is the world to word fit. In
the former, there is a pre-understanding of the meaning of words while in the latter the
meaning emerges with the usage. Searle argues that assertive sentences have ‘word to
world’ direction of fit while directives have ‘world to word’ fit.11 India is a world to word
fit. In spite of a specific agenda of liberty for all enshrined in the American Constitution,
women’s and minority suffrage has taken almost two hundred years after independence to
fructify. The deliberative process was completely unable to convince the American
people of the abominable practice of racism and discrimination. Civil War was required
to abolish slavery in America.

John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An essay in the Philosophy of Language, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1990. Also refer to Barry Smith. Ed. John Searle, Buffalo: SUNY Press, 2003. p. 9.
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In the third world, the Indian caste system and the denial of women’s rights were
the two most atrocious inhumane practices. Gandhi consistently advocated the abolition
of caste system and the liberation of women in India.12 Most of the contemporary
political theorists neglect the failure of the deliberative process, which was guaranteed to
represent the grievances of the people even in an advanced liberal democracy such as
America. Joshua Cohen’s idea of associative democracy is laudable for its emphasis on
the role of civil society in informing decisions of the government pertaining to social
issues. Even in Cohen’s theory, there is a tacit assumption about the common goals of the
government and the people of a country. Both the government and the people work in
tandem to address social issues. Pluralism in the Western context, more often that not,
means pluralism of individual ideas. Since democratic ideals have permeated the West
and people believe in the political process, pluralistic ideas are channeled through the
Congressional process of representation. But, a country such as India which is not only
pluralistic in terms of individual opinion but also in terms of multi-lingual, multi-ethnic,
and multi-religious population which has inherited problems bequeathed over several
millennia cannot perform an epoche and adhere to a deliberative-associative
democracy.13 In this context, Habermas cites Jaspers. “To understand each other through
ciphers implies a form of communication in contact with the transcendent. Here the most
intimate tie can be accompanied by the most remarkable hostility.”14 Jaspers also further

Please refer to the Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi published by the Mahatma Gandhi Foundation,
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explores whether a maximal shared framework of understanding heterogeneous faiths
possible.

In the context of affirmative action as a cultural reparation to the blacks in the
United States, Nathan Glazer’s critique of affirmative action as reverse colonization is a
denial of the history of the evolution of the social self of America. Is it a form of
psychological escapism instead of encountering the past? Glazer’s critique attempts to
scuttle the process of cultural sublimation of the American self.15 Glazer’s analysis of the
emergence of ethnic group politics in the form of affirmative action extended to native
Americans, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and Pacific Islanders as contravening the ideal of a
non-ethnic and non-religious America. Glazer’s analysis appears very incisive until one
compares the evolution of American democracy and the discordant notes that emanate
between the words enshrined in the Constitution of America and the stark reality of
slavery and racial discrimination. Here, once again the clash between consequentialism
and deontology come to the fore. Glazer emphasizes a turning away from the sanguine
past of America.

For the people who did not suffer the oppression of slavery and discrimination,
much is not lost as a result of turning away from the past by declaring equality of
opportunities for all. But for those who have to turn away from a horrid past, the future
hopes always remind them of the horrors of the past. The present is a distant dream since

Ronald Takaki, Ed. Debating Diversity, Oxford University Press, 2002. Refer to Nathan Glazer, “The
Emergence of an American Ethnic Pattern.”
15

189

they are haunted by the past.16 What Glazer suggests is not a catharsis for the people who
were oppressed but even more repression that would only indelibly scar the analysands
perpetually and turn them into psychopaths or socio-paths. One of the reasons why
America did not become another Algeria or South Africa was because of the democratic
institutions that allowed a sliver of hope to filter into the psyche of the blacks.

Glazer’s espousal of an anti-affirmative action stance has some merits. There are
abuses of affirmative action policies and because of deontological emphasis on
affirmative action the consequential import of affirmative action policies as a privilege
are construed as rights. Demands of reparations and other retrospective corrective
measures create a fiasco. Glazer concedes that the political rhetoric of the founding
fathers of America has not been honored with action as witnessed in the denial of
women’s suffrage and continuation of slavery after 1776. But Glazer’s approach neglects
historical atrocities committed on the black people and the native Indians. The American
dream of an egalitarian state is the ideal that is to be coveted and defended and the
perversions of this ideal must not be mistaken as a purposive activity, according to
Glazer. Glazer also claims that since slavery and other acts of discrimination happened
not with an underlying deliberate teleology, affirmative action as a purposive corrective
measure is remiss of the non-partisan role of the government in encouraging an action
aimed at the advancement of the minority ethnic groups in America. Ethnic minorities
who were discriminated against thus far must be declared free to pursue their dreams in
16

In status societies, prevalent philosophies emphasize a type of fatalistic determinism in explaining the
present plight of people. In such societies, the philosophy of present and future are ineluctably intertwined
with the philosophy of the past. Such a philosophy effectively maintains the status quo. An example would
be the caste system in India.
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the same way as other Americans. Glazer cleverly separates economic affirmative action
as distinct from political discrimination. Glazer claims that since political and ideological
discrimination were perpetrated on the blacks and other minorities, a restoration of the
political rights would alleviate the problem of discrimination.

On the surface, Glazer’s proposition is attractive. Glazer’s suggestion is passable
as a liberal theory sans Rawls’ difference principle and definitely supports Nozick’s
‘night watchman state.’ But what Glazer fails to mention is that the manifestation of
ideological deprivation is not only in the political realm. Ideological oppression is a
malnourishment of cultural, social, political, economic, and healthy individual
development. By denying the basic necessities of human life, the growth of the oppressed
people is stunted which is in turn used as a tool of justification for their underdevelopment, thereby justifying more repression. Cultural repression is a human rights
violation.

For a more natural evolution and justification of the institution of slavery, Glazer
needs to compare slavery in America with Indian caste-system. It is interesting to
compare the history of the United States and the history of India. One can cite thousands
of glorious verses from the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Bhagawad Gita, Buddhist and
Jain canons and other philosophical, religious, and literary works about the ecumenical
strands of Indian philosophy.17 In the Bhagawad Gita, Lord Krishna goes as far to say
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that a liberated soul must not discriminate between a man, a dog or an untouchable.18
Does this mean that the general Indian population is to be likened to a Yogi? On the
contrary, the emphasis on the liberated soul affirms the discriminatory nature of ordinary
citizens. On the other hand, Habermas concedes that Western tradition, especially the
institution of religion, has not been fair towards other religions.

Multiculturalism in America is to be viewed in terms of enrichment of social
mosaic and the American populace must become willing participants in making America
a cultural melting pot. A multi-cultural democracy is the tottering first step towards
becoming a cultural melting pot. Glazer is correct in arguing that the non-ethnic character
of America has contributed to a sense of freedom to multi-ethnic and multi-religious
population that were allowed into America in greater numbers after 1965. But what
Glazer did not take into account is that America is not an isolated continent. America has
a foreign policy and also makes decisions with regard to its relationship with other
countries, which would have good or bad consequences.

An America that encourages possessive individualism in the garb of freedom and
simplifies ethnicity in terms of exotic cuisines, attires, cultural artifacts, and few catchy
phrases will not be able to utilize the cultural advantages that accrue out of being a multicultural democracy. What Glazer in a catchy phrase calls ‘salutary neglect’ of cultural
politics but not of ethnic-cultural freedom to run schools, religious institutions, and
indulge in cultural activities has been advantageous and disadvantageous at once for
18
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America. The advantage of American politics and not cultural-ethnic politics has kept the
focus on the American dream. On the other hand, disruptive features of ethno-cultural
politics have always been outside the American cultural paradigm, which has led to a
fragmented foreign policy. Because of a flawed social epistemological framework that
encourages avoidance and tolerance of other cultures and not constructive engagement,
the American intelligentsia and the government reveled in the self-congratulatory nature
of the American dream and failed to recognize the gathering danger outside the American
continent. The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks on the 11th of September were a
stark reminder for all countries to sincerely engage their cultural minorities socially and
politically. Cultural interaction must be facilitated between people at all levels: between
nations and between communities. Only when people recognize others as socially
embedded with similar concerns in their lives in all cultures will there be a genuine
interaction. Only a cooperative action among various cultures can facilitate multi-cultural
understanding.
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